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7KLVVWXG\VHHNVWRFRQWULEXWHWRWKHOLWHUDWXUHRQ5XVVLD¶Vpolitical and economic transition by 
reframing how we understand the role institutions play in transitioning away from a command 
economy by examining the effects of economic crises on the development of banking 
institutions. Attempts to explain the state of Russia¶s transition often fail to address the 
institutional influences that shape the polity and society. As such, the common explanation for 
5XVVLD¶VSUHVHQWHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOVWDWHLVWKDWLWVWUDQVLWLRQDZD\IURPFRPPXQLVPDQG
a command economy failed. Most scholars focus on individuals or groups of economic and 
political agents to understand how and why this transition failed. While this provides vital 
analysis of the decisions made at the start of transition and their consequences, it fails to 
examine what led to the decisions in the first place. Furthermore, it also falls short of explaining 
why genuine attempts at reform are often undermined by the reformers themselves. Even where 
this contradiction is acknowledged, few scholars attempt to solve this puzzle. This study 
hypothesises that the clue to solving this puzzle is deeper than individual actions and decisions 
² it lies in the inability to fully dismantle communist and command economic institutions. As 
VXFK5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLRQKDVQRWIDLOHGEHFDXVHLW is incomplete. This study argues that Russia 
is trapped in partial reform equilibrium. This chapter will develop and explore this argument 
E\ILUVWRXWOLQLQJWKHUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQEHIRUHDQDO\VLQJRWKHUVFKRODUV¶DWWHPSWVWRDQVZHULW
and why they are incomplete. Next, partial reform equilibrium, its strengths and weaknesses as 
D WKHRUHWLFDO IUDPHZRUN DQG KRZ LW FDQ EH XVHG WR XQGHUVWDQG 5XVVLD¶V WUDQVLWLRQ ZLOO EH
defined. Finally, what this study hopes to achieve in the subsequent chapters will be outlined. 
 
1.1 Contemporary Russian Political economy issues and research question 
7KLV VWXG\¶V PDLQ DUJXPHQW LV WKDW 5XVVLD¶V HFRQRPLF WUDQVLWLRQ KDV VWDOOHG EHFDXVH LW LV
trapped in partial reform equilibrium: it is no longer a communist, command economy, but it 
is not a market economy either. This phenomenon prevents the formation of strong institutions, 
which is seen most starkly in the development of the banking industry. However, because ideal 
types of neither communism, capitalism, nor democracy exist, WKHWHUPµPDUNHW¶ LVQRWYHU\
helpful. All market economies are regulated by the state to a certain extent, and all command 
economies are driven by production. For the purposes of this study, I am concerned with 
5XVVLD¶V WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ IURP D V\VWHP WKDW is primarily command to one that is primarily 
PDUNHW,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRFODULI\WKDWE\PDUNHWHFRQRP\,UHIHUWR.DUO3RODQ\L¶VGHILQLWLRQ
  2 
of a market as an insWLWXWLRQ µGLUHFWHG E\ QRWKLQJ EXW PDUNHW SULFHV« DQG LV FDSDEOH RI
organising the whole of economic life without outside help or interference¶1 In most modern 
market economies, government regulations prevent the market institution from impinging upon 
the wellbeing of society, yet this ultimately does not undermine the role the institution is 
supposed to play. This distinction is important as this study seeks to reframe how we 
understand the modernisation and transition paradigm as applied to Post-Soviet Russia, by 
demonstrating that the absence of institutions has stalled the transition. It is far less about the 
laws and rules that define whether an economy is a market ² it is about the strength of 
institutional practices, RUKRZDFWRUV¶H[SHFWDWLRQVWKDWWhe law will be enforced constrains and 
influences their behaviour.   
$VRQHRIWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWDQGPRVWSRZHUIXOFRXQWULHVFRQWDLQLQJVRPHRIWKHPRVW
precious natural resources, it was widely assumed that Russia, with the help of international 
organisations (The IMF, World Bank, EBRD) as political and economic consultants, would 
complete its transition from a command to market economy in a timely manner. Yet, its 
transition remains frozen and, in some instances, has even reverted to old command practices. 
From the late 1990s through the mid-2000s, Russian gross domestic product (GDP) grew 
rapidly. During Vladimir Putin¶VILUVWWZRSUHVLGHQWLDOWHUPVIURP± 2008, the GDP grew 
by 6.7 percent per year on average.2 Because of this, the government was able to repay most 
of its foreign debt, and the state used its massive budget surpluses to create a stability fund of 
over $100 billion in case of economic hardship.3 Furthermore, the average citizen saw an 
increase in living standards, as GDP per capita rose by an average of 5.5 percent and 
unemployment fell every year from 2000 to 2012, except in 2009.4  
However, this economic growth was due to rising gas and oil prices, not economic 
diversification. As gas and oil prices flagged because of the 2008 economic crisis, so too did 
5XVVLD¶VDQQXDO*'3JURZWK, and its stabilisation fund was quickly drawn down. Nevertheless, 
despite the uncertainty caused by reliance on hydrocarbons, the extent of Russia¶Vprogress 
towards economic diversification is debatable. The country has plenty of other resources 
available aside from gas, oil, and other minerals. For example, Russia could foster economic 
                                                 
1
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1944). 
2
 Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: Putin's 
Crackdown Holds Russia Back," Foreign Affairs 81, 1. (2008): 68 - 84. 
3
 Hilary Appel, "Is It Putin or Is It Oil? Explaining Russia's Fiscal Recovery," Post-Soviet Affairs 24, 
4. (2004): 301 - 23. 
4
 The World Bank. "Russian GDP Per Capita 1991 - 2012,"  2012. ; The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. "Unemployment Rate 2000 - 2012,"  2012.  
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growth through the creation of small and medium-sized enterprises. However, weak economic 
institutions undermine this diversification. For example, there is no expectation that private 
property rights will be enforced, which is UHIOHFWHGLQ5XVVLD¶VFRQVLVWHQWO\ORZUDQNLQJVLQWKH
:RUOG%DQN¶Vµ(DVHRI'RLQJ%XVLQHVV¶VXUYH\5 $VVXFKLI5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLRQto a market 
was indeed complete, then its economy would more accurately reflect this; not just in the 
growth of GDP, but also in the fairness and predictability of its institutions. Thus, economic 
strength is not only measured by growth and living standards, but also by the strength of rule 
of law: the expectation that laws will be fairly and consistently enforced. Strong rule of law 
ensures the protection of property rights, which is essential to economic growth. However, rule 
of law can only be as strong as the institutions that enforce it. If rule of law is weak, then 
economic growth is easily compromised, and thus not evidence of economic strength or 
robustness. As such, weak rule of law signifies weak institutions, which undermines the 
correlation between economic growth and modernisation. 
7REHWWHUGHPRQVWUDWHWKDW5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLRQLVVWDOOHGDQGWRHVWDEOLVKLWDVDQRXWOLHU
I ran two OLS linear regressions, which illustrated the levels of GDP in predicting the strength 
of rule of law against other explanatory variables such as income inequality, population, 
JHRJUDSKLFDO ORFDWLRQ DQG OHYHOV RI GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ 8VLQJ WKH :RUOG %DQN¶V UXOH RI ODZ
indicator, I found that for every $1,000 increase in GDP per capita, there was a 2.8 percent 
increase in strength of rule of law.6 Although the levels of democratisation, determined using 
)UHHGRP +RXVH¶V µIUHH¶ µSDUWLDOO\ IUHH¶ DQG µQRW IUHH¶ FODVVLILFDWLRQV DOVR VKRZHG VWURQJ
correlation to the strength of rule of law, it was not as significant a predictor as GDP per capita. 
This finding is significant because it supports the argument that economic growth will provide 
incentives to develop a strong rule of law to maintain said growth.7 It would follow that if 
5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLRQZDVFRPSOHWHWKHQWKHVWUHQJWKRILWVrule of law would increase as its GDP 
grows.  Yet, aVLWV*'3SHUFDSLWDKDVJURZQ5XVVLD¶VUXOHRIODZUDQNLQJKDVUHPDLQHGORZ
never rising above -.77. The objective of this study is to determine why Russia deviates from 
                                                 
5
 Richard Sakwa, "Systemic Stalemate: Reiderstvo and the Dual State," in The Political Economy of 
Russia, ed. Neil Robinson (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2013).; The World Bank, 
"Ease of Doing Business in the Russian Federation," The World Bank Group, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/russia. 
6
 World Bank governance indicator for rule of law measures the strength of rule of law on a scale of -
2.5 being the weakest and 2.5 being the strongest. The results refer to a 2.8 percent increase in the score. 
2.8 is not a score itself. See Appendix I for regression.   
7
 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990).; Douglass North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, 
(Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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the norm. If its GDP has been steadily growing, but its institutions have not strengthened along 
with the growth, then why do the institutions remain weak?  
0RVW WUDGLWLRQDODQVZHUV WR WKLVTXHVWLRQVXFK DV WKHVWDWH¶VGHSHQGHQFHRQQDWXUDO
resource exports to fund modernisation projects cannot withstand further interrogation. The 
most compelling arguments are those of Jeffrey Kahn, Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way, Thomas 
&DURWKHUV -RHO+HOOPDQ DQGRWKHU VFKRODUVZKRSRLQW WR5XVVLD¶V IDLOXUH WR LPSOHPHQW DQ
effective system of the rule of law, thereby allowing political elites to use the system for 
personal gain. Other scholars, such as Douglass North, Barry Weingast, and others, place the 
blame on weak institutions, arguing that a strong rule of law depends on strong institutions. 
Yet, Russia has created and passed multiple policies and laws aimed at strengthening 
institutions, but these measures have not resulted in actual institutional development. If 
5XVVLD¶VHFRQRPLF LQVWLWXWLRQVVKRXOGVWUengthen as its economy grows, why has there been 
little to no change in these institutions over time? The following section examines the more 
complex and competing theories that attempt to explDLQ5XVVLD¶VVWDOOHGWUDQVLWLRQ 
 
1.2 Literature review 
This section will examine both the contributions to and gaps in the literature to provide a 
foundation for WKLV VWXG\¶V PDLQ DUJXPHQW WKDW 5XVVLD¶V institutions are trapped in partial 
reform equilibrium. The challenges Russia faces in its transition to a market economy are 
complex. The scholars who attempt to unpack these issues span a variety of disciplines, 
including history, anthropology, economics, and political science. Each of these scholars has 
made a significant contribution to our understanding of how Russia became what it is today, 
and the various facets of contemporary problems it faces. However, very little of the literature 
answers the question of why, despite attempts to change, Russia remains trapped in transition? 
First, this section will examine the historical and cultural explanations, which explain how 
Russia reached its current state and how its economy currently functions. Second, it will 
analyse the various political science and development studies theories on democratisation and 
what these contribute to our understanding of 5XVVLD¶V WUDQVLWLRQ. Next, we will look at 
historical institutionalism, how it understands and analyses political and economic transitions, 
DQG KRZ ZH FDQ XVH WKLV WR XQGHUVWDQG 5XVVLD¶V WUDQVLWLRQ )LQDOO\ the partial reform 
equilibrium argument, the debates surrounding it, what it contributes to our understanding of 
economic transitions, and how this study contributes to our understanding of partial reform is 
clarified and enumerated.  
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Socio-cultural and historical explanations 
This approach examines how historical and cultural practices have both informed and 
XQGHUPLQHG5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLRQ7KHKLVWRULFDOSHUVSHFWLYHDUJXHVWKDW5XVVLDKDVUHYHUWHGWR
authoritarianism because of the weight of its historical legacy. For example, Gregoire Pop-
Eleches, in his statistical analysis to determine influential factors of regime change, found that 
historical legacy at the outset of transition was the best predictor of successful 
democratisation.8 He argues that because of the lack of experience in democratic practices, 
Russia and other post-communist and post-Soviet states will be unable to properly undertake 
elections, adapt to a market economy, or fully throw off the chains of its past regimes. 
Furthermore, Stefan Hedlund illustrates how various historical practices and behaviours are 
path-GHSHQGHQW DQG VKDSH 5XVVLD¶V FRQWHPSRUDU\ SROLWLFDO DQG HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW
Hedlund argues that the critical juncture for these practices are pre-Soviet, often dating back 
to the dawn of the Russian Empire.9 This argument is reinforced by studies of cultural memory, 
which examine how narratives of oppression by socialist powers have allowed many other 
socialist states to idealise pre-socialist practices and reinstate them.10 Russia does not have such 
D QDUUDWLYH EHFDXVH LW GRHV QRW KDYH WKH VDPH KLVWRU\ ,Q IDFW 5XVVLD¶V KLVWRULFDO WUDGLWLRQ
glorifies strong Russian leaders such as Peter the Great and even Joseph Stalin.11 
An extension of the historical perspective is the sociological and anthropological 
approach to transition, which examines how Russians themselves reinforce these historical 
practices. For example, Alena Ledeneva¶V seminal studies on the role of blat RURQH¶VVRFLDO
network, and sistema or what drives social, economic, and political interactions.12 Ledeneva 
illustrates how social networks have created informal institutions where formal ones have 
                                                 
8
 Grigore Pop-Eleches, "Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change," Journal of Politics 
69, 4. (2007): 908 - 26. Also see: Richard Pipes, "Fight for Freedom: What Russians Think and Want," 
Foreign Affairs 83, 3. (2004): 9 - 15. 
9
 Stefan Hedlund, Russian Path Dependence, Routledge Studies in the European Economy (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2012).; Stefan Hedlund, "Path Dependence in Russian Policy Making: Constraints on 
Putin's Economic Choice," Post-Communist Economies 12, 4. (2000): 389 - 407. 
10
 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).; Richard Esbenshade, "Remembering to Forget: 
Memory, History, National Identity in Postwar East-Central Europe and after 1989," Representations 
49,  (1995): 72 - 96. 
11
 Pipes, 2004.; Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia: The Journey from Gorbachev's Freedom 
to Putin's War (London: Atlantic Books, 2015). 286.  
12
 Alena V. Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise? : Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance 
(2013); Alena Ledeneva, "Telephone Justice in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 24, 4. (2008): 324 - 50; 
Alena Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices the Shaped Post-Soviet Politics 
and Business (New York: Cornell University Press, 2006); Alena Ledeneva, Russia's Economy of 
Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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failed. These practices extend to the government, with Vladimir Putin using his own social 
networks to protect government interests.13 Of course, resorting to blat over established rules 
and institutions weakens the institutions themselves. Importantly, as Ledeneva points out, these 
actions are often subconscious.14 People want more political accountability and economic 
opportunities, but they do not realise that their everyday actions undermine the foundations 
necessary for those two things.  
The historical and cultural arguments illustrate the institutional behaviours and 
practices that are left over from previous eras, and how they have FRPSOLFDWHG 5XVVLD¶V
transition. This context is an essential foundation for understanding what might be 
complicating 5XVVLD¶Vtransition. However, these arguments do little to explain why, despite 
the genuine attempts to end these practices, they fail. Understanding what complicates or 
GHOD\V5XVVLD¶V WUDQVLWLRQ LV LPSRUWDQWEXW LW LV RQO\SDUW RI WKHVWRU\$OO V\VWHPVFKDQJH
Russia is no exception. Yet, for those scholars who take historical, sociological, or cultural 
approaches, change is beyond the scope of their argument. Thus, while this study does indeed 
seek to understand what is preventing Russia from completing its transition, it is more 
concerned with why Russia has not been able to move past these legacies and practices despite 
attempts to do so.  
 
Democratisation and hybrid regimes 
The literature on democratisation and regime type provides YDOXDEOH LQVLJKW LQWR 5XVVLD¶V
transition problems. This body of literature is composed of two competing criteria for 
evaluating transitions: either by the stage of the transition, or the regime type that has resulted. 
Democratisation literature is based on the argument that the transition to democracy takes place 
in stages. For states to undertake a successful transition to democracy, certain preconditions 
must be met before moving on to each stage, the final stage being a consolidated democracy.15 
These preconditions generally include the need for a strong national identity and national unity, 
sometimes emerging in the aftermath of civil strife, political struggles, and economic 
                                                 
13
 Stephen; Kryshtanoyskaya White, Olga, "Putin's Militocracy," Post-Soviet Affairs 19, 4. (2003): 289 
- 306. Joel Hellman, Daniel Kauffman, and Geraint Jones, "'Seize the State, Seize the Day' : State 
Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition" The World Bank Group, 2000. 
14
 Ledeneva, (2013). Loc. 163. 
15
 Rustow Dankwart, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2, 
3. (1970): 337 - 63.; Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is...And Is Not," 
Journal of Democracy 2, 3. (1991).; North.  
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development.16 Democratisation literature is not concerned with how to catalyse democratic 
transitions, because its various theories argue that the entire process must be organic and 
grassroots. As such, transitions are lengthy and complicated. These studies provide a 
framework through which we can determine what stage of transition Russia is in, or what 
preconditions it fails to satisfy.   
Democratisation literature can be further divided into two schools: sequencing and 
gradualism. Sequencing contends that states should first construct a strong foundation of rule 
of law through institutional development before undertaking political and economic 
competition.17 Sequentialists argue that ensuring strong institutions are upheld by a strong rule 
of law is the only way democracy can flourish; not ensuring this risks the formation of an 
illiberal democracy.18 Furthermore, they argue that sequencing forces states and international 
advisors to reckon with historical precedents that would complicate the transition if they were 
to be ignored, which they argue gradualists do.19 Gradualists, on the other hand argue that 
democracy and political competition can take place inside the framework of nascent 
institutions, which will later develop to meet the needs of the polity and economy.20 The 
contention is that if democratisation is postponed until rule of law can support strong 
institutions, then the postponement could become indefinite.21 Instead, they argue that it is 
better to try and democratise from the beginning and focus on adjusting and developing 
institutions as the transition proceeds.22   
Those who focus on issues of regime type flip the argument and question the necessity 
of a democratic government as a precondition for strong rule of law and the corresponding 
political and economic freedoms. These scholars examine the plethora of so-called hybrid 
regimes, or those states that cannot be classified as either democratic or authoritarian.23 This 
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body of literature argues that the assumption that all states are transitioning to a democracy is 
IDOVHDQGWKDWLWLVWLPHWRHQGWKHµWUDQVLWLRQSDUDGLJP¶24 It follows that transition has ended 
in what many still consider transition states. Thus, what we see as a flawed or failed transition 
is neither, it is just the result of the change that took place. For these scholars, it is more 
important to look at what influenced the trajectory of development rather than evaluate it on a 
scale of political aspiration. This allows us to understand that democracy is not the only goal 
of political transition, and that studying non-democratic transitions is not any less important.  
Yet, the literature on democratisation and hybrid regimes does not really satisfy the 
question of why Russian government drafts and approves reform measures, but cannot 
implement or enforce them. In the first instance, democratisation literature is too concerned 
with the conditions necessary for democratisation. While this is helpful in evaluating where 
Russia may fall along that trajectory given the problem at hand, it does little to resolve it. 
Second, the literature on hybrid regimes would require the abandonment of the transition 
paradigmEHFDXVHLWZRXOGDUJXHWKDW5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLRQLVFRPSOHWHEXWXQGHPRFUDWLF. While 
it is helpful in demonstrating that not all transitions have or should have democratic aspirations, 
WKHQRWLRQWKDW5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLRQLVFRPSOHWH is false. The beginning of any major political or 
economic reform requires institutional transformation to support and reinforce change. This 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQLVQRWTXLFNDQGUHTXLUHVWULDODQGHUURU,WLVDUJXHGWKDW5XVVLD¶VLQVWLWXWLRQV
are still changing and, therefore, its transition is not yet complete. 
 
Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalists argue that the success or failure of political and economic transition 
OLHVLQWKHVWUHQJWKRIDVWDWH¶VLQVWLWXWLRQV$VLOOXVWUDWHGE\6DPXHO+XQWLQJWRQWKHIDLOXUHWR
focus on institutional development during times of transition will lead to political decay.25 
,QVWLWXWLRQVDUHGHILQHGDVµ«WKHKXPDQO\GHYLVHGFRQVWUDLQWVWKDWVKDSHKXPDQLQWHUDFWLRQ
In consequence, they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or 
HFRQRPLF¶26 Furthermore, these institutional constraints are embodied by organisations or 
agencies, and enforced by individual agents.27 These organisations are the institutional tools 
by which regulations and policies are enforced and upheld. As such, institutionalists examine 
                                                 
24
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how institutions shape political and economic behaviour and outcomes.28 By extension, they 
are also concerned with how institutions are made and strengthened, as well as the sources of 
weakness and decay. The strength or weakness of institutions translates into the strength or 
weakness of the rule of law, and how well conflicts are mediated.29 Using this approach to 
DQDO\VH5XVVLD¶s transition is the most useful. If institutions are weak or underdeveloped, then 
reforms cannot be implemented despite the good intentions of policy makers.  
 Samuel Huntington argues that institutional development and modernisation are 
complimentary goals, as modernisation cannot take place in the absence of strong institutions.30 
He lists four measures of institutional strength: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and 
coherence. 31 The more of these criteria that institutions meet, the stronger they are. Thus, 
Huntington and other institutionalists argue for focusing on institutional development before 
modernisation. The distinction is important because the reforms and policies formulated during 
the transition aimed at modernising the Russian economy and government could only be 
enforced by strong, stable institutions. Without the institutions to support and implement the 
transition reforms, the transition cannot be completed. The problem is that path dependency 
UHLQIRUFHV LQVWLWXWLRQDO GHVLJQ µDFWRUV¶ H[SHFWDWLRQV DERXW LQVWLWXWLRQDO HQIRUFHPHQW DQG
VWDELOLW\VKDSHWKHLUDSSURDFKWRLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHVLJQ¶32 Thus, weak institutions are likely to be 
replicated. 
 Francis Fukuyama argues that economic growth, stimulated by industrial and economic 
revolutions or modernisations, forces changes in institutions to protect everything from 
property rights to labour laws.33 Furthermore, Douglass North and Barry Weingast explore the 
intricate relationship between institutional and economic strength, dividing states into limited 
or open social access orders based on their institutional development. Open access order 
(OAO) states have strong institutions, a high level of rule of law, and stronger and more 
prosperous economies.34 In these states, economic laws are clearly stated and imposed equally 
                                                 
28
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on everyone, which creates an expectation that the laws will be consistently enforced. Limited 
access orders (LAO), by contrast, limit opportunities of wealth maximisation to a select group 
of players, who can construct barriers to wealth maximisation by manipulating weak 
institutions to favour themselves.35 Weak institutions result in laws that are inconsistent and 
unpredictable, making it impossible for economic players outside the elite to adequately plan 
and invest in their long-term interests. As such, a general measure of institutional strength 
could be economic growth or development: the more the economy grows, the stronger its 
institutions are likely to be. 
As illustrated by Claus Offe, the transition that the post-Soviet states must make is 
unique as it has three objectives: it must simultaneously transition toward a market economy, 
a democracy, and form a common national identity.36 However, these three goals are divergent, 
making the transition incredibly difficult. Other states that have transitioned to democracy 
since the end of WWII have not had to face the geographic disintegration of their country or 
the complete transformation of their economies.37 When the Soviet Union collapsed, fifteen 
new governments, nationalities, central banks, currencies, and borders appeared. All formerly 
communist countries, both Soviet and non-Soviet, have had to completely reorient their 
HFRQRPLHV¶LQFHQWLYHVWKDWGULve economic growth and development from the state to private 
enterprise, and from a planned to a market economy. Offe points out that undertaking the triple 
transition of national identity, democracy, and market economy, simultaneously is 
impossible.38 CombLQHGZLWK+XQWLQJWRQ¶VREVHUYDWLRQVRQKRZPRGHUQLVDWLRQLQWKHDEVHQFH
of strong institutions can cause decay, we can conclude that Russia, in trying to undertake all 
three tasks simultaneously, has become stuck in partial reform equilibrium, with weak 
institutions that have stalled its economic transition.  
 
1.3 Partial reform equilibrium 
When any state, post-communist or otherwise, enters a phase of economic transition, the 
immediate result will be a reduction in living standards for most of the population (the so-
FDOOHG µORVHUV¶ 7KLV SHULRG DV WHUPHG E\ -DQRV .RUQDL LV D µWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDO UHFHVVLRQ¶
caused by the implementation of hard budget constraints (HBCs): unproductive firms will 
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close, subsidies will be cut, credit repayment will be enforced, and barter transactions will 
cease.39 The effects of a transformational recession are rising unemployment and prices, cutting 
benefits, and closing existing economic loopholes. This was a drastic change for Russia, as 
there was no official unemployment rate until the 1990s. There was also no such thing as 
bankruptcy because there were no mechanisms for recalling a debt, only prolonging or 
forgiving it. For example, the Central Bank of the Soviet Union only accepted payments in 
kind; they were not allowed to accept monetary payments.40 The long-term objective is for the 
changes created by a transformational recession to eventually result in a robust market 
economy with more potential. New firms will be created and old firms that avoid liquidation 
will increase efficiency, quality, and profits. This will lead to job creation, increased wealth, 
and an increased standard of living.   
Just as the transformational recession takes its toll on most of the population, it benefits 
a select group individuals that Joel Hellman calls µZLQQHUV¶7KH\DUHDSWO\QDPHGDVWKH\DUH
the select few who benefit economically from the transition: they earn increased profits on 
goods and resources that maintain production subsidies, but can be sold at the market prices; 
use influence to gain control of powerful and successful enterprises in order to pocket profits 
instead of reinvesting them; rack up debt by taking out large loans with the intention of 
defaulting knowing that the state has no mechanism to enforce repayment; and the list 
continues. As transition proceeds and reforms are implemented, these loopholes should close, 
and the standard of living should increase.  
However, +HOOPDQDUJXHVWKDWWKHµZLQQHUV¶FDQXVHWKHLULQIOXHQFHHFRQRPLFSROLWLFDO
or otherwise, to stall reforms and trap the economy in a halfway state between command and 
market. Hellman defines this phenomenon DV SDUWLDO UHIRUP HTXLOLEULXP RU µWKH VHOHFWHG
introduction of market mechanisms into an economy in which substantial spheres of economic 
activity sWLOORSHUDWHDFFRUGLQJWRDOWHUQDWLYHPHFKDQLVPVRIFRRUGLQDWLRQ¶41 In other words, 
by freezing the transition from command to market economy, contradictory practices from both 
economic systems exist simultaneously. The result is a limited access order that preserves the 
ORRSKROHVFUHDWHGE\WKHWUDQVLWLRQDQGPDLQWDLQVWKHµZLQQHUV¶DELOLW\WRSURILWDWWKHH[SHQVH
of everyone else. Furthermore, it creates an economic incentive to maintain partial reform 
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equilibrium. Some countries, notably Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary were able to close 
WKHVHORRSKROHVDQGSUHYHQWWKHµZLQQHUV¶IURPKDYLQJWRRPXFKLQIOXHQFH7KLVVWXG\DUJXHV
that while Russia is trapped in partial reform equilibrium, it was not deliberately caused by the 
µZLQQHUV¶DQGLWKDVEHHQunable to break this equilibrium, which has stalled its transition.  
2QH RI WKHSULPDU\ FULWLFLVPV DJDLQVW+HOOPDQ¶V WKHRU\ LV WKDW LW UHTXLUHV FROOHFWLYH
DFWLRQRQWKHSDUWRIWKHµZLQQHUV¶RUWKHHOLWHV42 While Hellman implies this is the case, he 
does not state it as an outright condition.43 Upon closer inspection, collective action is not 
QHFHVVDU\IRUSDUWLDOUHIRUPHTXLOLEULXPWRWDNHURRWEHFDXVHµZLQQHUV¶DFWLQJLQGLYLGXDOO\FDQ
cause partial reform. In fact, partial reform is better sustained when the elites cannot act 
collectively. Studies have found that necessary economic social reforms are more likely to be 
avoided when socio-economic actors have diverging interests.44 This ensures that no consistent 
measure or reform of any kind can be implemented. Evidence of this is often seen in the 
piecemeal ways UHIRUPHUV KDYH SDWFKHG ODZV WRJHWKHU DV HDFK µZLQQHU¶ LQVLVWV WKDW their 
interests are protected. Partial reform equilibrium could be sustained based on these laws alone. 
,IWKHµZLQQHUV¶FRXOGFROOHctively agree on what to implement and what to exclude, the laws 
would be much clearer and easier to navigate and enforce.  
The second disagreement that scholars have with Hellman is perhaps more substantial. 
Hellman argues that partial reform equilibrium is a freeze on the further implementation of 
reforms. These partially implemented reforms prevent further changes to laws or policies. 
However, this is not an accurate description of partial reform equilibrium. Russia has 
implemented many policies and changed numerous laws since the 1990s. Many scholars, such 
DV1HLO5RELQVRQXVHWKH5XVVLDQH[DPSOHWRUHIXWH+HOOPDQ¶VWKHRU\45 In contrast to these 
scholars, I argue that policy changes alone do not preclude the existence of partial reform 
equilibrium. The question driving this research specifically seeks to answer why reforms have 
not been fully implemented. If partial reform equilibrium did not exist in Russia, then the 
development of its institutions would have continued unfettered or not been addressed at all. 
Furthermore, where this study disagrees with Hellman is that partial reform equilibrium is not 
D SUREOHP RI DJHQF\ EXW VWUXFWXUH +HOOPDQ¶V HUURU DV ZHOO DV WKDW RI PDQ\ RI WKH RWKHU
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scholars mentioned above, is his overwhelming focus on the direcWLQWHQWLRQVRIWKHµZLQQHUV¶
and other elites involved in policy making, rather than on the institutional forces that drive 
them. Decisions are not made in a vacuum ² the organisations, agencies, and agents 
responsible for upholding institutional practices will act upon the incentives provided by the 
institution itself. 
Partial reform equilibrium prevents institutional development from taking place by 
maintaining practices that undermine and contradict each other. As mentioned above, if path 
dependency sets in, these partially reformed institutions will be weak and self-replicating, 
making them extraordinarily difficult to develop and strengthen. This is likely to happen in 
states where modernisation is undertaken at the expense of institutional development, à la 
Huntington. Thus, if states, like Russia, become more preoccupied with implementing reforms 
such as privatisation and democratisation in the absence of strong institutions, then 
modernising reforms will continue to undermine the very institutions required for their 
implementation. Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, modernisation reforms were 
prioritised over institutional reform and development. This drive for modernisation over 
development increased once Russia was an independent state and attempted to meet various 
conditions set by international advisors.46 ,Q IDFW LPSOHPHQWLQJ µERUURZHG LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ RU
institutions that were not formed and developed by the state or culture in question, is one of 
the key causes of institutional weakness.47 Thus, it is the endurance of partially reformed 
institutions that undermines genuine attempts to upset partial reform equilibrium.   
 
7KHµQRW-so-JUHDW¶WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ 
.DUO3RODQ\L¶VVHPLQDOZRUNThe Great Transformation, provides a framework through which 
ZHFDQXQGHUVWDQGDQGDQDO\VHSDUWLDOUHIRUPHTXLOLEULXP7KHSUHPLVHRI3RODQ\L¶VERRNLV
that a market economy is not a natural phenomenon. Market economies were constructed by 
man and society beginning in the late eighteenth century. A market economy, according to 
Polanyi, is an institution and thus must be developed and strengthened.48 He defines a market 
economy as a self-UHJXODWLQJV\VWHPWKDW LVµGLUHFWHGE\QRWKLQJEXWPDUNHWSULFHV«DQG LV
capable of organising the whole of economic life without RXWVLGH KHOS RU LQWHUIHUHQFH¶49 
Furthermore, Polanyi differentiates between an economic system and a market economy. In 
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economic systems that are not markets, the economy is merely a function of the social order, 
whereas a market society is subordinated to market institutions.50 The market determines the 
most efficient way to produce and distribute goods and services based upon their supply and 
demand.51 Furthermore, to reinforce what was stated above, Polanyi demonstrates that 
governments intervene such that the market does not impinge upon the wellbeing of society, 
as market institutions do not consider things like environmental and human safety. Although 
no perfect market exists, the economy is primarily subordinated to market institutions.  
Market institutions have not fully developed in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and many of the economists advising Russia on its transition did not take previously 
existing norms and practices into consideration. The reformers subVFULEHGWRDµRQHVL]Hfits 
DOO¶PHQWDOLW\EHOLHYLQJWKDWLIFHUWDLQUHIRUPVFRXOGZRUNIRUVWDWHVOLNH+XQJDU\DQG3RODQG
then why not for Russia?52 This is because many of the reformers belonged to the classical 
school of economics, which believes that people will rationally respond to changes in price 
signals.53 +RZHYHU 3RODQ\L H[SODLQV WKDW µ2QO\ LQ WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO VHWWLQJ RI D PDUNHW DUH
PDUNHWODZVUHOHYDQW¶DQGSULFHVLJQDOVDUHIXQGDPHQWDOPDUNHWODZV54 Thus, market economic 
laws can only be imposed by corresponding institutions. As such, a command economy cannot 
satisfy the requirements of a market economy. The problem Russia faces is that its economic 
institutions are primarily command, while the laws and policies they are supposed to enforce 
or implement are primarily market. These two things contradict each other, and prevent 
institutional reform or economic transition from taking place, resulting in partial reform 
equilibrium.   
,W IROORZV WKDW 5XVVLD¶V LQVWLWXWLRQV FDQQRW DFFXUDWHO\ UHOLDEO\ RU FRQVLVWHQWO\
reproduce predictable behaviour, which warps the economic incentives of all agents, and 
perpetuates the reconstruction of weakened institutions. The result is a dual set of economic 
incentives within society and the government ² that of reciprocity (sistema or blat), but also 
of personal interest. Furthermore, we can categorise the two types of incentives by the 
contradictory types of economic systems: those that drive reciprocity, or systemic corruption, 
stem from both the feudal and command economies that were the root of Russian and Soviet 
economic life; those that drive personal interest, or venal corruption, stem from the market 
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institutions that have crept into the economic system. 
Furthermore, written laws do not always constrain political and economic behaviour, 
and constraints on said behaviour do not always come from written laws.55 Because of the 
weakness or absence of institutions to uphold reforms, new expectations and social / 
behavioural norms cannot be formed. As Polanyi notes, no society could exist without an 
economic system, but not all economic systems are market economies5XVVLD¶VHFRQomy has 
been through many systems. Before communism and the Soviet Union, one could argue that 
the economy remained feudal.56 This economic system was characterised by the importance of 
VRFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSVEHFDXVHLQGLYLGXDOVGLGQRWDFWµWRVDIHJXDUGWKHLUPDWHULDOSRVVHVVLRQVEXW
WRVDIHJXDUGWKHLUVRFLDOVWDQGLQJVRFLDOFODLPVDQGVRFLDOQHWZRUNV¶57 The Soviet government 
then spent a lot of time building command economic institutions, yet even those could not 
completely subordinate social relationships to the economy as a market can. As a result, what 
continues to generate expectations are pre-existing social norms, or what was referred to earlier 
as sistema.58  
 ,QKHUERRNµCan Russia Modernise?¶$OHQD/HGHQHYDGHVFULEHVsistema as a system 
of social relations and obligations that drive various aspects of Russian politics and 
economics.59 Sistema is the adherence to the informal and unwritten rules of what has come to 
EHNQRZQDVWKHµVKDGRZ¶RUµLQIRUPDO¶HFRQRP\/HGHQHYDH[SODLQVWKDWsistema emerged to 
fill voids left by weak or non-H[LVWHQW LQVWLWXWLRQV LQ WKH6RYLHW HUD µWR FRPSHQVDWH IRU WKH
GHIHFWV RI WKH FRPPDQG HFRQRP\¶ DQG LQ WKH SRVW-Soviet era to compensate for the 
ineffectiveness of the nascent and weak market institutions.60 Ledneva acknowledges that 
sistema has evolved and changed overtime, but its overall purpose has not.  
 There are five main tenants of sistema µ 7KH PHPEHUV RI HDFK QHWZRUk are tied 
together by an unwritten code; 2) members are recruited and kept based on loyalty; 3) all 
members are compromised in some way or another; 4) rewards and punishments are extra-
legally administered; 5) formal appointments to powerful positions support and reinforce the 
HQWLUH QHWZRUN¶61 The underlying social responsibilities of sistema are self-reinforcing and 
self-replicating by constructing obligations to remain loyal to the network and the system. The 
                                                 
55
 John Carey, "Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions," Comparative Political Studies 33, 6 / 7. (2000): 
735 - 61. 737. 
56
 Hedlund, Russian Path Dependence (2012). 223, 230.  
57
 Polanyi, (1944). 48. 
58
 Ledeneva, (2013). 
59
 Ibid. loc. 160 
60
 Ibid. loc. 702, loc. 217 
61
 Ibid. loc. 400 
  16 
second and third points are particularly useful: membership is based on loyalty ² all members 
of a group could be compromised at any time. If anyone in the group fails to uphold their 
obligations, the group could disavow and compromise them by turning the person in for any 
crimes they committed. This self-UHSOLFDWLQJV\VWHPWKHQIDOOVLQWR3RODQ\L¶VGHILQLWLRQRIDQ
economic system that is merely a function of social order as social ties and loyalty are far more 
important than economic profit (of course, the two are not mutually exclusive).  
There are several examples of how sistema, or the social economy, was reinforced as 
the Soviet Union collapsed. This is important because many of the reforms and programmes 
initiated both by Mikhail Gorbachev and the reformers after him, aimed to end these practices 
DV WKH\ XQGHUPLQHG WKH HFRQRP\¶V SRWHQWLDO.62 Yet, by focusing on modernisation over 
institutional development, the reforms could not be properly implemented because social 
institutions intervened to protect the status quo. However, to start building a market economy, 
the status quo must be upset as hard budget constraints (HBCs) are imposed. HBCs lead to 
social disruption and a decline in standards of living for most people, as Hellman notes. Polanyi 
reinforces this throughout the rest of The Great Transformation by analysing how the 
construction of a market economy causes massive social dislocation.63 Therefore, if the 
difference between a market economy and a social economy is that in the latter is a function of 
society, and the former subordinates social relations and interactions to the supremacy of the 
market, then the transition from one to the other necessitates the destruction or transformation 
of the social economic relations. The next chapter will outline the methodology for illustrating 
how this transformation has failed to take place at the H[SHQVH RI 5XVVLD¶V HFRQRPLF
development. The most important implication being that the Russian economy is not a market 
economy ² it never has been. While it is no longer a command economy, it has not yet become 
a market economy. 
 
Argument 
This study argues that Russia has not been able to complete its economic transition and is not 
a market economy, because its institutions are trapped in partial reform equilibrium. Partially 
reformed institutions cannot implement or enforce the reforms necessary to complete the 
transition from a command to market economy. Furthermore, the focus on economic 
modernisation over institutional development perpetuates weak institutions as reformers and 
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politicians are more concerned with pushing through reforms than ensuring economic 
institutions have the capacity to implement them. Partial reform equilibrium results in 
parchment institutions, or institutions unable to undertake the tasks they have been set, and 
parchment rules, laws that cannot be implemented because there is no institutional capacity to 
do so.64 This results in a weak rule of law as there is no change or improvement to predicted 
behaviours or general expectations. This is evidenced by the inability of Russian banking 
institutions to strengthen and develop since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
If institutions are the socially constructed practices that determine how transactions and 
exchanges are undertaken, then laws are the codification of these practices, which are enforced 
by agencies and agents. As such, a strong rule of law is reflective of strong institutions. 
Conversely, weak institutions fundamentally prevent the development of the rule of law as 
informal practices clash with formal, written regulations. As a result, the law is not consistently 
enforced, and does not generate new or change pre-existing expectations. Jeffery Kahn outlines 
the three main principles of rule of law as: 1) there can be no crime without law; 2) the law is 
universally applied ² no one is above or out of reach of the law; 3) the law will be analysed 
and enforced by a neutral third party.65 Weak institutions do not abide by these principles. The 
defining characteristic of parchment rules are laws that have been written to solve a problem 
or reach an objective, yet their full enforcement is not possible because there is no institutional 
precedent to do so. Either the institution cannot provide the agency with mechanisms to enforce 
the law, or the mechanisms it possesses do not have the intended effects. Thus, weak 
institutions are unable to provide agents with the tools or guidelines to undertake the tasks they 
have been set, which renders laws vague and able to be widely interpreted.  
Examining how Russia violates all three of these principles illustrates how weak 
institutions cripple the rule of law. To begin, parchment rules create new laws that are not 
supposed to be broken, but their implementation often obscures what is or is not legal. Rarely 
do regulations become obligatory as there are always exceptions. In chapter three, it will be 
demonstrated that while these exceptions greatly benefit some individuals, the most important 
implication is in how they affect social norms and attitudes. The second principle is 
undermined by the inability of weak institutions provide agents with the foundations to 
consistently and predictably enforce laws. For example, elites use their blat or sistema to avoid 
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prosecution. It must be said that rarely do these individuals outright break the law, but they 
violate its spirit and bend it to their purposes, further obfuscating the purpose and efficacy of 
the law. 66  Further complicating matters is the tendency towards rule by law, or the selective 
implementation of laws, a defining feature of the social economy. Rule by law is a tool used 
penalise defectors in sistema: everyone is guilty of something, but only those that betray the 
group are punished. Those who are prosecuted receive punishments that are not commensurate 
with the crime they committed.  
Importantly, the third principle is undermined because judges cannot create legal 
precedence when legal interpretation varies widely and implementation is selective. Ledeneva 
demonstrates that while politicians and elites do not actively make phone calls to judges to 
sway verdicts, sistema encourages judges to rule in their own interest as well as that of the 
social network to which they belong.67 Judges know that anything can be used to indict them, 
thus forcing them to make decisions that will not bring down the proverbial sword of 
Damocles.68 Outside the judicial system, weak institutions further obfuscate the enforcement 
of laws. As institutions are incapable of properly enforcing laws, either because they do not 
possess the tools and mechanisms for enforcement or because the laws have too many 
loopholes. These parchment rules prevent neutral third parties from properly analysing and 
enforcing laws, thus making a consistent interpretation and application of the law to be difficult 
if not impossible.  
The result of weak economic agencies and rule of law is that institutional development 
is a painstaking and time-consuming process. Command economy institutions have not been 
destroyed, and market economy institutions have not yet been developed. Yet, a market 
economy requires strong institutions, as they generate expectations about the various possible 
outcomes of economic transactions. If laws are written and not enforced, then no new 
behavioural expectations can be formed. Thus, weak economic institutions mean that Russians 
cannot form expectations about how other economic agents will act. As a result, they 
consistently find it within their immediate interests to make decisions that will maximise their 
profits in the short-term. This undermines incentives to make long-term economic investments. 
Instead, reliance on old social economic functions remain ² individuals will only interact with 
and do business with other known and trusted entities. 
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This study focuses on 5XVVLD¶VXQGHUGHYHORSHGEDQNLQJ institutions, which clarifies 
how the transition has progressed very little even in the presence and creation of seemingly 
sound policies and laws. Weak institutions have resulted from a clash between informal and 
formal behavioural constraints, with the former undermining the latter.69 This allows differing 
individual preferences to become a priority and prevents collective action from achieving 
desired change.70 For example, transition reforms aimed at introducing market economy 
mechanisms such as privatisation and liberalisation fail to do so, because they have two 
contradictory goals: to allow for some privatisation and some liberalisation, but to also 
maintain the status quo and protect the social economy. The result is that command economy 
institutions are trying, and failing, to implement and enforce market economy laws. This is 
because command institutions are not founded upon the same practices and expectations as 
those in a market, and thus do not have the coordination mechanisms necessary to enforce 
market economy laws. Therefore, we arrive back at partial reform equilibrium, or the existence 
of command and market institutions simultaneously contradicting and undermining each other 
DQGKDOWLQJ5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLRQ 
7KH UHVXOW LV WKDW 5XVVLD¶V banking institutions struggle to perform their intended 
functions. As the laws banking agencies are supposed to enforce are constructed from 
institutional practices, weak institutions are self-replicating. The degree of law and policy 
enforcement often comes down to either the tools at the disposal of the organisation and its 
agents, and / or their interpretation of the law rather than a clear and consistent interpretation 
by all enforcement parties (police, lawyers, judges, etc.). This lack of consistency undermines 
the legitimacy of the institution. Furthermore, weak institutions provide agencies with tools 
that are ineffective and do not reflect social norms and practice. This incentivises the use of 
social networks to compensate for tKH DJHQFLHV¶ incompetence, and to exploit institutional 
weaknesses that further undermine institutional legitimacy. Therefore, I submit that the 
political and economic elites are not necessarily maintaining partial reform equilibrium out of 
a selfish desire to maximise individual rent-seeking behaviour. Rather, they have been acting 
upon the skewed incentives these institutions provide, which reinforces their partially reform 
state. In fact, this is what maintains the equilibrium of partial reform: a combination of 
circumstances from which no actor has an incentive to deviate. 71 
Thus, partial reform equilibrium stems from the incomplete transition of command 
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institutions, rather than the individual decisions of political elites. Perestroika reforms set out 
to change economic practices, such as encouraging enterprises to maximise profits, but the 
Soviet Union collapsed before these new institutions could be fully developed. As such, the 
Russian Federation inherited an economic system that was already partially reformed. Partial 
reform equilibrium ensures that many Soviet institutions and practices are now functioning 
within the context of an ersatz market economy. These weak institutions maintain practices 
like state subsidies and poor tax and debt collection, which prevents the formation of new 
expectations, such as the necessity of meeting debt obligations. Furthermore, as weak 
institutions fail to provide an effective and efficient means of conflict resolution, people 
continue to defer to personal networks and the informal economy. Consequently, the Russian 
economy today operateVPXFKOLNHDµ3RWHPNLQYLOODJH¶WKHDSSHDUDQFHRIDPDUNHWHFRQRP\
on the outside, but in fact a command economy on the inside. 
 The parchment rules that make up weak institutions are what differentiate partial 
reform equilibrium from the process of prolonged political and institutional decay outlined by 
Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama.72 In a process of political decay, the leaders and 
elites of a formerly functional political system maintain their positions of power as new social 
groups emerge. These groups and other external forces cause institutions to decay because they 
stop responding to the changing needs of society and can no longer provide long-term 
predictability and stability. As elites embed themselves in and use agencies, both for their own 
political purposes and to satisfy their social networks, the institutions stop reflecting social 
norms and needs.73 Therefore, society demands change and new institutions in one form or 
another, and this change is rarely smooth. Successful institutional change occurs, Fukuyama 
VD\VµZKHQRXWVLGHUVEHFRPHLQVLGHUV¶VLJQDOOLQJDQRSHQLQJRIRUJDQLVDWLRQV to new blood 
or perspectives from emerging social movements or groups, and the changing of institutions 
based on the inclusivity of those perspectives.74  
This has happened in Russia. Fukuyama and Huntington might argue that the reason 
there was no institutional change in the early 1990s was not because of partial reform 
equilibrium, but because the old nomenklatura became the privatisers and managers of the new 
capitalist economy. In other words, there was no opening of the agencies to outside members 
because the old members from the Gorbachev era simply changed their formal titles. I would 
argue that this is not the case in two points, which will be elaborated in chapter three. First, 
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ZKLOH RQH FRXOG DUJXH WKDW WKH GHOD\ LQ 5XVVLD¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO GHYHORSPHQW LV FDXVHG E\
extended political decay, it does not explain why this decay then continued when outsiders 
started to become insiders in the mid-1990s with the privatisation and loans-for-shares 
programme. Specifically, loans-for-shares introduced new bankers and other new faces to the 
political arena, but it did not change or otherwise strengthen the institutions. Second, the most 
drastic infusion of new EORRG LQWR 5XVVLD¶V SROLWLFDO and economic agencies, namely the 
FRPLQJWRSRZHURI9ODGLPLU3XWLQ¶VQHWZRUNDOVRKDVQRWUHVXOWHGLQVWURQJHULQVWLWXWLRQVRU
further institutional development. Who the elites are is irrelevant because they can only work 
within the framework of the weak institutions they inherit, and they act upon the incentives the 
institutions provide. All modernisation policies will be ineffective so long as institutions 
remain weak and partially reformed. Thus, what differentiates partial reform equilibrium from 
more general political decay is that the addition of µQHZEORRG¶RUthe inclusion of new actors, 
in the process of governance does not result in institutional change.  
It could be argued that the perseverance of these institutions through regime change 
could be a sign of institutional strength because strong institutions endure. However, this would 
be an oversimplification and a fallacy. Strong institutions endure because they provide the 
foundation for a strong rule of law, which allows actors to predict what will get them into 
trouble, and what will benefit them. But because Russia¶VLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHZHDNDFWRUVVWLOOOLYH 
in a primarily rule by law state where loyalty to social networks trumps formal laws and 
regulations, institutions remain weak.75 As will be demonstrated, the selective use of law to 
punish individuals or social groups undermines the rule of law, prevents actors from forming 
consistent expectations, and undermines the strengthening of new institutional practices. The 
RQO\WKLQJWKDWFDQEHH[SHFWHGDWWKLVVWDJH LVWKDWEHWUD\LQJRQH¶VVRFLDOQHWZRUN LVPRUH
likely to bring trouble than breaking the law.76  
This argument builds on the work of Hellman and others to demonstrate that Russia¶V
banking institutions are indeed trapped in partial reform equilibrium, which has retarded the 
development of the banking industry, and by extension affects economic development more 
generally. This study demonstrates that 5XVVLD¶VVWDOOHGHFRQRPLFWUDQVLWLRQ is caused by weak 
institutions, rather than the actions of the elites. While individual interests contribute to and 
exacerbate partial reform, they do not cause it outright; collective action on the part of the 
µZLQQHUV¶LVQRWQHFHVVDU\WRHLWKHUFUHDWHRUPDLQWDLQSDUWLDOreform equilibrium. While Russia 
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is indeed a limited access order, it is only a symptom of partial reform equilibrium, and the two 
are not synonymous. Partial reform equilibrium is a caused by conflicting and obstructive 
institutional incentives. An LAO is a social order created by the exclusion of most economic 
players from the economy by the elites. The two often work in tandem, but they are not the 
same. This distinction is important because it explains why economic incentives alone are not 
enough to break either partial reform or transform a limited into and open access order.  
If partial reform equilibrium were D SKHQRPHQRQ EURXJKW DERXW VROHO\ E\ 5XVVLD¶V
political and economic agents, then the equilibrium would indeed be broken with the 
implementation of new policies. However, although there have been numerous policies and 
laws that have been drafted and approved, organisations remain incapable of fully 
implementing them as they are not supported by any institutional foundation. As such, there 
has been no appreciable change to long-term economic development. Thus, the equilibrium is 
one in which economic institutions are stuck in a partially reformed state ² they have not 
made significant development toward a market economy. For example, the partially reformed 
banking sector has made little progress toward fulfilling the role it should play in a market 
economy. This demonstrates how partial reform equilibrium is not of the variety described by 
Hellman, as it does not result in a long-term policy freeze. However, the fact that a myriad of 
banking laws and policies have been updated and enacted since the late 1990s with no actual 
improvement in long-term sectoral stability, shows that barriers to completing transition 
remain. Thus, Russia¶VEDQNLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVDUH stuck in partial reform equilibrium, not because 
the elites have decided so, but because its foundations remain fundamentally unreformed.  
The Russian economy is neither command nor market. Weak institutions have 
prevented the rigid imposition of hard budget constraints on firms and enterprises, resulting in 
the continued operation of many under efficient firms and industries at the expense of 
entrepreneurship and the development of small and medium sized businesses. This has further 
damaged long-term investment prospects for the economy. Thus, not only do existing 
enterprises struggle to re-invest in their own businesses, but the development of new companies 
and industries remains stifled.77 This is because the rules of the game are not clear, due to 
institutional weakness and a correspondingly low level of the rule of law. The more deeply 
entrenched partial reform equilibrium is, and the opaque the rules of the game are, the higher 
the risk is for all economic actors. 
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1.4 Analysing partial reform equilibrium  
This study will analyse the development and trajectory of partial reform equilibrium in Russia, 
focusing specifically on banking institutions and the agencies that embody them. The strength 
of banking institutions is one measure of a strong and robust economy, which is positively 
correlated with stronger rule of law. As specified above, because GDP per capita is positively 
correlated with the strength of rule of law, it is a more important predictor of strong institutions 
than democracy or other political measures. While a democracy cannot exist without a strong 
rule of law, a state does not have to be democratic to have a strong rule of law. It also follows 
that the combination of a high GDP per capita and high rule of law rankings is indicative of a 
VWURQJ PDUNHW HFRQRP\ 5XVVLD¶V *DP per capita is strong, but its rule of law is weak, 
signifying weak economic institutions and the lack of a market economy. Therefore, this study 
analyses the development of 5XVVLD¶VEDQNLng institutions as one H[DPSOHRI KRZ5XVVLD¶V
economic institutions have developed. Because this study exclusively examines banking 
institutions and its agencies, it cannot generalise for the development of the entire Russian 
economy. Instead, it provides an insight into the development (or lack thereof) of a vital market 
institution.   
Although the study will make brief references and comparisons to other post-Soviet 
and post-socialist states, the study itself is interested only in Russia. Most comparative studies 
seek to analyse most similar or most different systems.78 However, it is not so simple when 
looking at the former Soviet Union (FSU). Russia was the core region that composed the 
Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. This is crucial because it explains why the Warsaw 
Pact and the Baltic states have come much farther in their institutional modernisation than 
Russia, but why Russia and the remaining former FSU countries are still struggling. As 
illustrated by Francis Fukuyama, former colonies often inherit the institutions of the coloniser, 
either in attempts to mimic the coloniser or as a direct implant of the colonising power to ease 
administration.79 These institutions often are what the new states use when the colonisers 
leave.80 The Russian Empire did not have strong institutions, and the Soviet Union did little to 
strengthen them when they took power. In fact, the Bolsheviks were successful in dismantling 
the few solid institutions the Empire did have, such as the central bank, but failed to properly 
rebuild them and make them autonomous. Thus, while FSU states inherited these institutions, 
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the Baltic and the Warsaw Pact states did not. The latter two groups had strong, pre-existing 
institutional practices that were co-opted by the Soviets and Communists, and re-developed 
when these states overthrew their socialist regimes. 
As such, there are not enough similarities at the outset to undertake a most different 
systems design analysis comparing Russia and the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, 
former Soviet States that may have similar outcomes, do not have enough differences at the 
outset. Therefore, because of the nature of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, the 
traditional most similar or most different systems design analyses are not particularly helpful. 
Similar states are similar because they were once part of the same country. But, different states 
did not have similar institutional settings at the outset, and thus have had very different 
outcomes. Furthermore, while there are commonalities, finding them among a wide range of 
states creates generalisation. This is the opposite of what this study is trying to achieve: an in-
GHSWKXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHGHYHORSPHQWWUDMHFWRU\RI5XVVLD¶Vbanking institutions, and why 
they have been able to help Russia complete its transition. Although a larger study examining 
the same or similar institutions in other countries to distil the similarities and create a 
generalisation would be useful, it would be a large undertaking beyond the scope of this study.   
Finally, Russia is the focus of this study because it presents an interesting research 
puzzle: it has all the conditions of a state that should want to and be able to construct strong 
banking institutions, but it has not. It has a lot of economic potential due to WKH FRXQWU\¶V
geographical size, population, and natural resources, and a strong banking industry could 
encourage the growth of small and medium sized enterprises, which would increase the size of 
the middle class and overall economic growth. Even if the government was purely interested 
in rent-seeking, the state could increase its natural resource rents if banking institutions were 
stronger and favoured long-term investment for updating technology and increasing efficiency. 
However, this is not the case. Although the situation has somewhat improved since the 
economic chaos that characterised the 1990s, it has not changed much. In fact, according to 
North, this unpredictability should have led Russians to construct institutions as a means of 
creating order out of chaos.81 Yet, while capital flight has slowed, asset stripping is still 
common ² it now takes the form of hostile takeovers, known in Russia as raiding.82 
Furthermore, in the 1990s, many of these activities were the work of independent oligarchs, 
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but today these activities are undertaken by the state, further eroding institutional 
foundations.83  
The study uses process tracing to demonstrate that perestroika reforms are the genesis 
for partial reform equilibrium, and then analyses their effect on institutional development. 
Perestroika ZDVVSHFLILFDOO\DLPHGDWUHVWUXFWXULQJWKHFRXQWU\¶VHFRQRPLFLQVWLWXWLRQVto make 
economic activities profitable. It was the most drastic attempt at change in the former Soviet 
Union, and later in the Russian Federation, and one that required a complete reorientation of 
economic institutions and incentives. However, perestroika failed in its mission and instead 
became the starting point for partial reform equilibrium. Thus, it was the Soviet 8QLRQ¶V
changes to the economy that had the most lasting impact on the Russian Federation and its 
attempts to transition to democracy and a market economy. Furthermore, this study will use 
HFRQRPLF LQVWLWXWLRQVDQG LQFHQWLYHV WRVKRZZK\ 5XVVLD¶VGHPRFUDWic institutions are also 
weak. Although there is no debate that the attempted change from an autocracy to a democracy 
ZDVDOVRGUDVWLF5XVVLD¶VVWDWXVDVD µGHPRFUDF\¶ LVGHEDWHGDV LW WRR LV LQ WUDQVLWLRQ<HW
because of the correlation between strong economic institutions and political liberalism, 
economic institutions are vital completing the political transition whatever the outcome. As 
VXFK WKH ZHDNQHVV RI 5XVVLD¶V banking LQVWLWXWLRQV LV PRUH LOOXVWUDWLYH RI ZK\ 5XVVLD¶V
democratic institutions are weak than focusing on democratic institutions alone.  
At the heart of this study is an analysis of the effects of partial reform equilibrium on 
the development of The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) and its regulation of the commercial 
and investment banking industry and financial markets. Specifically, the case studies in 
chapters five and six test the hypothesis that the 1998 and 2008 economic crises resulted in 
institutional development as the CBR emerges a stronger agency. The CBR is the perfect 
organisation to study for evidence of partial reform equilibrium. The banking industry and 
financial market constitute a purely market institution, one that is unfamiliar to the Russian 
economy. Thus, Gosbank, a vital command agency needed to fulfil the economic plan by 
softening budget constraints, is now a vital organisation that must to mediate and regulate the 
backbone of a market economy: banks. The study will explore the contradiction of these two 
roles in chapter four. It will investigate how the CBR has changed, superficially or otherwise, 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union by comparing the roles of the Gosbank and the CBR. 
Such a comparison provides a clear illustration of how the CBR has contributed to the 
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maintenance of partial reform equilibrium in the banking industry, and provides an insight to 
the consequences for general economic development. It will also distinguish those institutional 
practices and incentives that have changed versus those which still exist and are contributing 
to the persistence of a quasi-market economy. The partial reform of Soviet banking institutions 
has led to weak and underdeveloped Russian banking institutions, and has diminished the role 
banks play in the Russian economy.  
This overall study has two objectives. The first is to analyse the reforms and policies 
that affect banking institutions and its corresponding organisations: what the main 
responsibilities, restrictions, and powers of enforcement are; how independent they are and 
how this independence is protected; and what external influences exist. For each reform, the 
circumstances in which it was enacted and who was involved in the process are weighted. This 
allows the study to analyse how the effectiveness and efficient banking organisations are. 
Where they fail, it seeks to demonstrate how institutional weakness causes this. Building on 
this, the second objective seeks to understand if the CBR can fulfil its role, by examining those 
regulatory powers that are effective and those that are not. This will allow for a rich 
understanding of how banking organisations are supposed to function on paper, versus the 
institutional limits of their regulatory abilities. This will shed light on how these organisations 
function in theory and practice. To do this, we analyse key reforms undertaken from 
perestroika through the 2008 economic crisis, how they were enacted, and whether any change 
resulted. Understanding the degree of change that has resulted gives evidence for the influence 
of weak institutions on the effectiveness of regulatory agencies, and the impact this has in 
providing long-term economic stability or maintaining partial reform equilibrium. 
This study contributes to the literature by providing a richer understanding of the 
development and contemporary functioning of fiscal and monetary institutions in Russia, 
which is understudied. Additionally, most studies on partial reform equilibrium examine legal 
and political institutions: elections, regional reforms, the passing of laws, crime rates, and 
corruption levels, whereas the studies that focus on economic institutions tend to be far more 
concerned with the corruption of individual agents and how this affects trust in institutions, as 
well as broader economic stability and growth.84 Furthermore, studies that focus on fiscal and 
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monetary policy seem to have peaked in the 1990s, and focus solely on policy and international 
conditionality, and the corresponding social and political implications.85 While these studies 
are indeed important, it they do not address the incentives driving the agents under observation, 
which is what this study intends to do.  
This study further contributes to the literature by looking beyond the intentions of 
reformers, advisors, and politicians, and by looking at their constraints; it argues that the 
problems with transition stem from structure, rather than agency. As such, the framework it 
XVHVWRDQDO\VHWUDQVLWLRQLVGLIIHUHQW,QVWHDGRIORRNLQJDWKRZ5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLRQIDLOHGLW
examines why it is still incomplete. Most studies focus on the agents of change: reformers, 
politicians, oligarchs, neo-liberal Western advisors, and so on. Yet, many scholars take 
institutions for granted without realising that even weak institutions are influential, as they 
form the fundamental framework within which agents must work. Thus, while the agency 
factor cannot be ignored, this study is more concerned with the institutional influences that 
motivate and constrain these agents beyond a selfish desire to maximise personal rents. This 
study will illustrate how institutions became partially reformed, and how this has endured by 
constraining the changes the agents can make. It illustrates that partial reform equilibrium is a 
far more endemic phenomenon than a mere disinclination to address structural economic 
problems. Finally, the study aims to provide an understanding of what motivates political and 
HFRQRPLFDFWRUV WRDFWFRQWUDU\ WR WKHVWDWH¶V ORQJ-term economic interests, as well as their 
own. 
Elites and average Russians alike want more long-term economic stability and 
prosperity even as their actions continually undermine attempts to create it.86 Key evidence for 
this is presented in the case studies in chapters five and six. To provide a better understanding 
of how this contradiction has evolved, chapter three provides a general history and analysis of 
partial reform equilibrium from perestroika to the second Putin presidency starting in 2004. 
This will allow us to understand both the beginning of partial reform equilibrium and how 
institutional constraints and incentives have prevented agents from breaking it. Specifically, 
the chapter will analyse the general effects of liberalisation reforms and key policies of the 
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Putin era on the economy and society. Examining the effects of partial reform equilibrium on 
the CBR will be the subject of chapter four. Before we can analyse this, however, we must first 
understand the arguments surrounding the development of banking institutions. The following 
chapter will analyse the literature on how economic crises affect banking institutions in order 
to construct an analytical framework, through which the case studies will process the shocks 
and reforms that Russia endures during the transition period and how they have affected 
institutional development. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 CRISIS MODERNISATION 
 
The basic research question at hand is: why has Russia not completed its economic transition? 
Why, despite many genuine attempts at reform and modernisation does the economy remain 
trapped in partial reform equilibrium? This study argues that EHFDXVH 5XVVLD¶V HFRQRPLF
institutions are stuck in partial reform equilibrium, it is not a market economy as defined by 
Adam Smith and Karl Polanyi. This causes dissonance as the government requires the agencies, 
such as the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), to undertake tasks for which it is not equipped, 
while also providing it with ineffective coordination mechanisms. This paradox explains why 
Russia has drafted well-meaning economic and political reforms over the past twenty years, 
but still resembles a state in transition.  
Russia has very little historical experience with a market economy because there has 
never been an incentive for the state to relinquish control to market forces, as industrialisation 
was always a threat to political stability.1 By retaining control over the economy, the market 
premise of self-regulation is undermined. This led the state to develop the economy in fits and 
starts whenever it was necessary. Historically, has coincided with military threats, which 
required the state to undertake several economic development reforms simultaneously to 
produce arms and equip the military.2 However, this resulted in the immediate changing of 
formal rules, with no way to control the informal norms undermining the implementation of 
said rules.3 This pattern would continue even through the Soviet era. Thus, why the Soviet 
Union could send a man into space but not produce quality goods of any significant retail 
value.4 The result was a very lopsided economy that had a strong military industrial complex, 
but was otherwise economically underdeveloped.    
 Scholars argue that economic crises can catalyse institutional development in 
developing states, or states in transition. These crises serve as critical junctures that reveal 
unknown or ignored institutional weaknesses, which must be addressed to exit the crisis. This 
is known as crisis modernisation. JànoV.RUQDL¶VWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDOUHFHVVLRQLVRQHH[DPSOHRI
this.5 The generally accepted logic is that the 1998 crisis was a period of crisis modernisation 
                                                 
1
 Hedlund, Russian Path Dependence (2012). 223.  
2
 Ibid. 230.  
3
 Ibid. 230. 
4
 Ibid. 290. 
5
 Kornai, 1994. 
    
 30 
for Russia, because it forced the state to implement the necessary hard budget constraints to 
complete its transition. Since the 1998 financial crisis, Russia has experienced 5.25 percent 
average growth per year, despite the global economic crisis of 2008.6 In fact, in the 16 years 
VLQFH 5XVVLD¶V HFRQRPLc implosion, the only year it has experienced any kind of negative 
growth was in 2009, when its GDP contracted by 7.82 percent.7 If economic growth picked up 
after the 1998 crisis, then the necessary economic institutions must have been developed to 
support said growth.  
However, using evidence from the banking industry, this study demonstrates that this 
is a fallacy. The data does not consider measures of institutional weakness. For example, 
5XVVLD¶V VWUHQJWK RI UXOH RI ODZRYHU WKH VDPHSHULRG KDV DYHUDJHd a total score of ±0.89, 
placing them in the bottom 20 percentile internationally.8 6R ZKLOH 5XVVLD¶V HFRQRP\ LV
growing steadily, its rule of law is not improving. Because rule of law is a measure of 
institutional strength, this calls the stability and sRXUFH RI 5XVVLD¶V HFRQRPLF JURZWK LQWR
question. If economic growth is not due to institutional development, then what is it? That 
question can be answered fairly quickly: natural resource rents. If this is the case, then what is 
WKHVWDWHRI5XVVLD¶VEDQNing institutions and why has it been unable to develop? 
 In a 2013 conference paper, Kenneth Arrow describes how the bankers responsible for 
the 2008 financial crisis were not blind to the potential consequences to their actions, but their 
incentives for taking the risks that they did were obvious; thus, their actions were not 
surprising.9 Similarly, in Russia, it confounds Western economists and observers that Russia 
does not actively pursue policies required to support a market economy, because the former 
see the benefits of doing so. What many economists see as irrational behaviour is, in fact, very 
rational because the incentives for maintaining underdeveloped institutions are higher than 
those for changing the system.10 7KLVLVEHFDXVHRYHUWLPH5XVVLD¶s economic institutions have 
generated expectations about the various possible outcomes of economic transactions. If agents 
expect institutions to be weak, and they find it within their immediate interests to maximise 
their profits in the shortest possible term. This reinforces partial reform equilibrium by creating 
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Instead using formal institutions to resolve conflicts, agents rely on informal social networks.  
This chapter will break down what crisis modernisation is and how it works. First, it 
analyses various theories of institutional change and where crisis modernisation fits into this. 
It then argues that crisis modernisation has not taken place in Russian banking institutions 
because the mechanisms necessary to undertake reforms are underdeveloped or non-existent. 
Thus, using policy implementation as a measure of institutional strength, three hypotheses are 
established to test the degree that the CBR experienced crisis modernisation because of the 
1998 and 2008 economic crises. Finally, the methodology for testing the hypotheses and the 
analytical framework for evaluating the results will be developed. This sets up the foundation 
upon which we will analyse the history of partial reform in chapter three, the development of 
the CBR in chapter four, and the case studies on the 1998 and 2008 crises in chapters five and 
six. 
 
2.1 Crisis modernisation 
How and under what conditions institutions change is hotly debated. Many argue that weak 
economic institutions are most effectively changed through crisis modernisation: a crisis that 
forces agents to strengthen institutional weaknesses. Others look to individual actors and their 
desire to change, or the historical role of the institution. The agent-centric arguments put forth 
that institutions are reformed via policies and political actors.12 This school of thought believes 
that the most efficient way to change institutions is to focus on formal laws and reforms that 
increase or decrease the powers and purposes of existing institutions, or that destroy old and 
create new ones. The rationale LVWKDWQHZODZVZLOOFKDQJHDJHQWV¶ expectations and behaviour. 
This is considered a rational choice argument whereby change will occur when doing so 
PD[LPLVHVWKHDJHQW¶VSRWHQWLDOJDLQV$GGLWLRQDOO\ these scholars argue that it is possible to 
drafWOHJLVODWLRQWKDWZLOOVZD\DJHQWV¶ cost / benefit analysis in favour of adhering to formal 
laws.13 Thus, institutions will change when it is in the interest of agents to change them. 
However, implementing formal laws does not ensure change will take place. It might express 
the desire or intent to change, but actual change will take a very long time. 
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The second school of thought is the structuralist school. This line of argument contends 
that institutions are nearly impossible to change due to the overwhelming weight of historical 
and cultural legacy.14 It is helpful for explaining why formal laws and reforms alone cannot 
change an institution overnight; that the sheer will of people and the government cannot change 
an institution. As formal rules do not change behaviour or expectation, agents revert to using 
informal practices.15 At the very least, new regulatory powers must be tried and tested again 
and again to determine how to best use them in accordance with the rule of law.16 However, if 
this school of thought were to be believed, no institutional change would ever take place 
because the weight of history would keep pulling the institutions back.  
North explains that institutions will change through a combination of changing formal 
rules and their enforcement, and informal norms.17 Most scholars who study institutional 
change agree that the most important variable is time.18 Institutions do not change quickly, and 
this cannot be rushed. However, historical institutionalists argue that most institutions remain 
stable until major events force them to change, in what they call punctuated equilibrium.19 
While they do not disagree that institutions and agents both need time to adapt, they argue that 
exogenous shocks provide the critical junctures needed to create the most change. One of the 
biggest criticisms of this approach is that it leaves little room for human agency.20  
Yet, this is not mutually exclusive. Historical institutionalism generally seeks to explain 
the how and why institutions change and it looks both at agency and historical factors. It is 
possible for agents to implement new rules that are either ineffective, do not address or fail to 
resolve the problem at hand. Concerning how institutions constrain incentives and behaviour, 
historical institutionalists equally weigh both agency and institution in times of change. If 
change takes place gradually over time, then it is likely that institutions are strong and can 
reflect the needs and values of agents. If change takes place due to an exogenous shock, then 
institutions are weak and the shock exposes and exacerbates the weakness.21 This draws on the 
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agent centric need to acknowledge and attempt change, and the path dependent nature of 
institutions from the structuralist school of thought. Agents pass laws, but it is only at critical 
junctures that these laws and reforms are legitimised.  
The result is what this study refers to as crisis modernisation: the strengthening of 
institutions because of an endogenous or exogenous shock, such as an economic crisis. In fact, 
there are numerous studies that look at the effect of economic crises on developing countries, 
and most of them find that crises do lead to much needed reforms.22 This is because developed 
economies with strong institutions can coordinate enforcement mechanisms more efficiently 
and resolve crises more efficiently than economies with weak institutions.23 For example, the 
Inter-American Development Bank found that economic crises, especially debt crises, led to 
lasting reforms despite the hypothesis that states would revert to old patterns once the crisis 
resolved.24 The exception was banking crises, yet this too disappeared when banking crises 
were combined with debt crises.25 Laeven and Valencia found that debt crises are easier to 
resolve, whereas banking crises are more complex and require stronger institutions to 
mitigating disputes over bankruptcy and property rights.26 It could be that when banking crises 
and debt crises occur simultaneously, it is in the best interest of all agents to cooperate to 
resolve the crisis, but a banking crisis alone affects one group disproportionately. This is 
generally supported by Drazen and Grilli, who found that only when the stakes are high for all 
agents will reforms occur.27 While Drazen and Grilli specifically look at problems of inflation, 
the same principle applies 
Many scholars point to evidence for crisis modernisation in Russia. Historically, the 
Russian Empire became invested and interested in economic infrastructure and productivity 
when there was a military threat.28 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars have argued 
that while the liberal reforms of the initial transition period were ineffective, 1998 economic 
crash resulted in crisis modernisation for Russia. It is generally accepted that the 1998 crisis 
forced the Russian economy to implement hard budget constraints and complete the transition 
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to a market economy.29 However, much of the evidence used to reach these conclusions were 
drawn based on economic data alone. The problem, as has been established, is that much of 
the positive economic data can be attributed to rising oil and gas prices, not the expansion of a 
market economy or the development of corresponding institutions. Thus, using evidence from 
the banking industry, this study argues that Russia has not experienced crisis modernisation 
and banking institutions remain trapped in partial reform equilibrium. 
As such, examining responses to economic crises in Russia provides crucial 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ IRUKRZDQGZK\5XVVLD¶V banking institutions remain poorly developed and 
trapped in partial reform equilibrium. This study will do this in two steps. First, the type of 
crisis and its cause will be identified. This is important because it allows us to evaluate the 
appropriateness of the response to the crisis. As previously discussed, the type of crisis will 
necessitate certain reforms or laws to resolve it. Logically, the second step will evaluate the 
responses to the crisis: is the scope of the reforms appropriate to resolve the crisis? Are the 
reforms realistic? The cause of each crisis warrants specific policy responses. For example, if 
the state is dealing with a monetary crisis, it is likely that bank restructuring, although 
potentially helpful, will not be the main driver of recovery. The first step is to understand the 
three main types of economic crises, sovereign debt, currency, and banking, in order to 
understand the most common and appropriate responses to said crises.  
Sovereign debt crises occur when the government or public-sector defaults on its 
foreign and domestic financial obligations: debt payments, contracts, and so on.30 The causes 
of debt crises vary. Hallerberg and Scartastini, and Reinhart and Rogoff find that sovereign 
debt crises precede or coincide with banking crises.31 Additionally, high levels of inflation can 
cause debt crises as the cost of meeting debt obligations rises.32 These crises are often preceded 
by surges in public and external borrowing, which worsen the overall crisis.33 Laeven and 
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Valencia find that sovereign debt crises are more expensive than banking or currency crises.34 
And in states with weak institutions, these crises can often be caused by poor fiscal discipline. 
For exampleLQ5XVVLD¶VFDVHSRRUUHYHQXHFROOHFWLRQPHFKDQLVPV 
Banking crises occur when corporate and financial sectors experience several 
successive defaults as banks and corporations struggle to make contracted payments, non-
performing loans increase, and financial market capital is exhausted.35 The causes of banking 
crises are complex. Laeven and Valencia demonstrate that banking crises often coincide with 
currency crises.36 Yet, when preceded by a currency crisis or sovereign debt crisis, banking 
crises are caused by a decline in investor confidence, a subsequent run on banks, and a rapid 
decline in liquidity.37 Additionally, banking crises can lead to a sovereign debt crisis as the 
state struggles to compensate for and / or bailout failing banks. Banking crises can also be 
caused by poor microeconomic policies, such as lax lending policies that result in asset 
bubbles, poor sector regulation, and bad assets; or poor macroeconomic policies that create 
general economic weaknesses and vulnerabilities to external crises.38 Furthermore, banking 
crises are difficult to resolve, and this is made more difficult when the state owns most of the 
sector.39 Specifically, Laeven and Valencia found that banking crises are more likely to happen 
in countries where at least 31 percent of the sector is state-owned because these banks tend to 
delay restructuring and own poor assets.40  
A currency crisis occurs when a currency loses 30 percent of its value, at a depreciation 
rate of 10 percent faster than the previous year.41 This requires a currency not only to decline 
in value, but to do so at a rapid pace. This can have various causes. One of the most common 
is inflation from poor fiscal discipline. As governments print money to fund public spending, 
it declines in value. States will often try to hide, peg, or otherwise mitigate the inflation rate, 
but the failure to bring it down in the long run could spark a crisis. Additionally, a currency 
crisis could be caused by speculative attack on a FRXQWU\¶VFXUUHQF\WKDWFDQUHVXOWLQDIRUFHG
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devaluation and possible default.42 As mentioned above, the effects of a currency crisis can be 
compounded if it sparks a sovereign debt and / or banking crisis. While typically one of the 
easier and least costly crises to resolve, this ceases to be the case should the currency crisis 
trigger another crisis.43  
In the event of any crisis, governments will normally undertake two kinds of measures 
to resolve the it: crisis containment and crisis resolution. The former is concerned with 
containing the immediate effects of the crisis, such as preventing wide scale economic 
displacement and contagion to other parts of the economy. For example, a currency crisis can 
easily spark a double or triple crisis if it also leads to a sovereign debt and / or banking crisis. 
Crisis containment policies are easy to implement efficiently because they do not require new 
or strong institutions to do so.44 As such, these measures will aim to prevent this from 
happening. This is importaQWDVµSRRUO\FKRVHQFRQWDLQPHQWSROLFLHVXQGHUPLQHWKHVXFFHVVRI
long-WHUP FULVLV UHVROXWLRQ¶45 Crisis resolution measures are long-term policies aimed at 
addressing those weaknesses that caused the crisis in the first place. If poor banking regulation 
and lending policies led to a banking crisis, then crisis resolution measures should seek to 
improve both. Thus, each of three crises just described, sovereign debt, banking, and currency, 
all have specific crisis containment and crisis resolution measures aimed at minimising the 
effects of the crisis and exiting from it as quickly and efficiently as possible.  
 
Crisis containment 
Government liquidity assistance is when capital is injected into banks to stabilise liquidity and 
reserves, thereby maintaining investor and consumer confidence and preventing bank runs.46 
For the purposes of this study, government liquidity assistance includes measures such as debt 
forgiveness as well as capital injection by the government.47 This can include the forgiveness 
of debt or arrears, assistance meeting loan obligations, or offering currency loans and 
exchanges. Government liquidity assistance is a common response to the onset of a crisis. 
Liquidity assistance measures are successful when they a) prevent banks and businesses from 
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failing, and b) allow them to start fresh instead of dragging out the crisis. 48  However, these 
measures are only successful when they are accompanied by conditions that require recipients 
to restructure in a manner that makes them less susceptible to cause or be victim of a future 
crisis.49 Studies have shown that providing liquidity assistance to banks and enterprises can be 
counterproductive in the long run, because they increase moral hazard by offloading the cost 
of the crisis onto the government instead of the bank.50 Additionally, governments need to try 
and limit the amount of liquidity assistance provided to prevent negative macroeconomic 
effects, such as inflation.51 Liquidity assistance is used for all crises, but is more likely to be 
used in a banking crisis since macroeconomic pressure caused by this policy could increase the 
risk of debt and currency crises. 
Regulatory forbearance policies ease regulations or restrictions that might otherwise 
cause banks to become insolvent if implemented at the time of the crisis or at its immediate 
resolution.52 Generally speaking, forbearance allows banks to delay the recognition of loan 
losses or capital shortfall in order to maintain investor confidence and give the banks time to 
recapitalise.53 Additionally, regulatory fRUEHDUDQFHDOORZVEDQNVWRµRYHUVWDWHWKHLUHTXLW\VR
DV WR DYRLG FRQWUDFWLRQV LQ WKH ORDQ VXSSO\¶ ZLWKRXW IHDULQJ SXQLVKPHQW RU ILQHV IURP WKH
regulatory overseer.54 Most central banks prioritise stability over cost at the onset of a crisis, 
so costs stemming from liquidity assistance and regulatory forbearance are not a major 
concern.55 Forbearance can only be successful when regulations are re-introduced, which often 
leads to bank restructuring.56 The problem is that regulatory forbearance rarely recognises or 
repairs systemic problems, and thus is only a crisis containment measure.57 Where it can result 
in the implementation of new regulations as a crisis resolves, it can also be classified as a crisis 
resolution measure.58 For the purposes of this study, the definition of regulatory forbearance 
will be the suspension of any regulatory requirements, including those rules aimed at 
preventing or reducing moral hazard, increasing or maintaining reserve requirements, or the 
reporting loan / capital losses. These measures are mostly implemented to mitigate banking 
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crises, but can be implemented anytime the financial sector is likely to be affected by a crisis. 
Deposit freezes and bank holidays are extreme measures of crisis containment that are 
undertaken as a last resort to keep banks solvent and maintain monetary control.59 Deposit 
freezes are devastating because they destroy investor confidence by announcing that the 
banking sector is insolvent. These policies are not taken lightly, because enacting them is 
extremely costly in the long-term as it requires the implementation of sound, tangible crisis 
resolution policies over a long period of time to rebuild investor and consumer confidence. 
These measures range from restricting the amount commercial customers can withdraw from 
their accounts, to currency freezes that disallow investors, banks, and others to exchange 
currency and take it out of country. Deposit freezes can be used in any crisis, but due to its 
extreme nature, it is only used in twin or triple crises.  
 
Crisis resolution 
Government owned asset management is the transfer of private, non-performing banks or 
enterprises to government management and ownership to accelerate restructuring.60 This is 
meant to be a crisis resolution policy as government ownership and management would 
restructure the bank or enterprise such that it becomes more efficient and profitable.61 In the 
long-run, this makes banks and enterprises less vulnerable to the effects of economic crises and 
less likely to cause them. Realistically, governments rarely have the skills or knowhow 
necessary to restructure assets in an efficient and effective manner that will generate profits.62 
Furthermore, where the government already has a vested interest in or connection to a 
company, they are less likely to restructure properly.63 Asset management policies can be 
enacted during currency and banking crises, but is more often during the latter. For the purposes 
of this study, policies that allow for or encourage government asset management will be 
considered, as will those cases and instances of forcible takeover and management by the 
government.  
Bank restructuring is the changing of practices and restructuring of debts and assets to 
help a firm more efficiently maximise profits. This is done by implementing stricter 
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requirements and regulations that force banks and enterprises to restructure.64 These reforms 
often increase or change capital / liquidity requirements, place more stringent and consistent 
guidelines for lending, call for changes to moral hazard and transparency regulations, and force 
firms to merge, liquidate or otherwise recapitalise.65 Bank restructuring usually follows a 
period of regulatory forbearance. Restructuring can take place by the bank itself, by an asset 
management company or government intervention as a condition for liquidity assistance, or 
via sale to foreign or other investors.66 Restructuring is most likely to take place after a banking 
crisis, but can also take place in enterprises after currency crises. This study will analyse the 
process of restructuring, who undertakes it, and how successful it is. It will also analyse those 
policies that aim to encourage restructuring.   
 Government sale of assets is the selling of government owned or managed assets to 
foreign or domestic investors.67 First, this achieves crisis resolution as it rids the government 
of its own unproductive assets and enterprises. Second, it achieves crisis resolution by selling 
those dead assets it acquired through intervention to prevent it from failing. This helps the 
government save and reallocate liquidity to other parts of the economy, as well as raise money 
in selling the enterprise. Additionally, privatising these assets also inject momentum into the 
HFRQRP\E\ LQFUHDVLQJ WKH HQWHUSULVHV¶ Hfficiency, output, and profits. The problem is that 
while foreign owners can use new capital to rejuvenate firms and banks, it is not a substitution 
for domestic investment as foreigners are more likely to flee at the sign of a crisis.68 
Furthermore, foreign banks are less likely to lend widely and only lend to low risk clients, 
which undermines potential economic growth and investment opportunities.69 This policy is 
used for crisis resolution in debt and currency crises when the government was the primary 
owner of the asset, and during banking crises when the government gained the asset through 
intervention. This study will examine how the government sells and privatises assets to achieve 
crisis resolution, paying attention to whom banks are sold.  
 
2.2 Argument and hypotheses  
This study argues that economic crises have not resulted in institutional development in 
Russia¶V EDQNLQJ VHFWRU because the mechanisms necessary to undertake crisis resolution 
                                                 
64
 Laeven and Valencia, 2008. 22. 
65
 Hoelscher and Quintyn, 2003. 19. 
66
 Laeven and Valencia, 2008.; Hoelscher and Quintyn, 2003. 
67
 Calomoris, Klingebiel, and Laeven, 2003. 55.  
68
 Ibid. 57. 
69
 Ibid. 56. 
    
 40 
measures are inherently market mechanisms, which have not yet been established. Therefore, 
5XVVLD¶VEDQNLQJ sector remains partially reformed as the CBR is too weak enforce formal 
rules over informal norms. This provides evidence for DQDOWHUQDWLYHH[SODQDWLRQIRU5XVVLD¶V
failed transition: it is not yet complete. In market economies, these mechanisms reside in strong 
institutions, thereby enabling governments to resolve the crisis with little intervention.70 Any 
successful crisis resolution reform in Russia would necessitate institutional development, as 
strong institutions are a prerequisite for the CBR implemHQWLQJWKHUHIRUPV¶DLPV. As such, 
where crisis modernisation does result, it is expected that the implementation of crisis 
resolution reforms would be a protracted process, but have tangible results. However, in the 
absence of strong institutions, it is anticipated that the government and CBR will primarily rely 
on crisis containment policies to stabilise the economy until the crisis passes, since they do not 
require strong institutions to implement. Consequently, where institutions are partially 
reformed there will be a focus on crisis containment over crisis resolution measures. 
Crisis modernisation can be both quantified and qualified, but because we seek to 
determine if economic crises constitute critical junctures in time, the most appropriate 
methodolRJLFDODSSURDFKIRUWKLVVWXG\LVSURFHVVWUDFLQJ3URFHVVWUDFLQJLVGHVFULEHGDVµDQ
analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence 
often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or SKHQRPHQD¶71 Furthermore, 
because quantitative economic data, such as economic growth, obscures the strength of 
5XVVLD¶VLQVWLWXWLRQVWKHQWKHEXUGHQRIHYLGHQFHPXVWEHTXDOLWDWLYH7KXVSURFHVVWUDFLQJLV
a far better approach than a purely quantitative study, as numerical data measures how much 
things have or have not changed, but it cannot explain how that change happened, what the 
implications might be, or other unmeasurable factors. This study will indeed use existing 
statistical data alongside qualitative evidence to analyse the sequence and process of change 
or stagnation in Russia¶VEDQNLQJLQVWLWXWLRQV ² snapshots of before, during, and after an 
economic crisis DORQJVLGH WKH JRYHUQPHQW DQG &%5¶V FULVLV FRQWDLQPHQW DQG UHVROXWLRQ
policies will be analysed. The more efficiently and effectively the measures can be 
implemented, the stronger the banking institutions and CBR are. 
 This provides for three testable hypotheses. To begin, null hypothesis states that any 
observation made is purely coincidental and that no pattern or correlation between economic 
crises and institutional development exists: 
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H0: Economic crises have no impact on institutional development in Russia. 
This hypothesis would be the result of one of two things. First, that the economic crisis has no 
impact on institutional development because the crisis does not elicit a response from the 
government. It is often argued that market economies are self-regulating and would naturally 
adjust without much government intervention.72 In fact, in a pure market economy this would 
likely be the case. However, as there is no such thing as a perfect market, most states will enact 
some containment and resolution measures. The second way one could arrive at the null 
hypothesis would be if crisis measures had no effect. If by the time resolution policies have 
taken effect the system has naturally corrected itself, or they were ineffective in the first place, 
then the measures are moot, if not counterproductive. Finally, if the government relies on crisis 
containment measures, then the null hypothesis would hold as crisis containment measures do 
not require strong institutions to implement them.  
 Second EHFDXVH 5XVVLD¶V LQVWitutions are partially reformed and their coordination 
mechanisms have already been disrupted, it is likely that the government and CBR would 
struggle to implement crisis resolution reforms. As illustrated by Hoelscher and Quintyn, poor 
policy coordination raises the costs of crises because it undermines efforts to resolve it.73 Thus, 
the first testable hypothesis for institutional development measures whether coordination 
mechanisms can resolve the crisis at hand by examining which crisis containment and 
resolution policies are implemented: 
H1: The government and Central Bank of Russia will undertake the appropriate policy 
responses to resolve the crisis at hand. 
This hypothesis measures institutional development by determining whether policy objectives 
appropriately stabilise and manage the crisis, and whether they address institutional 
weaknesses that caused it in the first place.74 Additionally, it analyses what new institutions, if 
any, the resolution measures seek to construct. For this hypothesis to be true, the state needs to 
implement the appropriate containment and resolution measures, and seek to strengthen 
institutional weaknesses in order to better enforce these measures.  
 Next, countries with weaker institutions struggle to implement crisis resolution 
reforms.75 As such, the second testable hypothesis looks at the efficiency of institutions by 
measuring how long it took to implement resolution measures:  
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H2: The Central Bank of Russia is strong enough to implement crisis resolution 
measures effectively and efficiently. Reforms also seek to improve institutional 
efficiency.  
This hypothesis tests the efficiency and effectiveness of institutions by measuring how long it 
takes the government and CBR to address institutional weaknesses, and then the length of time 
for policies to be implemented. Additionally, it measures institutional development by 
analysing whether resolution reforms seek to improve efficiency. The caveat is that this study 
will not rely on the resolution of the crisis as a measure of efficiency, because data used to 
reach this conclusion do not seek to understand the role of institutions. Because economic 
growth alone is not a reliable indicator for institutional strength in Russia, the length of time it 
takes to resolve a crisis is similarly unreliable on its own. Furthermore, because it takes longer 
to develop new institutional practices, the analytical timeframe must be extended beyond the 
crisis itself. Thus, for this hypothesis to be true, the CBR and government must implement 
UHIRUPVZLWKLQWKUHH\HDUVRIWKHFULVLV¶VRQVHW 
 Finally, the best predictor of institutional strength is how fairly and predictably the new 
laws and regulations are enforced, and thus how stable they are.76 As such, the final testable 
hypothesis measures the effectiveness of the resolution measures, and how much they have 
strengthened institutions: 
H3: New regulations will be fairly and universally enforced, leading to reliance on 
formal rules and organisations to resolve conflicts.  
This hypothesis measures institutional development by analysing how behaviours and 
expectations have changed. If new regulations are properly enforced, then they would 
incentivise agents to use formal instead of informal institutions. This hypothesis also measures 
the stability and durability of institutions. The better regulations are enforced, the stronger 
institutions are, and the more durable they will be. 
 The best way to test these hypotheses is to examine those crises that have posed major 
systemic challenges to the Russian banking industry. Laeven and Valencia differentiate crises 
from regular economic downturns when there is significant distress in the banking system 
(defaults, runs, liquidations), and the state enacts three or more crisis response measures.77 This 
distinction is important because Russia has experienced many episodes of financial distress 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but not all of them have resulted in crippling economic 
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crises. This narrows down potential crises to two: the 1998 economic crisis and the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Additionally, both crises have different catalysts, and each necessitate different 
resolution measures. Thus, studying each crisis provides more evidence for evaluating the 




Because the Central Bank of Russia is partially reformed, it is difficult for it to enforce or 
implement crisis resolution policies. Although it has gone through many changes since the 
FROODSVH RI WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ WKH &%5¶V HFRQRPLF UROHV DQG UHJXODWRU\ capacities remain 
poorly developed. Therefore, economic crises in Russia cannot result in crisis modernisation. 
Historical institutionalism alone does not provide an analytical framework to understand how 
this fails to happen.78 As such, this study employs process tracing to understand and explain 
how and why economic crises have not spurred institutional development in the banking sector. 
Process tracing, like historical institutionalism, identifies those critical junctures during which 
change is most likely, and thus provides an instance to analyse institutional development or 
stagnation.79  
Process-tracing is a methodology developed by economists to identify those choices 
producers make that commit them to using specific technologies.80 Those commitments then 
go on to determine the trajectory of the producer in question. As such, it allows us to identify 
those critical junctures that lead to path dependency. This study seeks to do something similar: 
isolate those instances in time that theoretically should incentivise new economic practices in 
Russia.81  These critical junctures highlight how crisis resolution measures attempt to break 
with traditional norms and behaviours, but fail to do so. Specifically, process tracing is 
particularly necessary when looking at post-Soviet institutional change. Timothy Frye explains 
WKDW µVWXGHQWV RI SRVW-communism struggle to make causal inferences about the impact of 
LQVWLWXWLRQV RQ RXWFRPHV GXH WR HQGRJHQHLW\ SUREOHPV« LGHQWLI\LQJ WKH LPSDFW RI DQ\
SDUWLFXODULQVWLWXWLRQRQDQ\SDUWLFXODURXWFRPHSUHVHQWVVSHFLDOFKDOOHQJHV¶82 For this study, 
process tracing provides an analytical framework that specifically isolates the role and ability 
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of the CBR before, during, and after a crisis, to single out the effects, or lack thereof, of the 
crisis itself. In each crisis, the weaknesses that led to crisis will be analysed to evaluate the 
aSSURSULDWHQHVVDQGHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKH&%5¶VUHVSRQVHDQGKRZWKRVHUHVSRQVHVKDYHIDLOHG
to result in institutional development.  
7KLV VWXG\ ZLOO WHVW WKH WKUHH K\SRWKHVHV HQXPHUDWHG DERYH WR PHDVXUH WKH &%5¶V
development as a response to the 1998 and 2008 crises. When studying institutional 
development, the key elements of analysis are rules and expectations.83 Specifically, this study 
is concerned with the effectiveness of formal rules over informal practices, or institutions 
versus the social economy, DVWKHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHPVKDSHVDJHQWV¶PRWLYDWLRQV84 As 
such, each hypothesis is testing a crucial stage in institutional development: policy planning 
and objectives, implementation, and enforcement. Do the resolution measures appropriately 
address the cause of the crisis? Are the objectives of the measures met? How long did it take 
to implement the resolution policies, and how far reaching is the change? How effectively and 
IDLUO\DUHWKHPHDVXUHVLPSOHPHQWHG"'RWKH\FKDQJHDJHQWV¶H[SHFWDWLRQV"(ach of these tests, 
what they measure, and how they evaluate the dynamics of institutional change are detailed 
below. 
 
Policy objectives  
This will test the first hypothesis by evaluating what policies the CBR undertakes to resolve 
the crisis. Additionally, measures that aim to strengthen institutional coordination mechanisms 
are more likely to break partial reform equilibrium by making the institutions more effective. 
This will be measured by looking at the &%5¶VSROLF\REMHFWLYHV, and measuring how well they 
have been met. This is an important, if elementary starting point, because it tests the capacity 
of the organisations that embody the institutions, and whether or not they can undertake the 
task at hand. For example, if the policy aims to increase revenue collection, then revenue 
collection must increase. Furthermore, the construction of new institutions to resolve the crisis, 
where necessary, will also be evaluated. This will be measured by examining the role the 
institution is supposed to fulfil, and how well it undertakes its purpose. This evaluates 
institutional development versus modernisation paradox, because new institutions can only be 
as strong as the pre-existing ones with which it interacts.85 Therefore, modernisation policies 
are less likely to be implemented than those that focus institutional development; not because 
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of lack of desire, but of capacity. 
It is often assumed that institutional development has occurred when policy objectives 
are achieved. However, although fulfilling policy objectives is not itself a sign of institutional 
development, it is an integral first step for change. How well policy objectives are met will be 
measured by data collected from various think-tanks and international organisations, such as 
The Levada Centre, The International Monetary Fund, The World Bank, and so on. For this 
hypothesis to stand, the basic objectives of the policy must be met. The degree to which policy 
objectives have been met strengthens the first hypothesis. Additionally, the ratio of crisis 
containment to crisis resolution policies will be evaluated. A reliance on crisis containment 
policies signifies that institutions are too weak to undertake crisis resolution, since the former 
does not require strong institutions. If policy objectives are not achieved, then there is no 
change and the other two hypotheses are likely to be false. The policy fails and the null 
hypothesis is correct.  
 
Implementation time  
Evaluating how long it takes the CBR to implement resolution policies will test the second 
hypothesis. This will be measured by the difference in time it takes the government and 
parliament to agree on and implement the policies. The longer it takes to approve and 
implement crisis resolution measures, the less effective they are likely to be. This is because 
the longer a policy sits, the more time there is to re-draft and amend the policy such that the 
final product contains many loopholes, making it difficult to enforce. Additionally, the longer 
it takes to implement the policy, the more likely it is that informal norms will develop to 
compensate for effects of the crisis, thereby making formal rules less effective and harder to 
implement. However, there is a caveat for policies that have been approved and implemented, 
but are revised. These revisions do not count against the time it takes to implement the policy, 
nor are they considered new policies either. Amendments are a normal part of gradual 
institutional change as laid out in the sequencing arguments, as well as in the literature on 
transitioning from a limited to an open access order.86 
If a resolution measure takes more than three years after growth has resumed to be 
implemented, or is never implemented, then the null hypothesis would be correct: policy 
objectives are unlikely to strengthen systemic weaknesses and the chance for institutional 
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development disappears. For the hypothesis to be confirmed, policies must be approved and 
implemented in three years or less. The more quickly the policy is implemented, the stronger 
the institution is likely to be. Considering that the time from implementation to resolution is 
evaluated at a two-year mark, this measure is generous.87 Economies with strong institutions 
normally see crisis resolution in this time because they do not have to develop coordination 
mechanisms in addition to managing the crisis; they can make use of the institutions they 
already have. Yet, Russia does not have strong institutions. By extending the time-frame for 
resolution measures to be adopted, this study allows time for the state to contain the crisis, then 
work out how to strengthen institutional weaknesses. If this hypothesis is true, then institutional 
development is more likely to result from the crisis. 
 
Enforcement  
The third hypothesis will test the extent to which new reforms are fairly and universally 
enforced and complied with, and whether they endure through time and change.88 This is the 
most crucial step to achieving institutional change: the fair and predictable enforcement of the 
law encourages all economic agents to comply with the new regulations. This creates a new, 
stable set of expectations ² the laws should be followed, and if they are broken, there will be 
consequences. 8OWLPDWHO\WKLVLVWHVWLQJIRUDFKDQJHLQDJHQWV¶EHKDYLRXUVDQGH[SHFWDWLRQV
and whether they use formal institutions or informal norms to mediate transactions and 
conflicts.89 However, measuring this hypothesis is complicated. It would be expected that 
where firms are caught undertaking illegal activity, the law will be enforced. These 
expectations lower barriers to entry by allowing all economic actors to know how the system 
works and what to expect. It also builds investor confidence and encourages long-term 
investment.  
As such, data such as rule of law indicators, levels of foreign direct investment and 
domestic investment (where available), and other policy specific measurements will be 
evaluated. Additionally, we will look at ethnographic and other kinds of descriptive evidence, 
such as interviews, surveys, and current events to better understand how expectations have or 
have not changed. This is important because it provides context to the data and allows us to 
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understand what motivates agents. The more evenly a law is enforced, the stronger the 
institution is. Furthermore, the stronger the institution the more autonomous it is, and the less 
likely it is to be swayed by individual interests. If the reform has failed from the start or cannot 
be enforced at all, then the null hypothesis is accepted. If the policy is evenly enforced, then 
the primary hypothesis is accepted. If this were the case, we would expect to see banks that 
break the law or fail to comply with regulations penalised.  
 
2.4 Conclusion  
Crisis modernisation occurs when economic crises encourage institutional development in 
developing countries. Studies show that crises can act as critical junctures, providing 
governments with an opportunity to strengthen institutions, and by proxy the economy. Many 
scholars have argued that this is the case for Russian banking institutions, and that the major 
economic crises that have occurred since the collapse of the Soviet Union have helped complete 
the transition from command to market. The crisis of 1998 forced the state to implement hard 
budget constraints and cut its own spending, and the crisis of 2008 encouraged the Central 
Bank of Russia to crack down on small, undercapitalised banks, and those non-performing 
banks handing out risky loans. These reforms, they argue, have strengthened market 
institutions in Russia. 
This study argues that this is a fallacy. While the state and Central Bank indeed 
undertook genuine reforms to resolve the conflicts, institutional mechanisms were too weak to 
enforce them. The economic crises of 1998 and 2008 were challenging for Russia, but they did 
QRWEUHDNSDUWLDOUHIRUPHTXLOLEULXP$VDUHVXOW5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLRQWRDPDUNHWHFRQRP\LV
stalled as weak institutions encourage agents to defect from formal institutions and strengthen 
the informal social economy. To better understand this phenomenon, this chapter has outlined 
how to test for and measure institutional development resulting from economic crises. This 
analytical framework will be applied to the 1998 and 2008 crises, the subject of the chapters 
five and six. Analysing the target policy objectives, the ability of these policies to address 
institutional weaknesses, the efficiency with which this is done, and the effectiveness of policy 
enforcement, will shed light on how the CBR has responded to these crises, and whether it has 
been strengthened because of them. 





Before we can examine how partial reform equilibrium is manifest in Russia today, it is 
necessary to understand how the command economy functioned and how attempts to transition 
away from it have failed. As such, this chapter will analyse and describe the critical junctures 
where attempts at reform failed to fully achieve their objectives and set partial reform 
equilibrium in motion. This highlights how and where former institutional practices continue 
to undermine present institutional strength. Although quantitative data will be used where 
possible and applicable, partial reform cannot be fully understood through quantitative analysis 
alone. Process tracing allows this study to demonstrate how partial reform became entrenched 
in Russian economic institutions by highlighting critical junctures of change. As such, it will 
show how changes of regime and modernisation programmes have not spurred institutional 
reform or strengthening. To begin, we will analyse the main practices of command economics 
and how Gorbachev tried to reform them by examining the various perestroika reforms and 
why they failed. This is important, as it forms the foundation upon which Yeltsin and the 
UHIRUPHUVVWURYHWREXLOGDPDUNHWHFRQRP\:HZLOO WKHQDVVHVVKRZ<HOWVLQ¶VHQGHDYRXUV
failed to break partial reform and instead confirmed it. Finally, we will observe how the 
economic policies of the Putin era reinforced the partially reformed institutions, and failed to 
break the equilibrium.  
 
3.1 Gorbachev and the command economy 
Partial reform equilibrium began when Gorbachev attempted to introduce the laws of supply 
and demand to the command economy while simultaneously preserving its nature. To better 
understand how this happened, this section will first examine how the Soviet economy worked 
starting with the difference between hard and soft budget constraints. This allows us to analyse 
the perestroika reforms, focusing specifically on the Law on State Enterprise. The 
implementation of this law illustrates how the failure to implement hard budget constraints 
hampers perestroika reforms and creates the shaky economic foundation that the Russian 
Federation inherits. This era is crucial in understanding the genesis of partial reform 
equilibrium, as the failure to complete perestroika reforms ensures the replication of weak 
institutions after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
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Soft budget constraints vs hard budget constraints 
The command economy was based on fulfilling planned targets instead of demand. In a market, 
supply and demand drives businesses to provide goods and services that the economy needs 
and wants. Command economies fulfil planned targets set by the state rather than consumer 
demand. To meet planning objectives, the state, acting as CEO and accountant, would soften 
the budget constraints as necessary. Most economies operate on hard budget constraints 
(HBC), which are determined by the laws of supply and demand. HBCs are the day-to-day 
operating costs for an enterprise. If the enterprise cannot earn enough to maintain those 
operating costs, then the enterprises will close. HBCs drive enterprises to maximise their profits 
so that they can remain operational. Conversely, soft budget constraints (SBC) allowed the 
Soviet command economy to function on a day-to-day basis by allowing it to ignore the forces 
of supply and demand. SBCs allow businesses that are indebted or unprofitable to stay afloat, 
whereas hard budget constraints would have forced them to close. János Kornai lists the four 
main soft budget constraints that ordered Soviet economy as soft subsidy, soft credit, soft 
administrative pricing, and soft taxation.1  
 Kornai defines soft subsidies as funds granted to enterprises by the state. The amount 
and repayment of the grant are negotiable and, thus, not repayable.2 In practice, a soft subsidy 
is a grant from the state to enterprises to cover production costs and reduce the public selling 
price of the finished product. Enterprises could negotiate with the state on the total subsidy 
needed, and then use it to repay past arrears or fund current needs and impending payments. 
Furthermore, this was money that never needed to be repaid. In the rare case where repayment 
was a condition for dispensing the subsidy, the enterprise was often allowed to choose the 
terms of repayment. Soft subsidies are detrimental to an economy, command or otherwise, 
because they undermine the laws of supply and demand, and obscure pricing mechanisms. This 
is detrimental to both the enterprise and the state as neither earn any profit. The state spent a 
ODUJHDPRXQWRIPRQH\WRVXEVLGLVHHQWHUSULVHV¶SURGXFWLRQSURFHVVHVEXWHDUQHGYHU\OLWWOHLQ
return, because the prices of the finished products were also subsidised. This created a vicious 
cycle, whereby firms became wasteful and inefficient because they were not required to 
maximise their profits either as a condition for receiving subsidies or staying in business. 
Thereby requiring the state to extend subsidies to cover wasted time and funds.  
Soft credit is when the state loans money to an enterprise with the explicit condition 
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that the loan be repaid, without enforcing repayment.3 Like soft subsidies, soft credit was a 
way to ensure that firms could continue production regardless of its profit margins ² it allowed 
the firm to stay in business even if they were not profitable. Firms avoided repayment by 
negotiating favourable and flexible terms, or asking for forgiveness if profits were low or 
negative. Additionally, even if the state wanted to enforce credit repayment, there were no 
mechanisms to do so. The result of soft credit was that the state was, again, losing more money 
than it was making. The repercussions of this practice were that there was no precedent for 
debt repayment after the Soviet Union collapsed. If there is no expectation that loans will be 
repaid, and there are no tools to enforce repayment, then banks will struggle to both lend and 
ensure loans are repaid.  
Soft administrative pricing refers to a practice in which prices for raw materials are 
determined by a ministry rather than the laws of supply and demand.4 These prices were highly 
subsidised so that enterprises could afford them. Soft administrative pricing for natural 
resources and raw materials amounted to an additional form of soft subsidy. Soft administrative 
pricing created two problems. First, it promoted waste.5 Because prices were kept artificially 
low and enterprises were not profit driven, there was no need to maximise the use of primary 
inputs. If materials were misused, accidentally destroyed, or damaged, they could be replaced. 
However, this same inefficiency and waste also characterised raw materials firms, which led 
to a production backlog. The delays, inefficiency, and waste at all stages of the production 
process led to scarcity and rationing, as production could not meet demand. Second, and more 
importantly, the practice completely obscured the pricing mechanism, making it difficult to 
determine the actual value of goods. This would later hinder the attempts of reformers to harden 
budget constraints by liberalising prices, because there was no mechanism to determine what 
the prices should be.  
 Soft taxation refers to the paying of taxes in kind by individuals and enterprises, or 
receiving a tax-exempt status.6 Many Soviet enterprises avoided paying taxes, because it would 
have constituted a hard budget constraint. This would have forced enterprises to reduce 
employment or production, neither of which was in line with either socialist ideology or Soviet 
planning policies. As such, many enterprises bargained with the state for lower tax rates, tax 
exemption, or forgiveness of tax arrears. The problem is that taxation was one of the few 
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sources of domestic income that the Soviet Union had to cover the costs of soft subsidies, soft 
credit, and soft administrative pricing, but soft taxation prevented them from maximising this 
revenue. Soft taxation is also an example of how Soviet institutional practices perverted the 
development of Russian economic institutions. Not only were Russian individuals and firms 
unaccustomed to paying taxes, so too was the state unaccustomed to collecting them.7 Thus, 
although the state attempted to construct institutions that would collect taxes, the tools the 
institutions had were ineffective at creating new practices and expectations. 
OQHRIWKHHIIHFWVRIVRIWEXGJHWFRQVWUDLQWVLVWKDWLWUHGXFHGILUPV¶HIILFLHQF\DQGWKH
incentive to improve technological innovation. Gorbachev wanted to increase productivity, 
efficiency, and innovation by creating incentives for enterprises to maximise profits, without 
completely hardening budget constraints.8 As such, this was one of the perestroika UHIRUP¶V
many objectives: to restructure the economy. However, many of the nomenklatura opposed or 
XQGHUPLQHG*RUEDFKHY¶VUHIRUPVZKHUHYHUSRVVLEOHUHTXLring him to make concessions that 
weakened the reforms he was trying to implement.9 This combination resulted in policies that 
aimed to introduce hard budget constraints, but contained loopholes to prevent social 
dislocation or damage to elite interests. The result was that enterprises had no cues from which 
WRZRUN8QGHUWKHFRPPDQGHFRQRP\WKH\ZRXOGKDYHZRUNHGWRPHHWWKHSDUW\¶VSODQ,QD
market economy, theoretically, they would work to meet public demand. Yet, there were no 
more party plans, but they were insulated from demand. As the command economy was being 
dismantled, with no market mechanisms in place, efficiency fell even lower than it was before. 
 
Perestroika 
When Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, the Soviet economy was struggling. The estimated Soviet growth rate had declined 
from around five percent in the 1950s and 1960s, to between one percent and three percent in 
the 1980s.10 With a continual decline in growth and soft budget practices providing no 
LQFHQWLYH IRU HQWHUSULVHV WR PD[LPLVH SURILWV DQG XQGHUPLQLQJ WKH VWDWH¶V DELOLW\ WR FROOHFW
revenue, the economy would continue to decline. Gorbachev knew that economic growth was 
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necessary for the state to survive, and that growth could only come from investment and a drive 
to maximise profits.11 )RUH[DPSOHµ$WWKH7ZHQW\6HYHQWK3DUW\&RQJUHVVLQKHDUJXHG
WKDWLWZDVWLPHWR³RYHUFRPHSUHMXGLFHVUHJDUGLQJFRPPRGLW\-money relations and the under-
estimation of these relations in plDQQHG HFRQRPLF JXLGDQFH´¶12 Without intending to, by 
advocating the commodification of production, Gorbachev was arguing for hardening the 
budget constraints. Thus, Gorbachev devised perestroika ² a series of reforms to stimulate 
profit maximisation incentives in the Soviet command economy. These reforms took place 
alongside the civil and political reforms. However, as this study is concerned with the stalled 
development of economic institutions, this section will look only at economic reforms.  
A very strong believer in socialist values, Gorbachev wanted to simply tweak the 
system rather than replace it with market institutions, because it would cause worry over 
unemployment and the affordability of necessities, such as food and housing.13 He wanted to 
find a way to slowly, but consistently increase economic growth each year.14 In 1987, 
Gorbachev introduced Basic PositionsZKLFKVSHOOHGRXWWKHUHIRUP¶VREMHFWLYHVWRLQFUHDVH
profits by reducing micromanagement, but maintaining central planning from above, soft 
administrative pricing, and soft subsidies.15 It succeeded in removing the bureaucrats who 
oversaw and enforced production plans by 1988 when Gorbachev disbanded the economic 
branches of the Communist Party.16 Yet, it failed to harden budget constraints by requiring 
firms to pay for their production costs and take responsibility for their losses. The result was 
that factory and enterprise managers were given more control over production with few of the 
consequences or constraints one would face in a market economy. Thus, the reforms failed to 
harden budget constraints that apply market pressures and drive production. Without the need 
to maximise profits, firms were not motivated to become more efficient or increase production.   
For example, The Law on State Enterprise (1987) began removing many of the 
committees that oversaw economic activities and devolved power to firm managers, many of 
whom were nomenklatura or political elites.17 The law allowed also allowed for the creation 
of a private services and small-scale industry, and managers could set their own wholesale 
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prices and produce what they like once state targets had been met.18  As a result, the 
nomenklatura were able to acquire primary and other raw materials for a subsidised price, and 
then resell the products for higher prices even though the goods were of no better quality or 
produced more efficiently.19 Furthermore, the maintenance of soft taxation enabled enterprises 
to avoid paying taxes on their profits. This allowed firms to pocket the difference between the 
subsidised production cost and the market selling price. Thus, The Law on State Enterprise 
constituted a critical juncture for economic institutional development by creating a financial 
incentive for the nomenklatura to maintain institutional weaknesses.20 This obscured the rules 
of the game for all but the nomenklatura, creating and perpetuating a weak economy ruled by 
a low level of rule of law. As a result, the laws of supply and demand were unable to coordinate 
with soft budget constraints and generate economic growth.  
Examining the perestroika reforms illustrates how the introduction of market economy 
practices unintentionally weakened institutions by stripping them of the coordination 
mechanisms that made the economy work, and replacing them with mechanisms that are 
ineffective ² like trying to put a square peg into a round hole. Because the formal institutional 
enforcement mechanisms had become useless, officials resorted to whatever practices helped 
them undertake their responsibilities, often using social networks. This was vital to the 
development of partial reform equilibrium, as it ensured that the elites could interpret and use 
the institutions and laws to their advantage. If rule by law leads to the selective application of 
law, then there will be no expectation that institutions will be fair.21 Thus, an incentive to 
replicate weak institutions emerged, both from the desire to seek personal rents, but also from 
a lack of trust. 
 Huntington proposes that rapid social and economic change resulting from 
modernisation over institutional development forces societies to question existing values and 
behaviours, and the institutions that embody them.22 Claus Offe supports this argument by 
highlighting how undertaking three transitions simultaneously undermines the effectiveness of 
all of them, because it undermines the existing system and causes decay. 23  The Soviet Union 
exemplifies this notion. Gorbachev attempted to undertake political, economic, and social 
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reform all at once, which eroded the foundation of the state.24 As perestroika sought to change 
the Soviet economy, it confirmed what many had believed for a long time: that the command 
economy, and foundation upon which it was constructed, was crumbling. This culminated in 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Perestroika focused on implementing formal laws, 
without trying to change the structural issues causing problems in the first place.  
 
3.2 The Yeltsin years: stumbling through transition 
7KHFROODSVHRIWKH6RYLHW8QLRQVKRXOGKDYHILW6FKXPSHWHU¶VµFUHDWLYHGHVWUXFWLRQ¶WKHRU\² 
tear down the Soviet command economy and build a market economy in its place.25 However, 
Soviet institutional legacies complicate this. After the USSR collapsed, the Russian Federation 
attempted to modify rather than replace the former Soviet political and economic institutions 
they inherited, such as the Supreme Soviet and the Central Bank. However, this meant they 
also inherited what remained of the partially reformed the Soviet economic institutions, which 
ZHUHQHLWKHUFRPPDQGQRUPDUNHWQRUDQ\WKLQJ LQEHWZHHQ5XVVLD¶VHDUO\UHIRUPHUVZHUH
tasked with reigning in this anarchical system and trying to make it work. This was an 
enormously complex task as little of the traditional wisdom of political science and economics 
was applicable. Additionally, Soviet economists had not received the same training that 
Western economists did, which made it difficult the latter to effectively advise politicians on 
how to reform the system.26 -HIIUH\6DFKVVDLGKHµIHOWOLNHDVXUJHRQZKRVOLFHGRSHQDSDWLHQW
RQO\WRGLVFRYHUQRWKLQJWKDWZDVVXSSRVHGWREHWKHUH¶27 Economic advisors from all over the 
world had a different approach to reforming the system and speeding up the transition process. 
While there are many debates surrounding the success or failure of the 1990s reforms, this 
study will demonstrate that the reforms failed, as they did not break partial reform equilibrium. 
The next section will examine the key reforms of price liberalisation and privatisation 
(including loans-for-shares), what their objectives were, and the extent to which those 
objectives were achieved. It will also examine the various arguments surrounding the efficacy 
and legacy of these early reforms. Finally, we will analyse how Putin both changed the game, 
but failed to break partial reform equilibrium by placing vested interests in strategic economic 
sectors, specifically the gas and oil industry. 
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Liberalisation 1992  
The aim of liberalisation was to free the artificial prices that reflected state planning rather than 
supply and demand. Most arguments over liberalisation begin with the methods for undertaking 
it: shock therapy or gradualism. Gradualists and sequentialists argued that shock therapy was 
doomed to fail because the necessary institutions for enforcing it were not yet in place.28 
*UDGXDOLVPµVHHNVWRILQGDZD\IRUFRXQWULHVZKHUHIHZFLUFXPVWDQFHVIDYRXUGHPRcracy to 
take incremental but definite steps toward open political competition while simultaneously 
pursuing state-building and rule of ODZUHIRUPV¶ 29 However, feeling like there was no other 
choice, then Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar pursued shock therapy, RUWKHµUDSLGOLEHUDOLVDWLRQ
RISULFHVUHPRYDORIVXEVLGLHVH[SHQGLWXUHFXWVDQGVHYHUHUHGXFWLRQVLQWKHPRQH\VXSSO\¶30 
This study will not debate the difference between the two and which may have been better for 
Russia. While both options had their shortcomings, debating which would have been the best 
way forward sheds no light on how partial reform equilibrium has been maintained. Instead, 
this study examines the route that Russia did take, shock therapy, and the effects of this 
decision. An analysis of the fiscal and monetary effects of liberalisation is included in the 
following chapter. 
Shock therapy is drastic and difficult. The argument was that the economic effects 
would be harsh, but measureable improvement would come more quickly than with a gradualist 
approach. Several other countries, such as Poland, had experimented with shock therapy and 
had EHHQ VXFFHVVIXO $V VXFK LW ZDV FRQVLGHUHG D YLDEOH PHDQV RI UHRULHQWLQJ 5XVVLD¶V
economy in a timely and efficient manner. Yet Poland and other countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) that were also transitioning to a market cannot be compared to Russia. 
In the first instance, most CEE states had command economies forced upon them in the 
aftermath of the Second World War.31 These states had well-established market economy 
institutions prior to the Communist takeover, and a desire to return to them. Additionally, the 
influence of the European Union cannot be ignored, as prospective EU membership is strongly 
correlated stronger institutional development.32 Thus, it is unlikely that shock therapy would 
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have had the same effects on Russia as it did on other states even if it had been properly 
undertaken. 
 In theory, Gaidar envisioned a plan that would take place over three years and would 
focus on monetary policy, price liberalisation, and privatisation.33 The first major focus, and 
the only one Gaidar would see implemented, was the end to soft administrative pricing and 
subsidies on 2nd January 1992. However, this caused concern among many firms as it would 
require them to pay for their raw materials and inputs without any guarantee of earning enough 
to stay in business. To offset this, those factory managers who belonged to the Supreme 
6RYLHW¶Vnomenklatura fought with Gaidar to make exceptions for certain subsidies, notably 
energy prices, fuel, transport, and communications.34 The justification was that in the confusion 
created by sudden price increases, it was necessary to ensure that certain companies and 
industries would not flounder under hard budget constraints, and that consumers could still 
afford necessities.35 For example, a year after liberalisation, gas prices in Russia remained at 
eight percent of the world market price.36 As such, the economy was only partially liberalised 
as budget constraints remained soft and many subsidies were maintained.37 
 While there was genuine concern about the effects of liberalisation on social well-
being, the managers and nomenklatura also profited greatly from these reforms, and thus had 
an interest in maintaining its partial state.38 For example, hydrocarbon and metal production 
enterprises bought commodities for a subsidised price, then sold the products at the world 
market price and pocketed the difference.39 Additionally, those industries and enterprises that 
were not granted subsidies were able to escape the implementation of hard budget constraints 
by borrowing money from the Central Bank. As neither perestroika, nor liberalisation 
addressed the issues of soft credit, these enterprises could borrow money and avoid repayment. 
As such, the nomenklatura advocated for, and ensured that Gaidar was fired and replaced by 
Viktor Chernomyrdin before further reform could take place.  
However, continuity was essential to the success of the Russian programme because it 
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QHHGHGFRQVLVWHQWLPSOHPHQWDWLRQWREHDUIUXLW*DLGDU¶VGLVPLVVDOJXDUDQWHHGWKLVZRXOGQRW
happen. Liberalisation resulted in neither shock therapy, nor gradualism. Prices were raised or 
otherwise changed, but not actually liberalised.40 Shock therapy would have seen all prices 
liberalised and most subsidies ended simultaneously, whereas gradualism probably would have 
liberalised prices and discontinued subsidies incrementally over time. However, by labelling 
SROLF\DVµVKRFNWKHUDS\¶DQGWKHUHE\LQVLQXDWLQJWKDWWKHWDVNKDVEHHQFRPSOHWHGLWEOXQWHG
the need to end those practices that would undermine future attempts to fix the system. This 
was detrimental to the formation of a market economy, because hard budget constraints were 
not imposed and enterprises remained insulated from the market forces of supply and demand. 
Therefore, partial reform equilibrium was maintained. 
Anders Åslund has argued that Russia¶VOLEHUDOLVDWLRQDWWHPSWZDVQRWDIDLOXUHUDWKHU
that the economic troubles and corruption that have resulted are due to poor reform efforts.41 
,IRWKHUIRUPHUO\VRFLDOLVWVWDWHVVXFFHVVIXOO\XQGHUWRRNVKRFNWKHUDS\WKHQ5XVVLD¶VIDLOXUHWR
do so lies with the reformers and policy makers. Yet, this study argues that this is an over 
simplified analysis. To begin, money was tangential to Soviet economic practices because most 
people relied on barter and social connections to undertake economic transactions.42 Moreover, 
shock therapy was the rapid implementation of formal rules with no enforcement mechanism, 
and thus did not affect informal practices.43 Liberalisation addressed the market aspirations of 
price liberalisation, without considering the need to limit or constrain former economic 
practices, such as bribing officials, using social networks, and bartering.  
Even though the use of money was a relatively easy adjustment, the use of social 
networks and maintenance of subsidies undermined the liberalisation and perpetuated corrupt 
practices. While Åslund may be right in pointing out that liberalisation did increase the abilities 
of elites to seek rents, he fails to recognise that this corruption is a symptom of a larger problem: 
the neglect to address ingrained institutional practices. Liberalisation was drafted by focusing 
on the intended outcome, without taking considering the institutional capacities to implement 
it. Therefore, it is the failure to complete the process of liberalisation that is the cause of 
corruption, not the inherent nature of the elites.  
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Privatisation 1992 ± 1994  
$QDWRO\&KXEDLVZDVWKHGHVLJQHURI5XVVLD¶VSULYDWLVDWLRQSURJUDPPH/LNH*DLGDUKHKDG
to make concessions to the Supreme Soviet for the programme to be implemented, which 
resulted in further entrenchment of partial reform equilibrium. Privatisation is essential to 
stimulating economic growth, because it redistributes state-owned assets to private owners and 
incentivises the new owners to maximise profits by restructuring and improving production 
capacity.44 Additionally, without the state subsidising production, privatisation would 
introduce competition, thereby encouraging enterprises to maximise their potential or perish. 
In theory, this would provide new incentives for strengthening institutions: owners and 
managers will lobby for stronger rule of law to protect their long-term interests.45 If successful, 
this would have led to a more robust and dynamic economy that would have promoted and 
sustained economic growth in Russia. Instead, privatisation resulted in enterprise directors 
becoming managers who, for the most part, did not know how to function in a market economy. 
Those that did were constrained by the informal practices necessary for transactions with other 
businesses. Rather than rooting out Soviet practices, the privatisation reform legitimised them. 
)XUWKHUPRUHSULYDWLVDWLRQFUHDWHGZKDW&KU\VWLD)UHHODQGFDOOVµWKHORRSKROHHFRQRP\¶ZKLFK
made asset-stripping and rent-seeking easier.46 
 The means of privatisation was determined by the size of the enterprise. Small firms 
were to be auctioned off or otherwise sold. Medium-sized enterprises could choose between 
going to auction or becoming corporations. Large enterprises were to become corporations by 
one of three options: 1) employees and managers would receive 25 percent of non-voting shares 
for free and could purchase up to an additional 10 percent of voting shares at a reduced rate; 2) 
companies could purchase 51percent  of voting shares in closed auction; 3) a managing group 
could privatise a medium-sized company by purchasing 30 percent of thHFRPSDQ\¶VYRWLQJ
shares and selling 20 percent to existing managers and employees at a discount.47 Many large 
enterprise managers were the nomenklatura with whom Chubias had to draft the reform, and 
they used their positions to ensure that the privatisation reforms would be favourable to them. 
For instance, the second option initially allowed companies to purchase up to 40 percent of 
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voting shares, but Chubais had to increase the maximum amount to 51 percent before the 
reform was approved.48 As a result, 70 percent of enterprise managers used the second option 
to purchase their enterprises in a closed, rigged auction for a very, very low price.49  
 The consequence of this negotiation was that medium and large enterprises were not 
taken over by market-oriented, profit-maximising, managers and CEOs. Instead, managers 
who favoured inefficient Soviet practices remained in charge and prevented necessary 
restructuring.50 This only reinforced the disincentive to restructure and the incentive to exploit 
the loopholes between command and market institutions. For example, in addition to their 
ability to retain company profits, enterprises were also allowed to borrow from the banks. 
However, the reforms thus far had not addressed the maintenance of soft credit and means of 
enforcing loan repayment.51 Moreover, when the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) appealed to 
the state to force delinquent enterprises to repay their loans, the state sided with the enterprises 
and absolved them of their debts.52 Additionally, enterprises that were privatised often became 
market enterprises in name only. In practice, these enterprises remained inefficient and 
unproductive. They maintained the command economy practice of soft-administrative pricing 
by doing business directly with each other through non-cash transactions. Furthermore, those 
managers who were market-oriented were constrained, because they were forced to undertake 
economic transactions via informal practices in order to do business with other enterprises.53  
 Some argue that the privatisation programme was successful.54 The overall goal was to 
redistribute property from the state to entrepreneurs who would restructure the businesses and 
make them profitable.55 It also aimed to make the labour market more flexible by reallocating 
workers from inefficient to productive enterprises.56 Private sector employment grew from 13 
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percent in 1991 to 40 percent in 1997.57 Additionally, the private sector accounted for 65 
SHUFHQWRI5XVVLD¶V*'3LQ58 However, if enterprises that were privatised by insiders are 
included in that count, then their employees would be counted as working in private industry 
without having changed jobs. Here we see the trouble with the formal reform versus informal 
practices. Formally, many enterprises have been privatised, because on paper this is true. 
Informally, the picture is different, as insiders are still at the helm.59 Therefore, a far more 
effective analysis of privatisation is the extent to which the practice supports moving toward a 
market economy by: 1) redefining WKHVWDWH¶VUROHLQWKHHFRQRP\ using formal institutions 
to resolve problems; 3) and being able to make long-term investments.  
 As with liberalization, the failure of privatisation is due to the implementation of formal 
laws that have little effect on informal practices. The very concept of private property was 
unfamiliar, and the institutions needed to enforce private property rights were foreign.60 For 
example, enterprises still drafted contracts based on Soviet templates, not realising they were 
at liberty to set their own terms.61 Additionally, enterprises resorted to private enforcement 
(e.g. mafia) instead of contracts and courts to enforce or resolve inter-enterprise issues 
primarily because that was how contracts were enforced in the Soviet economy.62 As the 
practice of using sistema, or the social economy, to enforce contracts and resolve disputes in 
the command economy continued, it undermined attempts to develop market institutions. 




By 1995, the government was struggling to collect enough revenue to maintain its spending, 
because the state had difficulty collecting taxes from individuals and businesses. The problem 
was three-fold. First, many enterprises hid profits to obscure the amount of tax they owed. 
Second, tax collectors were easily bribed to write-RIIDUUHDUV)LQDOO\WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VWD[
collection policies were ineffective, and the institutions charged with collecting taxes did not 
have clearly defined enforcement powers. When collection cases were brought before the 
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government or other tax authorities, the government erred on the side of forgiving arrears so 
that businesses could remain open.63 This upheld the command practice of soft taxation. Doing 
so not only deprived the state of badly needed revenue, it also reinforced the incentive for firms 
QRW WR UHVWUXFWXUH )XUWKHUPRUH EHFDXVH WKH &%5¶V FKDUWHU VSHFLILFDOO\ IRUELGV LW IURP
ILQDQFLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VEXGJHWRUEXGJHWGHILFLWWKHVWDWHKDGQRZD\WRIXOO\ILQDQFHLWV 
own budget aside from printing money and increasing inflation.  
While the government used treasury bonds, or GKO bonds, to help alleviate the 
pressure on the budget, it was still parched for funds.64 $WWKHVDPHWLPH5XVVLD¶VQHZHVWEDQNV
were desperate for liquidity and business.65 So, those authorised banks that were part of larger 
financial industrial groups (FIGs) used their political connections to strike a deal that would 
help both the state and the banks. This deal became known as the loans-for-shares programme. 
The programme called for the government to auction its controlling share in select enterprises 
in exchange for a loan from an FIG or entrepreneur. Once the loan was repaid, the government 
would regain its controlling stake in the enterprise. Because the Duma had banned these 
enterprises from taking part in the first round of privatisations in 1992, the bidders could not 
purchase the shares.66 Rather, they would be held as collateral to be returned when the 
government repaid the loan. Only if the government defaulted would the investor own the 
shares. In theory, this programme was a way for the government to profit from privatisation 
without privatising, and earn much needed revenue in the process.  
In practice, the loans-for-shares programme robbed the government of billions of 
dollars and only increased the problem of insider privatisation.67 For the programme to be 
successful, the government should have held open auctions and selected the winner with the 
highest bid, and who was more likely to restructure the enterprise to maximise its potential. 
Yet, the auctions were closed and rigged to favour a predetermined bank or individual. This 
further undermined the attempt to create a market economy by intervening where market 
mechanisms should be allowed to function unfettered.68 For example, Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
won a 78 percent controlling share in Yukos, a company worth at least $1 billion, for a mere 
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$310 million.69 (YHQPRUHVKRFNLQJZDV%RULV%HUH]RYVN\¶VDELOLW\WRSXUFKDVH6LEQHIWZRUWK
an estimated $110 billion, for only $1 billion.70 The FIGs profited from loans-for-shares far 
more than the state: the state only pocketed $779 million from the entire scheme, while the 
),*VJDLQHGWKHFRQWUROOLQJVKDUHVRIWKHVWDWH¶VPRVWOXFUDWLYHILUPV71  
In the end, while it did provide some liquidity, loans-for-shares failed to generate 
enough revenue to compensate for poor tax collection mechanisms. Importantly, GKO sales, 
the other sources of budgetary funding, depended on the government earning a certain level of 
revenue to retain investor confidence.72 However, because the loans-for-shares programme 
shorted the government, it became more and more difficult to reach that threshold. Thus, the 
breakdown of privatisation not only resulted in the failure to create stable foundations upon 
which market institutions could develop, but also upheld those practices that continued to 
undermine attempts to do so. By favouring members of social networks over formal practices, 
the state undermined the rule of law and reinforced the need for the social economy. This was 
not only detrimental to the economy, but also to the state itself.  The failure to focus on 
developing market institutions resulted in revenue shortages: by not hardening budget 
constraints, the government continued to subsidise enterprises when it could not afford to do 
so; by undermining privatisation, it failed to encourage enterprises to generate revenue the state 
could tax; and by not focusing on the institutional problems regarding tax collection, it was 
unable to collect vital revenue. These issues were unsustainable, and made the government 
vulnerable to economic trouble. 
 
The financial crisis of 1998 
The 1998 financial crisis was a devastating blow to the government, as it undermined both its 
domestic and international credibility. The economy imploded as inflation skyrocketed 
overnight and the government could no longer meet its financial obligations. The importance 
of this crisis cannot be understated because it was the result of partial reform equilibriums 
inability to stabilise economic institutions. The upside of the crisis is that it forced the state to 
implement some hard budget constraints, particularly regarding spending. The institutional 
impact of the crisis is also important, as it required the state to address institutional weaknesses 
such as tax evasion and barter trading. However, these new hard-line policies softened once 
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gas and oil prices increased shortly after the crisis, which compromised those reforms that 
should have encouraged institutional development. As a result, the crisis was a critical juncture 
that created new ± and perpetuated old ± practices that enabled weak institutions to continue 
replicating themselves. This section will examine Western conditionality and the inability to 
collect taxes and cut spending, and contagion from the East Asian crisis of the same year. The 
role banks and fiscal policy played in causing the crisis is the subject of chapter five. 
 After years of failing to harden budget constraints and develop tax collection 
mechanisms, the government found itself unable to control its fiscal spending. To cover these 
costs, the government printed money, which resulted in inflationary pressure. At the same time, 
the CBR had pegged the exchange rate to favour the ruble and they refused to float it, thus 
hiding said inflation. Additionally, the government had received loans from various 
organisations such as The World Bank, The IMF, and The European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD). In an attempt to ensure that Russia would undertake democratic 
and market economy reforms, the loans came with conditions. Many of these conditions 
required changes to economic and political institutions within the country, which the 
government genuinely implemented. However, by no fault of the Yeltsin administration, these 
changes had little effect.73 As such, in the months preceding the financial crash, Russia found 
itself close to defaulting on its loan obligations as disbursements were withheld.  
 The largest contributing factoU WR WKH ILQDQFLDO FULVLVZDV5XVVLD¶V LQDELOLW\ WR
adopt hard budget constraints. As a result, many firms continued operating at a loss at the 
H[SHQVHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHILUPV¶FUHGLWRUV, as they continued to avoid taxation and 
debt repayment. In 1997, 49 percent of companies in Russia were operating at a loss, but neither 
the state nor creditors took steps to liquidate them.74 This is due to the primitive bankruptcy 
laws that favoured enterprises.75 These firms did not pay taxes and consistently had their 
outstanding tax arrears forgiven, undermining the credibility of state revenue collectors and the 
practice and expectation of paying taxes. As such, many firms realised that the more tax arrears 
mounted, the more difficult it would be for the state to collect them, and the more likely it was 
the arrears would be forgiven.76 Consequently, profitable enterprises claimed to be operating 
at a loss to avoid paying taxes or wages and pocketed the difference. These enterprises had 
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༦4.2 billion in wage arrears in 1998 and ༦1,126 billion, or 40 percent of GDP, of overdue 
payments.77 Additionally, one third of the ༦129 billion tax deficit belonged to only 250 
companies.78  
 The government was no better than the enterprises. In addition to its inability to collect 
taxes, it was also unable to control its spending. As of January 1997, just over a year and a half 
before the crisis, the government had payment arrears of ༦67 billion, or three percent of its 
GDP.79 It was $242 billion in debt by the time of the crisis in 1998, with $16 billion being 
accrued between June and August of that year alone.80 It should be noted, that this estimate 
includes both foreign and domestic debt. With little to no taxes being paid at the time, tax 
arrears to the federal government stood at ༦129 billion.81 To find alternative means of financing 
its deficit, the Russian government entered the global financial market by allowing the Central 
Bank to issue treasury bonds. Yet, Russia entered did so on shaky ground: its fiscal and 
monetary policies were not sound, its financial institutions were weak, and the global financial 
market only amplified these weaknesses and vulnerabilities.82  
In seeking to improve its economic outlook by attracting foreign investors instead of 
addressing the serious structural problems the economy was facing, the government created a 
massive and fragile financial bubble. It was the steady foreign investment in treasury bonds 
that encouraged the government and Central Bank to maintain artificially low inflation by 
pegging the exchange rate. Thus, although it appeared that the Central Bank had achieved 
single digit inflation, it was masking the true interest rate, which had appreciated by at least 55 
percent as of July 1997 and only continued to increase over the course of the year.83 In the 
months leading up to the crash, the government needed to sell $1 billion worth of treasury 
bonds investments if it wanted to keep using them to finance its debt. By 17 August 1998, this 
was no longer possible. The government defaulted on its international and domestic debt, and 
floated the ruble, which sparked a run on the banks.  
7KHHFRQRPLFFULVLVGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDW5XVVLD¶VHFRQRP\ZDVXQVWDEOHDQGWKH
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partial reforms it had relied on were unsustainable. The crisis led to a sharp devaluation in the 
price of Russian exports, which led to import substitution. Additionally, it forced the 
government to cut spending and improve the tax code. It is for these reasons that many see the 
1998 crisis as a critical juncture in Russian institutional development: it is after this crisis that 
µtrue¶ reform and modernisation takes place. Yet, none of the changes that occurred as a result 
of the 1998 crisis broke partial reform equilibrium or strengthened institutions. This argument 
will be further explored in chapter five. To better understand the illusion of reform, we must 
first analyse how Vladimir Putin changed Russian politics to have more control over the 
economy. In doing so, he inadvertently ensured the replication of weak, partially reformed 
institutions. 
 
3.3 The Putin era: illusions and delusions  
Gorbachev set out make the command economy more productive and accidentally brought the 
system crashing down. In introducing market mechanisms, Gorbachev stalled the Soviet 
economy. He wanted to find a way to make the command economy more profitable and 
demand, but ended up with a dysfunctional, hybrid system that was neither communist nor 
capitalist. Similarly, the Yeltsin era was one of traumatic changes that were neither 
comprehensive nor consistent enough to break the partially reformed economy it inherited from 
the Soviet Union. Maintaining these practices allowed inefficient, non-performing enterprises 
to continue operating, which generated negative economic growth and led to a major economic 
crisis. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin undertook economic modernization programmes, but 
because of the lack of institutional mechanisms to implement them, they failed. 
0DQ\VHHWKHHFRQRPLFFULVLVDVD WXUQLQJSRLQW IRU5XVVLD¶VPRGHUQLVDWLRQ ,W
appeared that the crisis forced the state to finally implement hard budget constraints: the state 
cut spending, businesses began to fold, and unemployment OHYHOV URVH 7KHQ DV .RUQDL¶V
transformational recession theory holds, unemployment and inflation eventually fell, and GDP 
and GDP per capita started to rise.84 This coincided with Vladimir Putin coming to power. It 
appeared that he removed subsidies, cut spending, and allowed the market to flourish 
unfettered. Yet, while Putin undertook more reforms than his predecessor, many of these 
reforms only strengthened sistema, or the social economy, instead of formal economic 
institutions. He did this through the UHQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ RI VRPH RI 5XVVLD¶V PRVW OXFUDWLYH
enterprises, and installing members of his blat, or social network, as the managers and CEOs. 
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Thus, where many see the emergence of a strong economy, instead it is the solidification of 
informal practices. The problem is that none of these practices are codified, and thus continue 
to defy formal laws and weaken economic institutions. This section will look at how Putin 
maintained partial reform equilibrium through renationalisation and replacing the Yeltsin era 
elites with loyal members of his own social network. 
 
Vertikal: renationalisation and centralisation 
Shortly after winning the 2000 presidential election, Vladimir Putin made it quite clear that he 
intended to make Russia a rule of law state. Having studied law, Putin understands the 
importance of law and strong institutions. In many of his early speeches, he propounded on the 
importance of the universality of law and its proper enforcement.85 However, most of his 
presidenFLHVKDYHXQGHUPLQHGWKHVHSULQFLSOHV2QHUHDVRQIRUWKLV LVWKDW3XWLQ¶VHFRQRPLF
vision requires him to centralise power as much as possible, which is antithetical to the rule of 
law.86 $VQRWHGE\9ODGLPLU*HO¶PDQDZHDNVWDWHPD\QRWEHDEOHWRHQIRUFe the rule of law, 
but a centralised, strong state will use its power over the law as a vehicle to achieve its own 
ends and protect its own interests.87 Putin did just this to achieve his economic objectives: a 
state that can profit from large conglomerates E\H[SORLWLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶VQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHV88 
$VVXFK3XWLQVHWRXW WRUHQDWLRQDOLVHPDQ\RI5XVVLD¶VQDWXUDOUHVRXUFH LQGXVWULHVWKDWKDG
been privatised in the 1990s through the privatisation and loans for shares programmes.  
  To set the stage for renationalisation, Putin first had to rein in the oligarchs who 
manned the enterprises he sought to control. Their untrammelled influence exploited structural 
economic problems, bankrupted the state, and led to the 1998 financial crisis. Thus, it was 
imperative to Putin that the oligarchs cooperate or have their power curtailed. When he won 
the election in 2000, Putin strongly hinted that the oligarchs should work with him to achieve 
economic stability in Russia.89 However, this meant a drastic reduction in economic autonomy 
for the oligarchs. Putin was effectively asking the oligarchs to give up both the political power 
that allowed them to rent-seek, and the economic autonomy over the industries they managed. 
By curbing oligarchs¶ power or bringing them into line with his economic plan, Putin could 
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form policies to protected and promoted WKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVWUDWKHUWKDQWKHROLJDUFKV¶ 
 In 2002, Putin held a not-so-secret, behind the scenes meeting with the oligarchs in 
which he told them to cooperate with him, leave their positions, or face the consequences.90 If 
they toed the line, Putin would allow them to remain in their management positions and keep 
their wealth.91 Those who did not would be prosecuted for economic crimes they committed in 
the 1990s, such as tax evasion, asset stripping, and money laundering.92 Although it could be 
argued that Putin lied to the oligarchs and always intended to strip them of power and reacquire 
their companies, the relationship is far more complicated. Putin wanted to recentralise state 
power in order to neutralise any opposition, and more effectively implement economic and 
political reforms.93 Some of the oligarchs followed Putin, notably Potanin and Chubias. Others 
did for a time and left before business got ugly, like Abramovich.94 Others tried to fight back 
and lost, including: Gusinsky, Berezovsky, and infamously, Khodorkovsky.  
 Under Putin, the oligarchs and elites of the 1990s were replaced with members of 
3XWLQ¶Vblat: the siloviki and the St. Petersburg Mafia. By filling these ROLJDUFKV¶HPSW\posts 
with trusted associates, Putin ensured that there was little resistance to his economic plans. The 
siloviki DUH3XWLQ¶V IRUPHU FROOHDJXHVDQGFRQWDFWV LQ WKHVHFXULW\ DQG Lntelligence services, 
both the KGB and FSB. The St Petersburg mafia refers to those colleagues that Putin worked 
with while working for Anatoly Sobchak, the Mayor of St Petersburg in the early 1990s. For 
example, Anatoly Chubias is a member of the St. Petersburg Mafia as he and Putin worked for 
6REFKDNXQWLO&KXELDVOHIWWRGLUHFWWKHSULYDWLVDWLRQSURJUDPPH0HPEHUVRI3XWLQ¶Vblat were 
appointed to the highest positions in the most lucrative companies, and sprinkled in important 
positions in the government. Often, one person filled both those positions simultaneously.95 
The result was that Putin had near total control over the government and many natural resource 
companies.  
 Putin wanted to use the renationalisation of the natural resource industries as a means 
of strengthening economic institutions.96 7KHLGHDZDVWKDWE\UHQDWLRQDOLVLQJWKHVWDWH¶VODUJHVW
and most profitable enterprises, the state would be able to enforce and assert company policies 
that would respect international norms for property rights, accounting standards, corporate 
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governance, and general rule of law. Additionally, it was hypothesised that this would create a 
trickle-down effect and spur changes in behaviour and expectation among the rest of the 
economy. Thus, Putin could kill two proverbial economic birds with one stone: the 
UHQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQZRXOGDOORZKLPWRLQFUHDVHWKHVWDWH¶VHDUQLQJSRWHQWLDO, and use his central 
FRQWURO RYHU WKH FRUSRUDWLRQV¶ FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH VWUXFWXUHV DV D YHKLFOH IRU LQVWLWXWLRQDO
development and economic modernisation. There is no argument that the standard of living for 
most Russians increased under Putin. The number of people living under the poverty line 
shrank from 65 million in 1998 to less than 17 million in 2006; economic growth averaged 6.8 
percent per year, translating in to an increase in real wages; and unemployment fell to 7.5 
percent.97 +RZHYHU DVHYLGHQFHVKRZV3XWLQ¶V UHQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQKDVGRQH OLWWOH WR LPSURYH
5XVVLD¶VHFRQRP\RUVWUHQJWKRIUXOHRIODZ 
The problem is that development and modernisation via renationalisation presents a 
paradox: modernisation and institutional development requires a strong leader, yet it also 
requires him to restrain his power.98 To renationalise, Putin selectively used law as a weapon 
to achieve his objective. The most famous example being the Khodorkovsky affair, in which 
Putin imprisoned the oligarch for tax arrears, among other violations. Therefore, Putin gained 
PRUHFRQWURORYHUWKHVWDWH¶VHFRQRPLFUHVRXUFHVEXWKHZDVXQDEOHWRXVHWKRse resources to 
usher in modernisation, or stronger economic and legal institutions. TKH PRUH WKH VWDWH¶V
economy was centralised through renationalisation, the more it undermined the rule of law 
Putin appointed loyal members of his social network to influential and strategic posts 
in the government or large and lucrative enterprises. In doing so, Putin centralised his power 
into a strict vertikal or hierarchy. This gave him large degree of control over both politics and 
economics: he could renationalise thH QDWLRQ¶V ODUJHVW HQWHUSULVHV DQG XQGHUWDNH DPELWLRXV
legislative projects with little resistance. For example, for many years, Igor Sechin, one of 
3XWLQ¶V GHSXW\ SULPH PLQLVWHUV ZDV DOVR RQ 5RVQHIW¶V ERDUG RI GLUHFWRUV This gave Putin 
indirect control over the company. Additionally, the line between government and economy 
blurred as the state used Gazprom to achieve domestic and foreign policy goals. For example, 
the state maintained subsidised gas prices at home, but shut off gas pipelines to other countries 
as a means of diplomacy.99 As such, Putin¶VFHQWUDOLVDWLRQRI power allowed him to use as an 
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efficient and effective tool of state power. 
 <HW3XWLQ¶VFHQWUDOLVDWLRQRISRZHULVDQRWKHUSDUDGR[RIKLVSUHVLGHQF\² for each 
measure that centralised his power, the more the bureaucracy expanded.100 In theory, increasing 
his power would give him direct control over the economic and political reforms necessary to 
stabilise and expand the economy, and strengthen rule of law. However, the larger the 
bureaucracy, the more inefficient the government. Ironically, this further necessitates the 
fluidity of institutional constraints for the sake of expediency, and reinforces informal 
SUDFWLFHV LW LQFHQWLYLVHV FRUUXSWLRQ WR FXW RXW WKH µPLGGOH PDQ¶ )RU H[DPSOH as federal 
agencies grew from 3 to 32 between 2003 and 2006, intermediary agencies multiplied rapidly 
from 59 to 85.101 Therefore, the more Putin expanded the bureaucracy in order to centralise 
control, the more power he lost. This reduced his ability to strengthen institutions and break 
partial reform equilibrium.  
  
3.4 In whose interest is it anyway? A study of state and private interests in maintaining 
partial reform equilibrium.102 
This section is a micro-study illuminating the interests of individual agents in maintaining 
partial reform equilibrium. The results provide additional evidence of how the political and 
economic landscape changed under Vladimir Putin. Specifically, the study demonstrates the 
increasing direct and indirect state control over the economy. It compares the increasing vested 
interests in the gas and oil industry that are furthered and protected by blat and sistema, which 
do not necessarily uphold command practices, but still weaken market institutions. As such, 
this study has its own methodology, distinct from that enumerated in the previous chapter. The 
results of this study frame and support the argument set out in chapter one and the analyses of 
the formal case studies in chapters five and six.  
The infiltration of select interests in an economy helps maintain partial reform 
equilibrium. These interests, or the those representing them, must have enough power to tailor 
policies and laws, or their selective application to suit various rent-seeking needs. This results 
in a variety of social, political, and economic problems; RQHRIZKLFKLV5XVVLD¶VForruption 
that stems from, and upholds weak institutions and lack of rule of law. This study argues that, 
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above all other economic interests that maintain partial reform equilibrium, none is more 
powerful or more successful than the gas and oil industry. This study classifies the degree of 
interest the elites and state have in maintaining partial reform equilibrium by analysing the 
presence of each LQ 5XVVLD¶V K\GURFDUERQ LQGXVWU\ ,W H[DPLQHV WKH ODUJHVW JDV DQG RLO
companies to determine who uses it as a vehicle to seek rents or other benefits, thereby 
replicating weak institutions. Furthermore, it sheds light on who has an interest in maintaining 
partially reformed institutions, the state or the elites. This is an important distinction since 
institutional development and breaking partial reform requires government that is strong, but 
not too strong. Thus, too much elite interest in the gas and oil industry would signify that the 
government is not strong enough to regulate elite rent-seeking, whereas too much state interest 
would suggest the state is too strong.  
Tracing the increasing number of gas and oil company executives that belong to certain 
social networking groups and / or their previous or current positions in the government, creates 
a clear picture of the degree of vested interest between the state and the gas and oil industry. 
To illustrate how and why the gas and oil industry in Russia has this degree of influence in 
politics and why, above all other industries, its influence is the most sought after, three crucial 
factors will be briefly explored. First, the gas and oil industry and its central and strategic role 
within Russia will be examined. Second, the different social networks and their importance 
will be explained. Finally, the study will be presented. Beginning with a synthesis of the 
previously explained background information, the hypothesis and objectives will be stated and 
clarified.  Then, the scope and limitations of the case will be outlined and their reasoning and 
importance explained. Finally, the research methodology will be explained and the results 
presented. 
*     *     * 
Russia is WKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWSURGXFHUDQGH[SRUWHURIQDWXUDOJDVDQGWKHZRUOG¶VVHFRQGODUJHVW
producer and exporter of crude oil, and their gas and oil revenues comprise about 65 percent 
of their exports. 103 :KLOH5XVVLDKDVKLVWRULFDOO\KHOGWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVW natural gas reserves 
DQGWKHZRUOG¶VWRSFUXGHRLOUHVHUYHVLWZDVQRWXQWLODIWHUWKHIDOORIWKH6RYLHW8QLRQWKDW
these natural assets were exploited to their present capacity. Vladimir Putin realised long before 
he was president the importance of these natural resources and the wealth that could be derived 
IURP WKHP ,QKLVGRFWRUDO WKHVLV3XWLQVWDWHG µ:KHQHIIHFWLYHO\XWLOL]HG WKHQDWXUDO
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resource potential becomes one of the most important preconditions for the sustainable entry 
of Russia iQWRWKHZRUOGHFRQRP\¶104 In his quest to assert Russia as a powerful nation, Putin 
understood the conditional security that comes from natural resource exploitation. He also 
understood the wealth that could be exploited from natural resource rents and furthermore 
DUJXHGWKDWµ,QWKHIXWXUHLWZLOOEHQHFHVVDU\WRFRQVLGHUUHGXFLQJWKHQXPEHURIWD[HVDQGWR
shift primarily to rental payments, to raise the effectiveness of state management of resources 
H[SORLWDWLRQ«¶105 As previously discussed, when Vladimir Putin became President, he 
renationalised several industries and obtained a sizable share in others, a majority of these were 
gas and oil industries. 
 It is clear that because of the percentage of exports that come from the gas and oil 
market, the Russian state is at the mercy of its oil and gas revenues. Thus, whoever receives 
these revenues also receives a disproportionate amount of power. As Joel Hellman states, 
µ«WKH PRVW FRPPRQ REVWDFOHV WR WKH SURJUHVV RI HFRQRPLF UHIRUP LQ SRVW-communist 
transitions KDYHFRPHIURPYHU\GLIIHUHQWVRXUFHV«WKHVHDFWRUVFDQKDUGO\EHFODVVLILHGDV
short-WHUPQHWORVHUV«WKH\ZHUHLWVHDUOLHVWDQGELJJHVWZLQQHUV¶106 The gas and oil industry 
and those who run it in Russia, can certainly be classified as winners. During the liberalisation 
scheme mentioned previously, one of the industries that maintained state subsidies, but could 
sell its product at a market price, was gas and oil. Further, in the previously mentioned instances 
of voucher privatisation and the loans-for-shares program, the interests and the involvement in 
state politics of those who ran the gas and oil companies were legitimised, and their ability to 
H[SORLWWKHLQGXVWU\¶VZHDOWK increased exponentially.  
Furthermore, it has been shown that the more political power firms have correlates to 
higher growth and revenues in Russia.107 From the Soviet era to the present, gas and oil interests 
have enjoyed immense political power via state capture, and played a large role in the 
government by influencing the shape of various policies to extract maximum rents. The oil 
barons who represent these interests (in addition to their own personal interests) hail from, and 
are in their positions thanks to, various social networks. To better understand political interest 
representation, the social networks must also be explored. These social groups are essential as 
they highlight the connections that certain individuals have, or have had, with the government. 
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There are several different social circles, but only five will be discussed in this study: the 
Nomenklatura WKH 5XVVLDQ 8QLRQ IRU ,QGXVWULDOLVWV DQG (QWUHSUHQHXUV DOVR NQRZQ DV µWKH
ROLJDUFK¶VXQLRQ¶WKH%DQNHUVthe siloviki, and the St. Petersburg Mafia.108  
 The first network is the Nomenklatura, defined as an individual who was previously a 
high-ranking official in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) or a member of the 
Supreme Soviet. The Nomenklatura have had a distinct advantage in the Russian government 
as they understand how politics work and many of them helped lay the initial foundations of 
partial reform equilibrium before the collapse of the Soviet Union.109 The Nomenklatura were 
5XVVLD¶V HDUOLHVW ZLQQHUV RI SDUWLDO UHIRUP DQG VRPH RI WKHP LI QRW PRVW DUH DOVR µ5HG
%DURQ¶V¶ ZKR LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHG SDUWLDO UHIRUP WKURXJK WKH YRXFKHU SULYDWLVDWLRQ SURFHVV DV
previously described, in which they cheaply bought the factories or companies they had 
managed in the Soviet Era.  
 Second, a particularly important group is the Russian Union for Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs (RUIE). A form of Nomenklatura itself, this Union began in Soviet times as the 
Scientific Industrialists Union and was carried over into the Russian government by Arkady 
9ROVNL7KH58,(KDVEHHQQLFNQDPHGµWKHROLJDUFK¶VXQLRQ¶ DVPDQ\RI LWVPHPEHUV DUH
bankers and other wealthy individuals who have an interest in stalling reform, and whose 
interests are represented in political form. The best-known example of this is their opposition 
WR*DLGDU¶VOLEHUDOLVDWLRQUHIRUPVRIWKHHDUO\¶VZKLFKDVDOUHDG\PHQWLRQHGmaintained 
partial reform, DVWKHSULFHVRI5XVVLD¶VVWUDWHJLFLQGXVWULHVUHPDLQHGVXEVLGLVHGZKLOHDOORWKHU
prices were liberalised. Many of the bankers who belong to the RUIE have or had connections 
to the gas and oil industry.110  
 Third is the social group made up of bankers. This group is essential to partial reform 
equilibrium, especially in the gas and oil industry, as it is the banks that process revenues and 
therefore, the rents. For example, most oil and gas companies have their own bank and these 
banks hold around 60 percent of the Russian cash flow.111 Consequently, these banks hold 
immense power.  
The government thus could not challenge the interests of a handful of powerful 
banks without a risk of undermining the system as a whole. At critical junctures, 
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such as a decision to default, the interests of oligarchic banks tend to be 
particularly strongly intertwined with the fate of the entire sector.112 
This illustrates that these banks have a high degree of power over the government, and thus the 
bankers within a company could play several key roles in maintaining partial reform. 
 The next two social groups, the siloviki and the St. Petersburg Mafia, fall into a 
patronage type network in which high paying and lucrative positions in the government and / 
RUJDVDQGRLO LQGXVWULHV DUH DZDUGHG WR WKHPEHFDXVH WKH\NQRZ WKH µULJKW¶SHRSOH ² not 
because they are necessarily qualified. They are also specific to the Putin presidency because 
these social networks lead directly to him. It must be clarified that many of these people sought 
employment in the private sector before the Putin era. However, it is necessary to stress that 
while some governmental officers were strategically placed in the certain industries, most ties 
with members already in these industries were simply convenient and not deliberately 
constructed.113 Rather, these individuals were called upon to help the government protect its 
interests if the need arose.  
The first group is the siloviki. A silovik is defined as a politician who has a background 
in the military or security services industries. The siloviki network is significant considering 
3XWLQ¶VGD\VDVD.*%RIILFHUDQGWKHKHDGRIWKH)6%7KHVHFRQGJURXSZLOOEHUHIHUUHGWR
DV µWKH 6W 3HWHUVEXUJ 0DILD¶ DQG GHQRWHV D SHUVRQ ZKR LV LQYROYHG LQ WKH 6W 3HWHUVEXUJ
(Leningrad) University Law or Economics faculty, where Putin completed his higher education 
RUPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\VRPHRQHZKRZRUNHGLQWKH6W3HWHUVEXUJ0D\RU¶VRIILFHZKHUH3XWLQ
ZDVWKH0D\RU¶VDVVLVWDQWLQWKHV114 These two groups are particularly dangerous in the 
context of partial reform equilibrium. Often, they have little or no experience in the field they 
are appointed to or choose to work in, and they are simply in the position to protect and further 
the interests of the state (in addition to their own personal enrichment interests). They are also 
protected from prosecution by the nature of their position in the government as Putin himself 
protects them. 
Regardless of whether the gas and oil interests are represented in politics via state-
capture as observed in the Yeltsin period, or renationalisation and bureaucratic recourse that 
characterised the Putin period, the industry has continuously presented one key incentive  to 
maximise rents. This harms progression of reform as it impedes development of rule of law, 
which in turn discourages investment, destabilises society, and in the end, perpetuates partial 
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reform. To measure the degree to which the interests of certain gas or oil companies are 
represented in politics, a study of seven different gas and oil companies was performed. The 
hypothesis states that through vested interests in state politics, the political and economic elites 
of the oil and gas industry have SOD\HG D VLJQLILFDQW UROH LQ VWDOOLQJ 5XVVLD¶V HFRQRPLF
transition, thereby maintaining partial reform equilibrium. The objective is to determine the 
role of the gas and oil industry in maintaining partial reform equilibrium by measuring the 
degree of vested interest between the industry and political and economic elites, and the 
government. Of course, the null hypothesis says that any link made between the number of 
connections in a gas or oil firm and the government is a coincidence.  
 While the hypothesis is proven correct within this study, there are limitations to the 
results, which are presented through the challenges of the study itself. The most important 
challenge faced was language. While most information was available in English, there are other 
sources that could not fairly or adequately be understood or utilised that were in Russian. The 
second limitation was that of transparency. Being at the mercy of information that was 
publically available rendered the study vulnerable to the honesty of the information provided. 
Much information was not available, including: unidentifiable shareholders, various executives 
and managers that were not members of either the Board of Directors or Management 
Committee, lack of transparent corporate governance laws, and so on. The study successfully 
compensated for this through the literature review. For example, it was not clear from Igor 
6HFKLQ¶VELRJUDSK\RQWKH5RVQHIWZHEVLWHWKDWKHKDGH[SHULHQFHLQWKH.*%DQGZRUNHGLQ
WKH6W3HWHUVEXUJ0D\RU¶VRIILFHZLWK9ODGLPLU3XWLQEXWWKLVZDVKLJKOLJKWHGDQGH[SDQGHG
upon in several books and articles. 
 
Methodology 
To properly illustrate partial reform equilibrium in Russia, the study analysed the composition 
of the board of directors and management committees of seven gas and oil firms in 2010 and 
in 2017.115 It singles out those members that were appointed during or DIWHU9ODGLPLU3XWLQ¶V
second presidential term in 7KLV WLPHIUDPH LVFKRVHQFRQVLGHULQJ3XWLQ¶VDWWHPSWV WR
further centralise his power during his second term, specifically referring to the ending of the 
elections for Federation Council representatives and regional governors.116 Furthermore, 
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addition of the termination of elections for Federation Council representatives this takes on significance 
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Post-6RYLHW5XVVLD¶VLGHQWLW\FULVLVFDXVHG0RVFRZ¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\WRVKLIWDQG
YDFLOODWH XQWLO3UHVLGHQW3XWLQ¶V VHFRQG WHUPZKHQ5XVVLDQSROLF\ FRQJHDOHG
LQWRDFRKHUHQWµ'RFWULQH¶DLPHGDWUHEXLOGLQJ5XVVLDQJreatness atop objective 
pillars of energy fuelled strength. 117 
It was also chosen because, since this point in time, gas and oil interests in maintaining partial 
reform are intensified and represented in two different forms.  
The first form is the traditional, independent, personal interest of the state captor: the 
oligarch or Nomenklatura ZKRNQRZVKRZWRSOD\E\3XWLQ¶VUXOHVDQGGRHVVRWRDYRLGWKH 
fate of previous oligarchs Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky, and Berezovsky. This measures the vested 
interest of the elite by looking at his or her connections via social networks and any previous 
political experience. The second form is that of the government. It measures WKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVW
in maintaining partial reform equilibrium through 9ODGLPLU 3XWLQ¶V UHQDWLRQDOising of key 
strategic industries. Therefore, it considers the overlapping roles of those who are 
simultaneously an appointed minister or representative and an executive in the gas and oil 
industry. Since Putin was still involved in the government as Prime Minister between his first 
two and current presidential terms, and because partial reform equilibrium is still present in 
Russia, the timeframe cannot simply be constrained to his second presidential term from 2004 
± 2008. Furthermore, examining the composition of the committees at two different periods, 
2010 and 2017, illustrates how the state has increased its direct and indirect control over the 
gas and oil industry and further entrenched partial reform equilibrium. 
There are several gas and oil companies in Russia, but they were narrowed down to 
seven and split into two groups for the initial analysis in 2010: four natural gas companies and 
three oil companies. In each group, there is at least one company that is controlled by the state 
(meaning the state owns the controlling share), one company that has significant state 
investment (but not a majority share), and one company that is almost entirely privatised (the 
VWDWH¶VVKDUHVDUHWRRVPDOOWREHVLJQLILFDQWZLWKDWWHQWLRQSDLGWRWKRVHFRPSDQLHVWKat are 
almost entirely privatised. The four natural gas companies are: Gazprom, Surgutneftegaz, 
Novatek, and ITERA. The three oil companies are: Rosneft, LUKoil, and Tyumen (TNK-BP). 
The research itself case study involved two steps: internet research and careful literature 
analysis. The internet research had a limited scope, but was an essential tool. The websites of 
                                                 
in that the governor is appointed by the president, and the governor in turn appoints his representatives 
to the Federation Council.  
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WKHVHYHQFRPSDQLHVZHUHDQDO\VHGWRILQGRXWZKRWKHFRPSDQLHV¶H[HFXWLYHVDUH:KLOHHDFK
website had various amounts of information, all, except for Surgutneftegaz, included the names 
of the members of the Board of Directors and / or the Management Committee, as well as their 
biographies. These were examined for A) their dates of employment with the company to 
determine if they correspond with B) any relevant past political experience and / or links to 
social networks and C) if the correlation of positions with the company and the government 
was after 2004. It was not possible to find all the company executives as only those who are 
current members of the Board of Directors and the Management Committees were listed, and 
the majority shareholders either coincided with the executives listed or were unidentified.  
The second part of the methodology was a thorough analysis of various primary and 
secondary sources for the roles of the executives and / or other pieces of information to provide 
a more rounded picture. This was done by noting in each article or book, every time one of the 
H[HFXWLYHV¶QDPHVZDVPHQWLRQHGWKHQDPe of the person and what the author was using them 
to reference: a political post, a company, a social network, and so on. This greatly helped 
complete the picture because it often directly related a person to the government and Vladimir 
Putin, or indirectly did so by naming them in a particular social network or political post that 
was not included in the website biography. Through this, a more comprehensive biography of 
PRVWRIWKHFRPSDQLHV¶H[HFXWLYHVHPHUJHG7KHH[FHSWLRQWRWKLVZDVWKHQDWXUDOJDVFompany 
Surgutneftegaz, whose website was the only one that did not include biographies of its Board 
of Directors (it did not list a management team). Literature analysis did not turn up any further 
information on members of the Board of Directors other than CEO Vladimir Bogdanov. Thus, 
due to lack of information on company executives, other than Bogdanov, Surgutneftegaz was 
withdrawn from the study. 
The applicable executives are further divided into two groups.118 The first, and most 
important group are indivLGXDOV UHIHUUHG WR DV µSROLWLFDO H[HFXWLYHV¶ WKRVH WKDW ZHUH
simultaneously gas or oil industry executives and government ministers at some point from 
RQ7KLVJURXSUHSUHVHQWVWKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVW LQPDLQWDLQLQJSDUWLDOUHIRUPHTXLOLEULXP
via its direct influence on gas and oil companies. The second group is composed of individuals 
UHIHUUHG WR DV WKH µSROLWLFDO VRFLDOLWHV¶ JDV DQG RLO H[HFXWLYHV ZKR EHORQJ WR RQH RI WKH
aforementioned social networks. If any of the individuals in the political executive group also 
belong to a social network (which is the case, more often than not) it will be noted, but they 
                                                 
118
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ZLOOQRWEHFRXQWHGWZLFHLQWKHµSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWH¶JURXS 
To determine the power of D FRPSDQ\¶V LQWHUHVW LQ PDLQWDLQLQJ SDUWLDO UHIRUP
equilibrium, the results are divided into four degrees of interest, determined by the number of 
µSROLWLFDO H[HFXWLYHV¶ DQG µSROLWLFDO VRFLDOLWHV¶ LQ HDFK FRPSDQ\ ,I DW OHDVW RQH µSROLWLFDO
H[HFXWLYH¶LQDFRPSDQ\H[LVWVLWLVVDIHWRDVVXPHWKDWWKH\DUHWKHUe to exploit and maintain 
SDUWLDOUHIRUPHTXLOLEULXPUHJDUGOHVVRIZKHWKHUWKH\DUHUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHFRPSDQ\¶VLQWHUHVW
in politics, or the state representing its own interest in the company. Thus, the degree of 
representation a company has is largely, but not wholly, determined by the number of political 
executives. Because the total number of individuals is so small, they do not constitute a robust 
enough dataset to run any statistical analysis. As such, the degree of interest ranking was 
devised to measuUHWKHVWUHQJWKRIHDFKFRPSDQ\¶VSRZHULQWKHJRYHUQPHQW² for each degree 
of interest a company has, the larger the stake they hold and the more bargaining power they 
have in politics, or vice versa. 
Zero degree VLJQLILHVWKDWDFRPSDQ\¶VLQWHUHVWLQPDLntaining partial reform is weak 
as WKHUH DUH QR µSROLWLFDO H[HFXWLYHV¶ LQ WKH FRPSDQ\ DQG WKHUH DUH OHVV WKDQ IRXU µSROLWLFDO
VRFLDOLWHV¶² their stake in partial reform is undetermined as there is not a specific link that 
FDQ EH GUDZQ )XUWKHU IRXU µSROLWLFDO VRFLDOLWHV¶ DQG QR µSROLWLFDO H[HFXWLYHV¶ TXDOLI\ D
company as having first-GHJUHH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVLQFHRQHRU WZRµSROLWLFDO VRFLDOLWHV¶FDQEH
LJQRUHGDVDFRLQFLGHQFHZKHUHDVWKUHHµSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWHV¶HVSHFLDOO\LIWKH\FRPHIURPD
powerful group, have past political experience, and / or come from or belong to the same 
network cannot be ignored.   
First degree determines that the company has a mild interest in that there are no more 
WKDQWZRµSROLWLFDOH[HFXWLYHV¶RUKDVDWOHDVWIRXUµSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWHV¶7KLVLQWHUHVWLVPLOGLQ
that there is indeed a direct link, but it may not be very strong. It could either be a company 
H[HFXWLYHZKRKDVDPLQLVWHULDOUROHWRSURWHFWWKHFRPSDQ\¶V LQWHUHVWRUDPLQLVWHUVHQWWR
serve as an executive in the company and ensure it follows state directives. The fewer political 
executives there are, the more difficult this is to disentangle, thus the weak degree of interest 
in maintaining partial reform. )XUWKHUPRUHLIWKHUHDUHOHVVWKDQIRXUµSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWHV¶LQD
company, particularly if they are not from the same social network, their combined political 
capital is very weak, whereas if there are more than four, the chances of each of them not being 
from the same network is low, combined with their combined political capital is viable, even 
if only mildly so. 
 Second degree PHDQVWKDWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VLQWHUHVWis strong in that it has between three 
DQGILYHµSROLWLFDOH[HFXWLYHV¶DQGKDVXSWR ILYHµSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWHV¶7KHVHFRPSDQLHVDUH




Consequently, we can assume that by having three to five individuals from the same company 
in the government, that interest representation is strong. 
Finally, third degree VLJQLILHVWKDWDFRPSDQ\¶VLQWHUHVW in partial reform is critical in 
WKDWLWKDVPRUHWKDQILYHµSROLWLFDOH[HFXWLYHV¶DQGKDVPRUHWKDQILYHµSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWHV¶,Q
KDYLQJPRUHWKDQILYHµSROLWLFDOH[HFXWLYHV¶WKLUG-degree companies have significant power in 
politics and the state conversely has a strong interest in these companies. Because the state has 
a high interest in third-degree companies, it is not likely to prosecute the company or its 
strategically placed employees since doing so would risk destabilisation. Thus, considering the 
VWDWH¶VLQWHUHVWLQWKHVHFRPSDQLHVLIWKH\SOD\E\WKHVWDWH¶VUXOHVWKH\ZLOOHQMR\WKHVWDWH¶V




2008 crisis, and in 2017, after the 2014 crisis. The 2010 analysis was a case study that explored 
the increase in state control over the economy since 2004, and the 2017 analysis shows how 
this trajectory has continued. Generally, many of the political executives and socialites that 
were in the 2010 results have either changed companies or left the gas and oil industry 
completely. For example, Gazprom political executive Elvira Nabiullina was appointed the 
Governor of the Central Bank of Russia in July 2013.119 Since the initial 2010 study, the 
landscape of the gas and oil industry changed drastically as the economy responded to 
economic shocks and the government increased its control. Significantly, in 2014, Russia was 
sanctioned by the West after it annexed Crimea, which catalysed an economic crisis. While the 
degree of interest each company has in upholding partial reform equilibrium remains, much of 
the sector has been consolidated. The companies ITERA and TNK-BP no longer exist as they 
were both bought by Rosneft in 2013.120 As such, the gas and oil industry has become one of 
many industries in which the state further expands its control in the aftermath of the 2008 
economic crisis. 
Gazprom has a third degree interest in upholding partial reform equilibrium in both 
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2010 and 2017. In 2010, of the eleven members on the Board of Directors, five of them were 
ODEHOOHG µSROLWLFDO H[HFXWLYHV¶ DQG IRXU RI WKHP were labelled political socialites. Of the 
seventeen-member Management Committee, one member was labelled as a political executive 
and six of them were political socialites (see Table 1). In 2017, the Board of Directors had 
three µpolitical executives¶ and four µpolitical socialites,¶ whereas the management committee 
had two µpolitical executives¶ and four µpolitical socialites¶ (see Table 2). 
 
Table 1: Gazprom 2010121 
*D]SURPµ3ROLWLFDO([HFXWLYHV¶  
Name Position Government Post  
Viktor Zubkov Board of Directors  Head of Financial 
Monitoring Committee (2004 
± 2007); Prime Minister 
(2007 ± 2008). 
Farit Gazizullin Board of Directors Minister of Property 
Relations (2004). 
Elvira Nabiullina Board of Directors Economic Development 
Minister (2007 ± present).122 
Igor Yusufov Board of Directors Minister of Energy (2004) 
Sergei Shmatko Board of Directors Minister of Energy (2009). 
Alexander Koslov Management Committee Head of the Main Division 
for Procurement and 
Transportation with the 
Administrative Board of the 
President. (2004 ± 2005) 
*D]SURPµ3ROLWLFDO6RFLDOLWHV¶ 
Name Position Social Networks 
**Alexey Miller Board of Directors Nomenklatura; St. Petersburg 
Mafia123 
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 All executives listed were found at Gazprom, "Board of Directors,"  www.gazprom.com ; Gazprom, 
"Management Committee,"  www.gazprom.com  
122
 Institute for Contemporary Development, "Board of Directors,"  http://www.riocenter.ru/en. 
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**Elena Karpel Board of Directors Nomenklatura 
Mikhail Sereda Board of Directors St. Petersburg Mafia; Banker 
(Sberbank) 
Valery Musin Board of Directors St. Petersburg Mafia  
**Valery Golubev Management Committee Siloviki; St. Petersburg 
Mafia124 
**Igor Fydorov Management Committee St. Petersburg Mafia 
**Viktor Illyushin Management Committee Nomenklatura125 
**Olga Pavlova Management Committee St. Petersburg Mafia 
**Andrey Kruglov Management Committee Banker (BNP ± Drezdner) 
Vlada Rusakova Management Committee Nomenklatura 
** Denotes an executive who has a political experience prior to 2004.  
 
Table 2: Gazprom 2017126 
*D]SURPµ3ROLWLFDO([HFXWLYHV¶ 
Name Position Government Post  
**Viktor Zubkov Board of Directors  Head of Financial 
Monitoring Committee (2004 
± 2007); Prime Minister 
(2007 ± 2008). 
Denis Manturov Board of Directors Minister of industry and trade 
(2007 ± 2008); Deputy 
minister of industry and 
energy (2008 ± 2012); 
Deputy minister of industry 
and trade (from 2012). 
**Alexander Novak Board of Directors Deputy governor 
Krasnoyarsk (2002 ± 2007); 
Deputy minister of finance 
(2008 ± 2012); Minister of 
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Energy (from 2012). 
**Vladimir Markov Management Committee Member of State Duma, 
committee for energy (2007 ± 
2011); Head of Gazprom ± 
State relations (Present). 
Alexander Koslov Management Committee Head of the Main Division 
for Procurement and 
Transportation with the 
Administrative Board of the 
President. (2004 ± 2005) 
*D]SURPµ3ROLWLFDO6RFLDOLWHV¶ 
Name Position Social Networks 
**Alexey Miller Board of Directors Nomenklatura; St. Petersburg 
Mafia 
Andrey Akhimov Board of Directors Banker (Chairman VTB until 
2002, Chairman 
Gazprombank until 2006). 
Mikhail Sereda Board of Directors St. Petersburg Mafia; Banker 
(Sberbank) 
Dimitry Patrushev Board of Directors Banker (Rosselkhozbank) 
Timur Kulibaev Board of Directors Nomenklatura  
**Valery Golubev Management Committee Siloviki; St. Petersburg Mafia 
**Igor Fydorov Management Committee St. Petersburg Mafia 
**Andrey Kruglov Management Committee Banker (BNP ± Drezdner) 
** Denotes an executive who has a political experience prior to 2004. 
 
*D]SURP¶VWKLUG-degree ranking is not at all surprising as it is a strategic, state-owned 
company. The company is technically private and its shares can be bought and sold, but it is 
the state that owns the majority share. In 2009, Gazprom was ranked the 22nd largest 
corporation in the world and one of WKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWHQHUJ\FRUSRUDWLRQs.127 Its performance 
over the timeframe has varied, with revenues decreasing in 2014 when sanctions were 
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LQWURGXFHG DV D UHVSRQVH WR 5XVVLD¶V DQQH[DWLRQ RI &ULPHD Earning top revenues of $141 
billion 2009 and $153 billion in 2013, profits fell from $144 billion in 2015 to only $91 billion 
in 2017.128 Gazprom is strategically and economically important to Russia.129 It makes sense 
that the state would want to place as many ministers in executive positions as possible to assure 
WKDWWKHFRPSDQ\UXQVDVLWVKRXOGDQGFRQWLQXHVWRVHFXUH5XVVLD¶VSODFHRQWKHZRUOGVWDJH, 
especially given the rapidly changing geopolitical climate. Therefore, in the case of Gazprom, 
partial reform equilibrium is a win-win situation since, as long as the company plays by the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V UXOHV, all rent-seeking parties can continue to exploit the system. Due to the 
VWDWH¶VWDFWLFDOLQWHUHVWLQWKHFRPSDQ\WKHZLQQHUVDUHassured that the state ZLOOXVHµUXOHE\
ODZ¶WRSUHYHQWSURVHFXWLRQRIWKHFRPSDQ\RULWV&(2¶V² unless of course it is to their own 
benefit to do so. Thus, for Gazprom, both the state and individual executives are concerned 
with maintaining partial reform to protect their wealth and to continue to seek rents.  
 The gas production company ITERA, has first-degree representation, largely as a result 
of LWVVKDG\GHDOLQJVZLWK*D]SURPLQWKH¶V2IWKHVHYHQ-member Board of Directors, 
none of them were µSROLWLFDO H[HFXWLYHV¶ however, five of them were µSROLWLFDO VRFLDOLWHV¶ 
(Table 3). ITERA is an abnormality because it meets the criteria for first-degree representation 
E\ KDYLQJ PRUH WKDQ IRXU µSROLWLFDO VRFLDOLWHV¶ EXW KDV QR µSROLWLFDO H[HFXWLYHV¶ DQG D
Management Committee was not listed.   
 
Table 3: Itera 2010130 
ITERA Political Socialites 
Name Position Social Network 
Igor Makarov Board of Directors Nomenklatura; Siloviki 
**Vladimir Makeev Board of Directors Nomenklatura 
**Valery Otchertsov Board of Directors Nomenklatura 
Gennady Skidankov Board of Directors Nomenklatura; Banker 
(Sibneftbank) 
Yuri Pianuk Board of Directors Nomenklatura 
** Denotes an executive who has a political experience prior to 2004.  
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7R D FHUWDLQ H[WHQW ,7(5$¶V ILUVW-degree representation was both expected and 
unexpected. It was expected because it was often accused of, and used for, asset stripping for 
*D]SURPLQWKHVHDV\WRGRDVFRPSDQ\¶VKHDGTXDUWHUVDUHLQ-DFNVRQYLOOH)/86$ 
One of the most brazen examples of this asset stripping was the way Gazprom 
executives aided and abetted the formation of ITERA. This company soon 
EHFDPH WKH VHFRQG ODUJHVW SURGXFHU RI QDWXUDO JDV LQ 5XVVLD « QR RQH LQ
-DFNVRQYLOOHVHHPHGSDUWLFXODUO\XSVHWWKDW,7(5$¶VDVVHQWVKDGEHHQVWULSSHG
from Gazprom.131  
It was unexpected because when Putin renationalised Gazprom and replaced Viktor 
Chernomyrdin and Rem Vyakhirev with Dimitri Medvedev and Alexei Miller, ITERA lost the 
royalties and contracts that it received from Gazprom and simultaneously lost its place as 
5XVVLD¶V VHFRQG ODUJHVW QDWXUDO JDVSURGXFHU WR1RYDWHN132 ITERA barely makes the first-
degree qualification, but because two of its executives had past political experience and they 
all belong to the Nomenklatura group, it could be assumed that they had at least a mild degree 
of interest in maintaining partial reform. However, as ITERA was purchased by Rosneft for 
$2.9 billion in 2013, there is no comparison for 2017. Additionally, 5RVQHIW¶V SXUFKDVH RI
,7(5$ LV HYLGHQFH RI WKH VWDWH¶V LQFUHDVLQJ monopoly of the gas and oil industry, which 
maintains partially reformed economic institutions. This will be further discussed in chapters 
six and seven.  
 The independent gas company, Novatek, is quite interesting. It had first-degree 
representation in 2010, but second-degree representation in 2017, indicating its interest in 
partial reform equilibrium has increased. In 2010, of the nine-member Board of Directors, four 
of them were µSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWHV¶2XWRIWKHILIWHHQ-member Management Committee, one of 
them was DµSROLWLFDOH[HFXWLYH¶DQGWZRRIWKHPwere µSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWHV¶VHH7DEOH4).  In 
2017, two of the nine members of the Board of Directors were µpolitical executives¶, and three 
of them were µpolitical socialites¶. The management committee shrank to eleven members, two 
of whom were µpolitical executives¶, and one was a µpolitical socialite¶ (see Table 5). 
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Table 4: Novatek 2010133 
1RYDWHNµ3ROLWLFDO([HFXWLYHV¶ 
Name Position Government Post  
Lev Feodosiev Management Committee Deputy Director in the 
Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade 
(2003 ± 2007) 
Novatek Political Socialites 
Name Position Social Network 
Andrei Akimov Board of Directors Nomenklatura; Banker 
(Gazprombank) 
**Vladimir Dimitriev Board of Directors Nomenklatura; Banker 
(Vnesheconombank) 
**Ruben Vardanian Board of Directors Banker (Novatek and 
Standard Bank); RUIE 
Gennady Timchenko Board of Directors Nomenklatura; Banker 
**Iosif Levinzon Management Committee Nomenklatura 
Evgeny Kot Management Committee St. Petersburg Mafia; Banker 
(Gazprombank) 
** Denotes an executive who has a political experience prior to 2004.  
 
Table 5: Novatek 2017134 
1RYDWHNµ3ROLWLFDO([HFXWLYHV¶ 
Name Position Government Post  
**Viktor Orlov Board of Directors Federation Council, 
Committee for natural 
resources (2001 ± 2012). 
**Andrei Sharonov Board of Directors Minister of industry and trade 
(2007 ± 2008); Deputy 
minister of industry and 
                                                 
133
 Novatek, "Board of Directors," www.novatek.com.; Novatek, "Management Committee," 
www.novatek.com. 
134
 Novatek, "Board of Directors,"  http://www.novatek.ru/en/about/management/BOD/.; Novatek, 
"Managment,"  http://www.novatek.ru/en/about/management/administration/. 
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energy (2008 ± 2012); 
Deputy minister of industry 
and trade (from 2012). 
**Lev Feodosiev Management Committee Deputy Director in the 
Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade 
(2003 ± 2007) 
Denis Khramov Management Committee Deputy head Ministry of 
Economic Development and 
Trade (2008 ± 2014); Deputy 
minister of natural resources 
and environment (from 
2014). 
1RYDWHNµ3ROLWLFDO6RFLDOLWHV¶ 
Name Position Social Networks 
**Andrei Akimov Board of Directors Nomenklatura; Banker 
(Gazprombank) 
Gennady Timchenko Board of Directors Nomenklatura; Banker135 
Leonid Mikhelson Board of Directors Banker (Russian Regional 
Development Bank) 
Vladimir Baskov Management Committee Siloviki 
 
1RYDWHN LV 5XVVLD¶V VHFRQG largest gas production company and is theoretically a 
private company. In 2010, the state, via Gazprom, owned about 19 percent of its shares (not 
enough to control it, but too much to say the company is truly independent) so the first-degree 
representation status was expected.136 However, in after the initial study in 2010, Gennady 
Timchenko, on the board of directors, increased his share in the company to 20.77 percent.137 
Just after this, in late 2010, Gazprom sold 9.4 percent of its shares to Gazprombank.138 While 
this may seem like the state reducing its shares in the company, it is not the case. Gazprombank 
                                                 
135
 Steven Lee Myers, Jo Becker, and Jim Yardley, "It Pays to Be Putin's Friend: Private Bank Fuels 
Fortunes of Putin's Inner Circle," The New York Times. 
136
 Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia (2010). 167. 
137
 Reuters Staff, "Timchenko's Fund Becomes Largest Novatek Owner," Reuters, 05 March. 
138
 Reuters Staff, "Russia's Gazprom Sells 9.4 Pct Stake in Novatek," Reuters, 20 December. 
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is wholly owned by Gazprom. Thus, while Gazprom itself may be divesting itself of its 
Novatek shares, its political presence remains. In fact, what we begin to see is less of an interest 
of the company¶V HOLWHV LQPDLQWDLQLQJSDUWLDO UHIRUPEXW DQ LQFUHDVH LQ WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
interest in indirectly controlling the company, thereby maintaining partial reform equilibrium.  
The presence of even one political executive is evidence of indirect state control. What 
gave Novatek an impressive and surprising amount of power in 2010, was WKH FRPSDQ\¶V
µSROLWLFDO VRFLDOLWHV¶ ZKR EHORQJed WR WKH VRFLDO QHWZRUN RI EDQNHUV )RXU RI WKH µSROLWLFDO
socialites¶ZHre bankers, two of whom came from Gazprombank, which suggested that they 
might have had quite a bit of power over the state despite their first-degree status. Yet, state 
interest in this company has always been present, as it still owns a significant share of the 
FRPSDQ\¶VVWRFNVDQGWKXVDOVRJHWVLWV¶VKDUHRIUHQWV)RUH[DPSOHµSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWH¶,RVLI
Levinson who is on the Management Committee, was the Deputy Governor of the Yamalo-
Nenets region where Novatek holds its production and exploration licences.139 As such, it can 
be inferred that the state has a strong desire to maintain indirect control over Novatek. The 
drastic increase in political executives confirms this. Accordingly, it appears that interests 
represented in Novatek are concerned with partial reform equilibrium to increase revenue 
through company rents. 
TNK-BP, was unique in that it was the only Russian oil company, Tyumen (TNK), to 
be partially owned by a foreign company, BP. TNK-BP had first-degree representation in 2010. 
Of its twelve-member Board of Directors (only four of whom represent TNK), three of them 
(one of which is an independent director) were µSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWHV¶2I its fourteen-member 
management committee, one of them was D µSROLWLFDO H[HFXWLYH¶ DQG RQH RI WKem was a 
µSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWH¶VHH7DEOH 
 
Table 6: TNK-BP 2010140 
TNK ± %3µ3ROLWLFDO([HFXWLYHV¶ 
Name Position Government Post 
Anatoli Tyomkin Management Committee Deputy Minister of Natural 
Resources (2004 ± 2008) 
TNK ± BP Political Socialites 
                                                 
139
 Novatek, "Business: Production,"  www.novatek.ru/eng. Dates of Governorship do not coincide with 
dates of case study limitation.  
140
 TNK-BP, "Board of Directors,"  www.tnk-bp.com ; TNK-BP, "Management Committee,"  
www.tnk-bp.com  
    
 87 
Name Position Social Network 
Mikhail Fridman Board of Directors RUIE; Banker (Alfa Group) 
Viktor Vekselberg Board of Directors RUIE; Banker (Renova 
Group) 
**Aleksandr Shokhin Board of Directors 
(Independent) 
RUIE; Banker (Renaissance 
Group); Nomenklatura141 
German Khan Management Committee Banker (Alfa Group) 
** Denotes an executive who has a political experience prior to 2004.  
 
TNK-%3¶V SROLWLFDO FRQQHFWLRns gave it a degree of interest in maintaining partial 
reform for its own purposes. TNK-BP stood out because of its partnership with British 
Petroleum, which was, and still is, unusual given 5XVVLD¶VKRVtile foreign investment climate. 
The networks to whicKWKHµSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWHV¶EHORQJed gave TNK-BP most of its power in 
interest representation. AOO IRXU µSROLWLFDO VRFLDOLWHV¶ ZHre bankers, who were in executive 
positions both at TNK-BP and at very powerful investment companies. Additionally, three of 
them DUH PHPEHUV RI 58,( )XUWKHUPRUH DOO WKH µSROLWLFDO VRFLDOLWHV¶ PLQXV 9LNWRU
Vekselberg, were notorious in the Yeltsin era and the heyday of the oligarchs for blocking and 
stalling reform, notably liberalisation and privatisation mentioned earlier in the chapter. Thus, 
because of the capital wealth controlled by the political socialites of TNK-BP, it is logical that 
they had a stake in the partial reform game to maintain that wealth, which in turn afforded them 
political power. While it was tempting to think that TNK-BP had more power than met the eye, 
it was bought by Rosneft in 2013.142 Importantly, this purchase was not hostile and many 
members of TNK-%3¶VERDUGQRZZRUNIRU5RVQHIW+RZHYHUWKLVPHUJHULVIXUWKHUHYLGHQFH
of the state increasing its monopoly in the gas and oil industry.  
 The state oil company Rosneft has second-degree representation. In 2010, of the 
FRPSDQ\¶VQLQH-member Board of Directors, five of them weUHµSROLWLFDOH[HFXWLYHV¶ and one 
was DµSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWH¶2IWKHFRPSDQ\¶VHLJKW-member Management Committee, three of 
them weUHµSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWHV¶VHH7DEOH7). An exception needs to be made here. The head 
of the company and member of the Board of Directors, Sergei Bodanchikov, did not hold a 
political position during the Putin Presidency. Rather, he was appointed to his position by 
presidential decree in the Yeltsin era.143 He remained in that position throughout the Putin era, 
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 Chaisty, (2006). 
142
 Neate, 2013. 
143
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so it can safely be assumed that Putin approved of his placement and he can thus be considered 
DµSROLWLFDOH[HFXWLYH¶In 2017, three of the nine-member Board of Directors were µpolitical 
executives¶, and one of them was a µpolitical socialite¶. The eleven-member Management 
Committee had two µpolitical executives¶ and two µpolitical socialites¶ (see Table 8). 
 
Table 7: Rosneft 2010144 
5RVQHIWµ3ROLWLFDO([HFXWLYHV¶ 
Name Position Government Post  
Sergey Bodanchikov Board of Directors Appointed president of 
Rosneft by Boris Yeltsin. 
Sergei Naryshkin Board of Directors Deputy Prime Minister (2007 
± 2008).145 
Igor Sechin Board of Directors Deputy Head of the 
Executive Office of the 
President of the Russian 
Federation (2000 ± 2008); 
Deputy Prime Minister (2008 
± Present) 
Andrei Reus  Board of Directors Deputy Minister of Industry 
and Energy (2004 ± 2008) 
Yury Petrov Board of Directors Head of the Federal Agency 
for State Property 
Management (2008 ± 
present) 
Rosneft Political Socialites 
Name Position Social Network 
Andrey Kostin Board of Directors Banker (VTB Bank) 
Sergey Makarov Management Committee Banker (Vneshtorgbank) 
                                                 
144
 Ibid.; Rosneft, "Managment Board,"  www.rosneft.com. 
145
  Sergei 1DU\VKNLQLVQRWOLVWHGRQ5RVQHIW¶VZHEVLWHDVWKH9LFH-Chairman of Rosneft, however, he 
is listed as such by Marshall Goldman. Additionally, also lists him as Deputy Prime Minister. No 
UHFRUGVRI1DU\VKNLQ¶VFRPSDQ\HPSOR\PHQWFDQEHIRXQGRQ5RVQHIW¶VZebsite after 2008, but as his 
involvement still falls within the case study time frame, he was included in the case results. Goldman, 
Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia (2010). Table 7.3. 
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Sergey Tregub Management Committee Siloviki 
Viktor Ploskina Management Committee Siloviki 
 
Table 8: Rosneft 2017146 
5RVQHIWµ3ROLWLFDO([HFXWLYHV¶ 
Name Position Government Post  
Andrey Belousov Board of Directors Minister of economic 
development (2012 ± 2013). 
Oleg Viyugin Board of Directors Director Federal Financial 
Market Service 2004 ± 
2007). Banker. 
Igor Sechin Board of Directors Deputy Head of the 
Executive Office of the 
President of the Russian 
Federation (2000 ± 2008); 
Deputy Prime Minister (2008 
± Present) 
Yuri Kalinin  Management Committee Director of the Federal 
Corrections Service (2004 - 
2009); Deputy justice 
minister (2009 - 2010); 
Federation Council (2010 - 
2012) 
Andrei Shishkin Management Committee Deputy minister of energy 
(2010 ± 2012) 
Rosneft Political Socialites 
Name Position Social Network 
Matthias Warnig Board of Directors Banker (Drezdner Bank) 
Peter Lazarev Management Committee Nomenklatura 
Vlada Rusakova Management Committee Nomenklatura 
 
                                                 
146
 Rosneft, "Board of Directors,"  https://www.rosneft.com/governance/board/; Rosneft, "Management 
Board,"  https://www.rosneft.com/governance/management/. 
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Rosneft narrowly misses third-degree representation in both 2010 and 2017. 
&RQVLGHULQJ5RVQHIW¶VHTXDOLmportance to Russia in the global economy as Gazprom, it was 
expected that Rosneft would also have as equal an interest-representation as Gazprom. Rosneft 
was ranked the 211th on the Fortune Global 500 ranking in 2010, and has increased its position 
since then, rising to 99th in 2013, and 51st in 2015, before falling to 158th in 2017.147  However, 
Rosneft presents a very unusual case, the study of which is beyond the scope of this one. In 
VXP5RVQHIWDSSHDUVWREHXVHGDVDYHKLFOHWRLQFUHDVHWKHVWDWH¶VPRQRSRO\LQWKHRLOLQGXVWU\
As mentioned, it bought ITERA and TNK-BP in 2013, purchased Yukos after it was seized 
from Khodorkovsky, and in 2016, it obtained Bashneft from Sistema CEO Yevtushenkov in a 
similar manner.148 Frustratingly, the state classifies and uses Rosneft as an example of a private 
company, but its controlling share is owned by Rosneftgaz, which is 100 percent state 
owned.149 This is particularly important as Rosneftgaz seemingly privatised 20 percent of its 
Rosneft shares in 2017, yet the entire sale is unaccounted for and Rosneftgaz still controls the 
majority share. Thus, the degree of interest in Rosneft is important, both because of its role in 
PRQRSROLVLQJ WKHRLO LQGXVWU\ DQG WKHVWDWH¶VHQGHDYRXUV WRPDNH WKHFRPSDQ\ ORRN OLNH D
private enterprise. This will be further discussed in chapter seven. 
Therefore, in light of their second-degree representation, Rosneft is unique, because 
there are clear examples of state interest being represented in the company. In 2010, this was 
manifest through the presence of µSROLWLFDOH[HFXWLYHV¶6HUJHL%RGDQFKLNRYDQG'HSXW\3ULPH
Minister Igor Sechin. As previously illustrated, Bodanchikov was appointed President of 
Rosneft by presidential decree of Boris Yeltsin. Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin is a noted 
Putin loyalist, both as part of the siloviki and the St. Petersburg mafia.150 He joined Rosneft 
DIWHUEHLQJDSSRLQWHG'HSXW\+HDGRIWKHSUHVLGHQW¶VRIILFH and remained in that post while 
serving as Deputy Prime Minister from 2008 ± 2012. Thus, it is safely assumed that he 
maintains direct ties to the highest levels of Kremlin power and is in that position to represent 
WKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVWZKLOHpotentially serving his own. Furthermore, Sechin was appointed CEO 
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of Rosneft after Bogdanchikov resigned in 2010.151 This direct link bolsters Rosneft's nominal 
second-degree representation to third-GHJUHHOHYHOV,WLVWKXVVDIHWRVD\WKDWWKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVW
LQVHHNLQJDVKDUHRI5RVQHIW¶VUHQWVKHOSVPDLQWDLQSDUWLDOUHIRUPequilibrium. 
Finally, the private oil company LUKoil has first-degree representation. Of the eleven-
PHPEHUERDUGRIGLUHFWRUVWZRDUHµSROLWLFDOH[HFXWLYHV¶DQGILYHDUHµSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLWHV¶VHH
table 2.5). There are no members of the management committee belonging to either group.  
 
Table 9: LUKoil 2010152 
/8.RLOµ3ROLWLFDO([HFXWLYHV¶ 
Name Position Government Post 
**Herman Gref Board of Directors Minister of Economic 
Development and Trade 
(2000 ± 2007); Banker 
(Sberbank 2007 ± present) 
**Igor Ivanov Board of Directors Secretary of the Security 
Council (2004 ± 2007) 
LUKoil Political Socialites 
Name Position Social Network 
Valery Grayfer Board of Directors Nomenklatura 
Vagit Alekperov Board of Directors Nomenklatura; RUIE153  
Sergei Mikhailov Board of Directors Siloviki 
Nikolai Tsvetkov Board of Directors Siloviki 
**Alexander Shokhin Board of Directors Nomenklatura; RUIE; 
Banker (Renaissance Group) 
** Denotes an executive who has a political experience prior to 2004.  
 
Table 10: LUKoil 2017154 
/8.RLOµ3ROLWLFDO([HFXWLYHV¶ 
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Name Position Government Post 
**Igor Ivanov Board of Directors Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(1998 - 2004); Secretary of 
Security Council (2004 - 
2007) 
LUKoil Political Socialites 
Name Position Social Network 
Valery Grayfer Board of Directors Nomenklatura 
Vagit Alekperov Board of Directors Nomenklatura; RUIE  
Roger Munnings Board of Directors RUIE 
Vadim Vorobyev Management Committee Nomenklatura 
Anatoly Moskalenko Management Committee Siloviki 
Stanislav Nikitin Management Committee Banker (various banks) 
Oleg Pashaev Management Committee Siloviki 
 ** Denotes an executive who has a political experience prior to 2004.  
 
The private company LUKoil has first-degree representation. LUKoil is probably the 
most unique company in the study, as it is one of 5XVVLD¶VIHZWUXO\SULYDWHFRPSDQLHV155 Its 
success has increased over the years, rising from 93rd in the Fortune Global 500 in 2010, to 46th 
in 2013, and 43rd in 2015, before falling to 102nd in 2017.156 Notably, it out ranks and out earns 
Rosneft. Yet, 2010 political executive Herman Gref was the Minister for Economic 
'HYHORSPHQWDQG7UDGHDQGKDVDVWURQJLQWHUHVWLQPDLQWDLQLQJWKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVWLQSDUWLDO
UHIRUP³/LEHUDO*HUPDQ>+HUPDQ@*UHI«ZRUN>V@QROHVVDFWLYHO\WRHQVXUHWKHVXUYLYDORI
bureaucrDWLFFDSLWDOLVP´157 It can be assumed that Gref was in his position to oversee and 
ensure the company complied with and did not hinder the government¶V LQWHUHVWV Gref has 
since left LUKoil, and it is assumed that his successor, Ivanov has carried on fulfilling this 
role. Thus, if LUKoil continues to play by the government¶VUXOHVWKHQWKH\DUHOLNHO\VDYHG
from further state control. Consequently, while LUKoil stands out as a private company, it is 
clear from their first-degree status that they do have some influence in state politics and that 
both parties, company and state, seek to protect their rents via maintaining partial reform. 
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The interest representation in this study goes two ways, but it is not always easy to tell 
in which direction it flows. The first direction flows from the company toward the state: the 
company asserts its rents-seeking interests vis-a-vis the government. This is, often, the case 
with companies that have first-degree representation as they have little or no direct relation 
with the state. The second direction of interest representation is the inverse: the state asserts its 
own rent-seeking interests through the company. This is most likely the case with second and 
third-degree representation companies, as there is a concrete relationship between the company 
and the state. Regardless of where the interests are coming from and where they are being 
directed, the interest that is being represented is that of maintaining the status quo of partial 
reform equilibrium. 
The results show that there has been an increasing degree of state interest in maintaining 
partial reform equilibrium. In 2010, all the gas and oil companies selected have at least a mild 
degree of interest in maintaining partial reform equilibrium, with some possessing a strong 
interest. In 2017, only four of the original six companies remain, as Rosneft bought TNK-BP 
DQG,7(5$$GGLWLRQDOO\1RYDWHN¶VGHJUHHRILQWHUHVWLQFUHDVHGDQGZKLOH/8.RLO¶VGHJUHH
of interest remains unchanged, it has more political socialites in 2017 than it did in 2010. This 
suggests that state is exerting more indirect control to protect its interest. As such, because the 
state now controls most of the industry, it has de facto also increased its interest in maintaining 
partial reform equilibrium. What is most interesting about the results is that the initial analysis 
in 2010 suggested a healthy, symbiotic relationship between elites¶ vested interest and the 
VWDWH¶V YHVWHG LQWHUHVW LQ PDLQWDLQLQJ SDUWLDO UHIRUP +RZHYHU WKH UHVXOWV IURP 
demonstrate that there has been a significant shift LQ IXUWKHULQJ DQG SURWHFWLQJ WKH VWDWH¶V
interest in the gas and oil industry. Thus, what the results show is not only the role the gas and 
RLOLQGXVWU\KDVSOD\HGLQPDLQWDLQLQJSDUWLDOUHIRUPEXWDOVRWKHVWDWH¶VLQFUHDVLQJFRQWUROLQ
the industry. This reinforces and maintains partial reform equilibrium by placing the interests 
of the state over market competition, and the development of market institutions.  
*     *     * 
The above study demonstrates both the result of partially reformed institutions, as well as how 
they are maintained. It shows the blurred line between the state and the economy, and how the 
former can use its power to protect its own interests. This weakens market institutions and 
strengthens command practices as the government uses its power to control the FRXQWU\¶V most 
powerful industry. Even in those companies in which the state does not have a controlling stake 
or its own representatives, it protects its social networks. In turn, the social networks comply 
with state directives. By using members of his personal network in the hydrocarbon companies 
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and in the government, Putin ensured that the state would be the main recipient of gas and oil 
revenues. As a result, from the early 2000s, it appears that the Russian economy is booming: 
the state had budget surpluses, which Putin used to create a $100 billion stability fund; GDP 
and GDP per capita expanded by 5.5 percent on average each year; and unemployment fell.158 
However, it created an incentive to replicate weak institutions and perpetuate partial reform 
equilibrium so Putin could continue seeking gas and oil rents to support the economy in the 
absence of a market.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined where partial reform equilibrium began: *RUEDFKHY¶Vperestroika 
UHIRUPV :KLOH LW ZDV QHYHU KLV LQWHQWLRQ WR IUHH]H HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW *RUEDFKHY¶V
attempts to fix the system brought it crashing down. This led to the critical juncture for Russia: 
in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it decided to focus on economic 
modernisation rather than institutional development. This set the state on a path that continues 
to reaffirm the incentives that maintain weak economic institutions that are neither command 
nor market. It was specifically affirmed by illustrating how, despite evidence to the contrary, 
Vladimir Putin did not break partial reform equilibrium. In fact, he further reinforced command 
over market practices, further entrenching the problem.  
 It is important to remember that the incentives to undermine attempts to strengthen 
institutions have not stemmed from corrupt officials, although they do profit from exploiting 
partial reform. Instead, it is because the institutions had no way of implementing the reforms 
the government attempted ± they lacked the enforcement mechanisms to do so. As a result, 
corrupt practices, some necessary, others predatory, evolved to compensate for these 
shortcomings. This chapter has analysed how this has happened over time, and how informal 
institutions have proven more adaptable than formal ones. The following chapter will dive 
more specifically into the challenges and shortcomings of one institution: the Central Bank of 
Russia. Analysing its trajectory allows us to understand how no matter the intentions of the 
reformers, there was no way the objectives of many reforms could be met. It allows us to 
highlight how the state, society, and the institution itself copes with this riddle by resorting to 
informal rather than formal institutions. 
                                                 
158
 Appel, 2004.; The World Bank. "Russian GDP Per Capita 1991 - 2012." 2012. 
   
 95 
CHAPTER 4  
THE CENTRAL BANK OF RUSSIA 
 
This chapter will discuss the history of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), the role it has played 
in the transition, and the role it has played in the maintenance of partial reform equilibrium. As 
such, it is divided into three sections. The first examines the autonomy of the CBR as a means 
of understanding the how its status as an independent institution did not help the transition to 
a market economy, although many argued its autonomy was an essential first step. The second 
section provides a brief historical overview of the CBR to provide a historical framework for 
examining the roots of many social economic practices from the banking perspective. The final 
section is an analysis of CBR policies in the reform era and how these policies maintained 
partial reform by undermining market practices. This chapter will provide insight into the 
SDUDGR[RIWKH&%5¶V development as a key economic institution.  
 
4.1 Central bank independence and the Russian Federation 
Central bank independence (CBI) is a sensitive issue because while central bankers are more 
concerned with inflation and price stability, politicians are more concerned with economic 
growth and employment.1 While the end goals of both the central bank and the ruling party are 
economic stability and growth, how they are achieved and the sacrifices each are willing to 
make often conflict. The degree of independence a central bank has determines how the conflict 
between the two is resolved.2 There are many debates surrounding central bank independence, 
but they can be separated into two categories. First, that central banks should be as independent 
and autonomous as possible in order to prevent long-term monetary goals from being 
undermined by short-term political pressures.3 There have been numerous studies that show a 
negative correlation between CBI and inflation.4 The argument is that this provides long-term 
                                                 
1
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price stability, which is important for the stability of a capital market where governments and 
enterprises can borrow cheaply and make long-term investments.5 The second argument is that 
central banks should be subordinated to an elected government or should be composed of 
elected officials.6 This is because an institutional agency that exists independently of electoral 
pressures undermines the democratic process, and cannot accurately reflect the will of the 
people.7 Those that argue against CBI, argue that the links between CBI and price stability are 
spurious and can be explained by other factors, such as political stability and accountability.8 
However, the clear downside to compromised central bank independence is that it is much 
more susceptible to political pressure during times of economic hardship when there are calls 
for expansionist monetary policy to alleviate social burdens.  
There are three main roles that a central bank is supposed to fulfil: setting monetary 
policy, regulating the banking industry and financial markets, and overseeing the payments 
system.9 As such, most measures of CBI try to evaluate how free central banks are to make 
policies regarding these issues. For example, the seminal work on contemporary CBI by 
Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti examine two main criteria: legal independence, or how much 
DXWRQRP\ LV JUDQWHG LQ WKH EDQN¶V PDQGDWH RU WKH VWDWH¶V FRQVWLWXWLRQ DQG SHUVRQQHO
independence, or who appoints central bank managers and how easily can that person be 
removed and replaced.10 Both criteria examine the degree to which a government can pressure 
or sway central bankers to abandon their long-term focus for short-term gains. These criteria 
are measured on a scale of 0 ± 1, with 0 being least independent and 1 being most independent. 
A recent study using these criteria by Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti found that the Central 
%DQN RI5XVVLD¶V DXWRQRP\ VFRUHV  IRU LWV DXWKRULW\ RYHU PRQHWDU\SROLF\ DQGSUREOHP
solving with the government, placing it in the same category as the USA and Canada; it scores 
.47 for its limits on lending to the government, placing it in the same category as France.11 This 
demonstrates that on paper and in practice, the CBR is autonomous.  
The debate around CBI is very contentious, but little of it is applicable to Russia and 
other states in the Former Soviet Union. Thus, a full analysis of the merits and disadvantages 
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and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank economic review 6, 3. (1992): 353-98. 354 
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of CBI is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is necessary to understand the basis of 
the debate to rule out CBI, or the lack thereof, as a cause of partial reform equilibrium. It was 
expected that if Russia could construct an independent central bank, as international observers 
recommended, then its transition to a market economy would be swifter and easier. If we accept 
that Russia has not yet completed its transition and it is indeed trapped in partial reform 
HTXLOLEULXPWKHQZHFDQLQIHUWKDWHLWKHU5XVVLD¶VFHQWUDOEDQNLVQRWDXWRQRPRXVRUWKDW&%,
has little to no effect on the efficiency of its economic transition. While CBR independence is 
probably for the best, for reasons that will be explained, this has not made the it any less 
susceptible to reinforcing command economy practices and maintaining partial reform 
equilibrium.  
The degree to which CBI is a useful macroeconomic tool for developing countries and 
countries in transition is also up for debate. There are some studies that demonstrate that CBI 
is essential in developing economies, and has a stronger negative correlation to interest rates 
and price stability than in developed economies.12 Regarding Russia and other FSU and 
formally socialist economies more generally, the results are mixed. Because of the challenges 
that many central banks in this region faced in the early transition period, it is difficult to 
untangle the causality between inflation and CBI. These countries sustained periods of high 
inflation during price liberalisation, which skews the data against CBI. Studies have found that 
if price liberalisation was sustained and fully completed, then CBI has the same effect on 
inflation as it does in developed economies.13 Additionally, CBI reinforces financial market 
development through hard budget constraints, which has a negative correlation to budget 
deficits, inflation, and a positive correlation to economic growth.14 The hypotheses for these 
relationships vary. It is likely that CBI, especially legal CBI, is an indicator of strong rule of 
law, which is conducive to long-term economic investment and overall political stability. The 
other common observation and hypothesis is that of contagion or coercion. Most of the 
countries that follow this pattern are geographically closer to, and / or members of the European 
Union.15 
However, Russia does not fit this pattern. It has a high degree of CBI, but its control of 
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monetary policy is questionable.16 In fact, especially in the 1990s, the CBRs inability to rein 
in inflation caused hyperinflation and widespread economic turmoil. As for any link to 
economic growth, this is a spurious correlation as numerous studies have demonstrated that it 
is far more likely that the rise in gas and oil prices in the 2000s to be responsible than other 
factors such as sound political, economic, or monetary policies. In fact, as will be discussed in 
further detail in the next section, CBI in Russia caused a lot of macroeconomic chaos as the 
CBR and the government pursued diverging reforms and policies in the first part of the 1990s. 
Since the 2000s, Johnson has argued, CBI has been slightly eroded by the Putin presidency, 
and the commercial banking industry and financial markets have not supported CBI, an 
important endorsement if it is to succeed.17 However, both Johnson and Tompson have 
demonstrated the increase in investments that occurred after Putin took power and began to 
bring the CBR more under executive control.18 µ,IWKHGHVLUHIRUVWDELOLW\KDVFDXVHGILQDQFLDO
institutions to back CBI in Western Countries, then the pain of stabilisation has had the opposite 
effect in Russia.¶19 &%,KDVQRW KDG WKHH[SHFWHGHIIHFWVRQ5XVVLD¶V WUDQVLWLRQ WRDParket 
economy as it has not been able to implement sound monetary policy and has often undermined 
the development of a market economy. 
The institutional legacy that the CBR inherited set it up to fail regardless of its level of 
autonomy. CBI is a tool of market economies, but Russia was not a market economy so this 
tool could not have the same effect.20 7KH&%5¶VDXWRQRP\ZDVFRQVWUXFWHGZLWKWKHKHOSDQG
advice of international observers and devoid of any economic legacy.21 As such, even when it 
wants to implement anti-inflationary monetary policy, or regulate banks more closely, it has 
no mechanisms to undertake these actions. In fact, Johnson makes a compelling argument that 
had the CBR had less autonomy in the 1990s, the liberalisation policies could have been much 
better coordinated and shock therapy would have been more effective. For example, although 
CBI had drastic anti-inflationary effects on those states that sustained rigorous liberalisation 
policies, Russia did not do this. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the government 
undermined much of its shock therapy plan by maintaining many price subsidies. As will be 
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illustrated in the following sections, the CBR contributed to the failure of liberalisation by 
maintaining soft budget constraints and printing rubles to soften the blow of inflation, which 
led to hyperinflation. Much of this is not because the CBR was actively trying to sabotage the 
transition. Conversely, because the monetary tools it had on paper proved to be ineffective, it 
resorted to those it knew would give them some leverage. 
One of the benefits of CBI is that it allows a central bank to act more decisively and 
effectively during an economic crisis.22 This means that central banks can raise or lower 
interest rates as necessary to control for inflation or provide emergency liquidity for banks or 
other entities that may need assistance. However, a measure of both CBI and, more crucially, 
credibility, is how easily a central bank reacts to pressures to aid banks or lower interest rates. 
Central banks with tighter limits on public lending tend to have more independence because it 
signals that they both are not subject to political pressure, and that they are committed to long-
term price stability.23 For example, during a crisis, if a central bank rescues problem banks to 
avoid crisis contagion, this signals that it is placing short-term pressures before long-term 
interests.24 The more often it does this, the more it undermines its own credibility, and the more 
its actual autonomy is questioned. The CBR indeed has a high degree of autonomy and can, 
and does, respond rapidly to economic crises to prevent crises from crippling the economy. 
Yet these measures often go too far, do not DOORZIRUFULVHVWRIRVWHUµFUHDWLYHGHVWUXFWLRQ¶DQG
echo the Soviet protectionist practices. Thus, providing relief, the CBR maintains command 
economy practices and soft budget constraints alongside those of a market economy. 
 It is tempting to think that if the CBR had enough independence, then it would have 
been able to take control of the economy and steer it toward a market. However, this ignores 
the fact that CBI did not make the anti-inflationary or other tools the CBR had any more 
effective. Furthermore, there is no evidence that subordinating the CBR to the government 
would have resulted in a different outcome. The problem of partial reform is that there are 
contradictory economic signals at play, each undermining the other. The CBR resorts to SBCs 
and other command economy practices, which undermine the market reforms both it and the 
government are trying to implement. This also undermines the rule of law and institutional 
practices: if the CBR does not adhere to its own policies, what good are they? If institutions, 
and by extension the rule of law, are weak, then the degree of central bank independence the 
CBR has will have no effect on partial reform equilibrium. 
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4.2 History of the central banks of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union 
To better understand the role that the Central Bank of Russia plays in reinforcing partial reform 
equilibrium, we must first understand and analyse the economic role it has historically played 
historically. If indeed the economy is trapped between command and market systems, we must 
understand the role it played in the former versus the role it is supposed to play in the latter. 
This will highlight both the practices of the CBR that reinforce partial reform, as well as the 
limitations of the CBR to foster genuine economic reform. As such, this section will briefly 
describe the history of the CBR: from the State Bank of the Russian Empire through the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Then, we will examine how the perestroika reforms affected the 
banking sector and thus the role the CBR inherited when the Soviet Union collapsed, and the 
tools it had to fulfil those roles.   
 
State Bank of the Russian Empire and Gosbank 
The State Bank of the Russian Empire was developed in 1860 as an auxiliary institution to the 
Ministry of Finance to facilitate the numerous economic development projects the empire was 
undertaking at the time.25 The Bank would not begin to assume the regular responsibilities of 
DFHQWUDOEDQNXQWLO WKHVZKHQLWEHJDQUHJXODWLQJWKHHPSLUH¶VEDQNs, lending to new 
commercial banks, taking bankrupt banks into receivership, and so on.26 It was not until 1895 
that the bank began issuing currency and taking control of monetary policy.27 In the 1900s, the 
bank again evolved by amassing gold and currency rHVHUYHVLQOLQHZLWKWKHVWDWH¶VILVFDOSROLF\
8QWLOWKH)LUVW:RUOG:DUWKH6WDWH%DQNRIWKH5XVVLDQ(PSLUHPDLQWDLQHGWKHHPSLUH¶VJROG
ratio at nearly 100 percent ² the bank kept its currency value equal to the amount of gold 
reserves the state owned.28 :KHQ::,EURNHRXWWKH%DQNILQDQFHGWKH(PSLUH¶VLQYROYHPHQW
in the war via treasury bills and loans, but spent just over 500 million rubles of gold reserves 
on the war over a three-year period.29 :KLOHWKLVPDGHDGHQWLQWKH%DQN¶VUHVHUYHVWKHEDQN 
FRXOGKDYHVSHQWPXFKPRUHRQWKHZDUHIIRUW7KLVLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHJLYHQWKDW5XVVLD¶V
poor performance in the war was one of the contentions of the 1917 Revolution ² it was one 
RIWKH%ROVKHYLNV¶PDQ\UDOO\LQJFULHV30 In December 1917, the Bank was seized as part of the 
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revolution.31 
 From 1917 until 1920, it was the Bank of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, 
after which it became the State Bank of the Soviet Union (Gosbank). It was during this time 
that the Bank would undergo the changes required for a command economy. It was a 
monobank, meaning it undertook banking activities for the state and the general population: it 
helped the state fund economic plans, but it also served as the state savings banks for individual 
depositors. Gosbank uQGHUWRRN WKHVH WDVNV E\ RYHUVHHLQJ DQG GLUHFWLQJ WKH VWDWH¶V WKUHH
specialised banks: Stroibank, the financing and investment bank; Sberbank, the state savings 
bank; and Vneshtorgbank, the foreign exchange bank.32 It stopped operating on a for-profit 
basis, and its main functions became financing the modernisation and industrialisation of the 
state by printing money, managing the redistribution process, and developing accounting 
practices that allowed the state to fulfil its economic plans.33 The state set quotas of what was 
to be produced in each industry and Gosbank allocated the necessary funding to each industry 
according to these quotas. 34 It was not intended as a tool of macroeconomic management, and 
did not have tools to manage macroeconomic policies such as inflation and interest rates.35 
Instead, it had WRROVWRVRIWHQWKHVWDWH¶VEXGJHWFRQVWUDLQWV*RVEDQNZDVDSDUWRIWKHSDUW\
machinery to ensure the command economy functioned smoothly. Its role was not to undertake 
any kind of fiscal or monetary policy, but to follow orders.  
Since the main aim of the new state was to be working toward the formation of a 
moneyless society, the role of the bank would be to help the state finance its economic policies 
through creative accounting in the absence of hard, stable revenue.36 To this end, Gosbank 
developed a non-cash system that allowed it to soften budget constraints. It developed two 
different forms of currency, liquidity and non-liquidity based, for different transactions: 
nalichnye, money or wages paid to workers, and beznalichnye, money used to conduct 
transactions between enterprises.37 By the mid-1930s, the bank negotiated loans and 
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outstanding payments in beznalichnye, non-cash settlements.38 It is the beznalichnye that 
allowed for soft budget constraint (SBC) to be practiced, and was the most stubborn legacy 
Gosbank left to its predecessor. SBCs gave enterprises the financing necessary to acquire the 
raw materials or other goods needed for production (soft administrative pricing). Because 
beznalichnye was not a hard form of currency, the Bank was able to expand the currency as 
much as needed, thus allowing them to grant credit to enterprises (soft credit and soft 
subsidies). This further allowed them to settle debts and other arrears in non-cash payments, as 
the beznalichnye was not the currency in which the economy was valued ² it was not used to 
purchase goods and services. Thus, by using an alternative currency on which the prices of 
goods were not based, Gosbank was able to grant and forgive loans, and expand credit 
seemingly without piling debt on the economy.   
However, the issuing of two separate currencies to accommodate the needs of the 
command economy took a toll. The SBCs undermined the economy and perverted the notions 
of profit maximisation, leading to inefficiency. Beznalichnye worked well in theory, but it did 
not provide the state with the hard revenue it needed to stay afloat. It also contributed to the 
confusion of economic value ² it was impossible to tell the actual cost or value of various 
goods and services. Gosbank had no experience in controlling inflation with interest rates, or 
undertaking and managing many of the policies on which market economies depend. The 
ability to maintain SBCs was the only tool that Gosbank had in its arsenal when it became clear 
that the economy was in trouble. To make matters worse, the tasks that were set during 
*RUEDFKHY¶Vperestroika reforms were mutually exclusive: to create a financial market that can 
help stimulate the economy and bring in much-needed revenue, but also protect the populace 
from the harsh realities of a market economy.39 As perestroika proceeded, Gosbank could not 
meet these objectives. The agency, and the people who ran it, understood the theory behind the 
reforms, but that did not help them develop the necessary instruments to both implement the 
reforms and make them effective.40 Reducing inflation and stimulating economic growth are 
straightforward concepts for a market economy with a sole currency. But in a dual monetary 
system in which the value of goods and services is unknown, these concepts become impossible 
to operationalise. Thus, as Gosbank began to take on the roles and responsibilities of a market 
central bank, it lost control over the command economy. The tools had to enact economic 
policy begin to change, but had little to no effect, as the economy itself could not respond to 
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WKHEDQN¶VVLJQDOV7KXV*RVEDQNUHVRUWVWRWKHWRROVLWKDVDQGNQRZVZLOOZRUN7KHUHVXOWLV





it an autonomous agency. It was tasked with forming and implementing monetary policy, 
creating a financial market, and generally taking on the roles and responsibilities required of a 
central bank in a market economy. 41 To this end, Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank were separated 
from Gosbank, but remained under its control. Three new specialised state banks (spetsbanks), 
PromsWURLEDQN $JURSURPEDQN DQG =KLOVRWVEDQN ZHUH FUHDWHG WR XQGHUWDNH *RVEDQN¶V
command economy responsibilities.42 Promstroibank managed the industrial sector; 
Agroprombank managed the agricultural sector; Zhilsotsbank managed housing and retail 
loans; Sberbank became the savings bank; and Vneshtorgbank managed foreign trade.43 The 
law did not include clear mechanisms for supervising or regulating the spetsbanks, nor any 
guidelines for the banks on how to undertake banking.44 This led to infighting between 
Gosbank and the spetsbanks.45 Gosbank created as many barriers and obstacles to prevent the 
spetsbanks from having any meaningful role or power: they limited the amount of credit the 
banks could extend, and refused to give them flexible interest rates.46 The idea was that if 
Gosbank did not have the power to properly regulate the spetsbanks it would do so by 
diminishing their role in the economy. The spetsbanks responded by hiring as many people as 
possible and not monitoring their loan portfolios, thereby creating bureaucratic mayhem for 
Gosbank to sort out.47  
 7KH  µ/DZ RQ &RRSHUDWLYHV¶ FRPPHUFLDOLVHG EDQNV LQ WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ48 In 
theory, this law allowed anyone meeting certain legal requirements to open a bank. In practice, 
the legal requirements of opening a bank created high barriers to entry for most budding 
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entrepreneurs. To get a banking license, one had to have the approval of the regional and head 
offices of Gosbank, the ministry of finance, and the local Soviet party. So, much like setting 
up a cooperative, only various party members, ministries, state enterprises, and those with 
personal connections to the party, could set up their own bank.49 However, if one had the 
connections, setting up a cooperative bank was quite easy as the capital requirement was only 
༦500,000.50 For comparison, to set up a commercial bank in the Soviet Union under the same 
law, the capital requirement was ༦5 million.51 The objective of the policy was to make it easier 
for cooperatives and enterprises to undertake their own banking needs: they could have access 
to all the financial tools they needed to be sufficient from the state and command economy, 
make investments, and profit from them.52  
This led to an explosion of banks as enterprises set up pocket banks, or banks attached 
to and run by the enterprises themselves, and spetsbanks created several offshoots and 
subsidiaries, called zero-banks.53 The banks would use their connections to borrow money at a 
favourable interest rate, transfer the money to a zero-bank or subsidiary, and then re-lend at the 
sum a higher interest rate and pocket the difference.54 During this time, the dual-monetary 
system allowed the state to continue to use soft budgeWFRQVWUDLQWVWRUHVROYHHQWHUSULVHV¶GHEW
problems.55 Moreover, enterprises and banks could not be held accountable for defaulting on 
their debt because due to the lack of bankruptcy laws. The first bankruptcy law was introduced 
in 1990 and heavily favoured the debtor.56 This ended up being a de facto soft budget 
constraint.57 Therefore, banks and enterprises rarely took their debt responsibilities seriously, 
expecting to be bailed out every time they defaulted. Second, in later years the CBR, and the 
state resort to SBCs in times of crisis to prevent economic hardship. 
7KHµ/DZRQ6WDWH(QWHUSULVHV¶DQGWKHµ/DZRQ&RRSHUDWLYHV¶DWWHPSWHGWR
create a market economy, or at least introduce profit driving incentives into the Soviet 
command economy.58 Yet it completely undermined the end goals of increasing profits because 
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it maintained soft budget constraints.59 For example, central banks use interest rates for two 
purposes: to earn revenue (via interest as the cost of borrowing money), and to take money out 
of circulation (to combat inflation). However, the maintenance of soft budget constraints made 
*RVEDQN¶VQHZPRQHWDU\WRROVXVHOHVV7REHJLQPDLQWDLQLQJDGXDOPRQHWDU\V\VWHPPDNHV
trying to evaluate the cost of money or the rate of inflation impossible. Second, maintaining 
soft credit practices undermined the purposes of these mechanisms because they did not drive 
enterprises to innovate, maximise profits, and repay loans.   
However, the use of soft budget constraints to undermine market institutions is 
complicated. Primarily, as Gorbachev expressly stated, the state wanted to prevent the 
imposition of HBCs because closure of enterprises might result in social dislocation.60 Also, 
the state also has its own incentive not to implement HBCs because many of those enterprises 
are owned by the state ² LIWKH\IRUHFORVHWKDWLVWKHVWDWH¶VORVV)LQDOO\EHFDXVHPRQHWDU\
tools are undermined by SBCs, Gosbank resorts to using them precisely because they are the 
only tools it possesses maintain some control over the economy.61 Therefore, partial reform 
equilibrium is borne not just out of a desire to maximise predatory rent-seeking and social 
protection, but it also becomes a tool for the state to protect itself. As will be seen, even still in 
WLPHVRIFULVLVWKH&%5¶VPDLQJRDOZKHQXVLQJ+%&VLVWRSURWHFWWKHVWDWH 
 
4.3 The Central Bank of the Russian Federation:  evolution from 1992 ± 2014  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gosbank became The Central Bank of Russia. It was 
given complete autonomy and all the responsibility that came with it. Sberbank and 
Vneshtorgbank (renamed Vnesheconombank or VEB) became commercial banks, 
theoretically independent of the CBR.62 In practice, however, the CBR still owns the majority 
shares of both, and Sberbank remains largest bank in Russia. Shortly before the collapse of the 
USSR, Promstroibank, Agroprombank, and Zhilshotsbank privatised themselves and separated 
from the state banking system.63 By 1992, when the Soviet Union collapsed, there were 1,360 
banks in the Russian Federation alone.64 The economy was in disarray after the collapse of the 
USSR, and the CBR was tasked with developing and implementing policies to sort everything 
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out. This required the CBR to: reconcile the dual monetary system, implement HBCs, 
undertake financial market deepening, regulate the quickly multiplying banks, help the state 
collect taxes, and untangle and separate from the other former republics of the Soviet Union.65  
As argued above, it is the position of this study that the subordination of the CBR to 
WKHVWDWHZRXOGQRW KDYH\LHOGHGGUDVWLFDOO\GLIIHUHQW UHVXOWV%RWK WKH&%5¶VGLIIHUHQFH LQ
vision from the government for how to proceed with economic reform, and its incapacity to 
enact its own policies, were the root causes of the economic upheaval of the early 1990s. It 
should be noted that there were three economic crises in Russia in the 1990s: in 1994, the ruble 
collapsed; 1995, banks began to fail due to a liquidity crisis; and 1998, when the state defaulted 
on its bonds and drastically devalued the ruble. 66 However, this chapter is not concerned with 
economic crises. It is more concerned with the role the CBR played in those reforms that were 




The CBR undermined the efficacy of the shock-therapy liberalisation programme by 
maintaining soft budget constraints. It did so both because SBCs were the most effective 
economic tools it had to modernise the economy, and because it had no control over the money 
supply.67 While the government was liberalising prices, trying to end inter-enterprise debt, and 
implementing hard budget constraints, the CBR undermined this by maintaining soft budget 
constraints and forgiving inter-enterprise debt.68 *LYHQWKH&%5¶VDXWRQRP\WKHUHZDVYHU\
little the liberal reformers could do to stop the CBR and reconcile the two policies.69 Indeed, 
the CBR printed ༦1.3 trillion to allow the enterprises to pay off their arrears, and gave them 
soft loans that were basically grants.70 Additionally, it is estimated that federal subsidies 
amounted to 55 percent of GDP in 1992.71 The CBR would continue to extend soft subsidies, 
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soft taxation, and soft credit to enterprises during the modernisation period. As a result, Daniel 
7UHLVPDQ VD\V µ«WKH EDQking system largely remained an instrument of centralised 
UHGLVWULEXWLRQUDWKHUFDSLWDOPDUNHWDOORFDWLRQ¶72 It is important to acknowledge here that the 
maintenance of SBCs was not only advocated by the elites. Thus, sustained partial reform 
equilibrium was not simply a consequence of vested personal interests looking for 
opportunities to enrich themselves. Rather, it was a by-product of trying to create a market 
economy through non-market means.  
Instead of coordinating goals for restructuring the economy, the government and the 
&%5HDFKXVHGWKHLURZQGLYHUJLQJPHDQVWRIRVWHUDµPDUNHWHFRQRP\¶,QIDFWPDQ\VWDWH-
owned enterprises survived only because of these soft budget constraints.73 The problem is that 
banking reform and macroeconomic and structural reforms cannot be pursued independent of 
each other.74 Because it had not yet established control over the ruble, there was no way for 
the CBR to restrict cash emission and inflation skyrocketed. The result was a crippling inflation 
rate of 2000 percent and an economy in shambles.75 While this had devastating effects on the 
economy, banks profited immensely, with banks accumulating wealth up to 9 percent of 
GDP.76 This led to another explosion of banks, with an estimated 2,000 ± 2,500 banks created 
by 1994.77 Banks could borrow money from the CBR, but repay the loan at a lower interest 
rate than it was borrowed and pocket the difference.78 The CBR also dispersed direct credits 
DQGVXEVLGLHVWRWKHWKRXVDQGVRISRFNHWEDQNVWKDWPDQDJHGWKHLUHQWHUSULVHV¶ILQDQFHVOLWWOH
of this money was reinvested in the enterprise.79 Additionally, banks profited from currency 
speculation by accumulating dollars as the ruble plunged.80  
Thus, there was no way that shock therapy could do for Russia what it did for other 
post-socialist states. To begin, many of the central banks in other post-socialist states (such as 
those in Central and Eastern Europe) were adept at using hard budget constraints and had the 
autonomy to do so.81 As such, in these states, both the government and the central banks were 
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of one mind about the means and objectives of liberalisation. Additionally, these states had far 
more concentrated and direct plans of action due to conditionality for joining the European 
Union, which was the immediate goal for most of them. More importantly, shock therapy could 
not be enacted in Russia because the liberal reformers and the CBR used mutually exclusive 
macroeconomic tools, each undermining the other. Shock therapy could not be properly 
implemented so long as this dual economic system existed. The state-owned enterprises 
JDPEOHGWKDWWKHVWDWHZRXOGQRWDFWXDOO\KROGWKHPWRWKHLUDUUHDUVDQGWKH&%5¶VIRUJLYHQHVV
of the arrears against the desires of the Yeltsin / Gaidar government confirmed and rewarded 
this risk.82 The result was the maintenance of partial reform equilibrium: soft budget constraints 
and command economic practices within the market economy that the government was 
attempting to create.  
 
1992 ± 1996: Privatisation and loans-for-shares 
Regarding the banking industry, the privatisation programme failed in two ways. First, like the 
general economic privatisation, it failed to create an incentive for banks to maximise profits 
and restructure, contributing to the mass proliferation of banks that was taking place at the 
time. Second, it failed to address a key problem in the industry: the fact that the CBR owned 
the largest bank in the state, Sberbank. The CBR did not play a role in drafting privatisation 
programme designed by Anatoly Chubias. As a result, the privatisation programmes that 
Chubais designed were unattractive and unprofitable to the banks. The programmes were 
designed to officially convert the positions of the nomenklatura from managers to owners of 
their enterprises; not actually increase investment or bring in new management.83 In fact, banks 
could use vouchers to purchase between 10 and 25 percent of company stock, providing both 
a barrier and disincentive for the banks to take part in the privatisation programme.84 The 
absence of this contribution had far reaching consequences for the development of the financial 
market as it drove a wedge between banks and enterprises. 
Additionally, the Duma passed a law that made banks responsible for the return of 
directed credits and the CBR did its best to enforce this law because not doing so undermined 
their tenuous grasp on monetary tools.85 These credits were subsidies that enterprises were 
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entitled to, but they had to be repaid ² the enterprises had to earn enough to pay it back. 
However, because the enterprises had no incentive to restructure and earn profits, they were in 
no position to repay the directed credits and banks began refusing to issue them.86 At first 
glance, this seems like progress as the state appears to be implementing a hard budget 
constraint. To get around this, enterprises opened their own pocket banks. This reversed the 
roles banks are supposed to play since they are owned by the enterprises.87 This allowed for 
insider lending: poor lending practices when bank managers are unable to properly evaluate 
loans and take on more risk.88 For example, enterprises held up to 90 percent of preferential 
loans at some banks.89 The burden of responsibility for repaying loans should fall to the 
HQWHUSULVHVQRWWKHEDQNV<HWEHFDXVHRIWKHZD\WKH'XPD¶VODZZDVHQDFWHG it absolved 
the enterprises from repayment responsibility.90 Thus, again, hard budget constraints are not 
implemented.     
Critically, the privatisation programmes did not address privatising Sberbank and 
Vnesheconombank, which were still owned by the CBR. Sberbank and Vnesheconombank 
were turned into joint stock companies, but the CBR holds the majority share.91 Privatising 
these banks is important because it grants the CBR the independence necessary to deal with 
regulation or monetary policy, the main role of a central bank in a market economy.92 For 
example, Sberbank was not held to the same reserve requirements as other banks until January 
1997.93 When it cannot separate the two, the CBRs concern over its commercial enterprises 
can both distract from and taint its ability to undertake these roles successfully.94 Further 
complicating matters is that Sberbank was the only bank that could insure deposits. This made 
the personal account market inaccessible to commercial banks since they could not offer the 
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same protections.95 Conversely, the CBR maintained control of Sberbank to prevent the 
government from exploiting it and using it to fund the state budget, which the CBR refused to 
do.96 The CBR is then damned regardless of what it does:  it remains largest vested interest in 
the financial market and its ability to objectively make monetary or regulatory policy is 
compromised, or it fails to prevent the government from overspending and makes inflation 
worse. Nevertheless, the CBR¶VFRQWLQXHG control over Sberbank and VEB prevents the proper 
development of a market economy, and maintains partial reform equilibrium.  
To further alienate enterprises from the CBR, the latter retained the power to extract 
WD[HVDQGDUUHDUVIURPHQWHUSULVHV¶DFFRXQWVWKURXJKWKHROG6RYLHW kartoteka system.97 This 
V\VWHPZDVXVHGE\*RVEDQNWRHQVXUHWKDWHQWHUSULVHVZHUHIXOILOOLQJWKHVWDWH¶VSODQE\RQO\
giving them the money they needed when they needed it and so on.98 After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union the kartoteka system continued granting the CBR direct access to these accounts. 
Thus, if an enterprise had arrears, taxes or otherwise, the CBR could see if the enterprise had 
money in its account, and withdraw as necessary (or as much as possible if the available amount 
was insufficient to cover the entire arrear). Eventually, this encouraged enterprises to hide 
money from the CBR and enter a system of bartering with other enterprises.99 As a result, both 
enterprises and banks were in a difficult position: banks could not do business without 
enterprise customers, and enterprises could not properly modernise and invest without banks. 
So many banks turned to the government for business. 
Also seeking to avoid doing business with the Central Bank was the government. It did 
so by allowing certain banks, known as authorised banks, to manage its accounts; in fact, some 
banks were set up for this purpose alone.100 It is estimated that these banks reaped more than 
$1.3 billion profit from this set-up.101 While this provided commercial banks with the funds 
they needed and wanted to stay in business, it was a risk for the state. Authorised banks could 
not be held accountable for their own failures, meaning the state would lose whatever money 
they had entrusted to that bank.102 By alienating enterprises and the state, the CBR 
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unintentionally forced both to undertake business via the social economy, meeting much of the 
day-to-day business and banking needs through opaque connections and thereby undermining 
the efforts of all involved to create a market economy. 
One of the main activities authorised banks undertook was selling GKO treasury bonds. 
The revenues from these bonds were used as a non-inflationary means of financing the state 
budget.103 In other words, the bonds became a way for the state to raise the money it needed to 
finance its budget instead of printing more rubles to cover what tax revenue could not (which 
would lead to inflation). The problem is that the government and the banks began to speculate 
and rely too much on the GKO bonds. This became a problem as they relied on the bonds 
instead of cutting spending or fixing tax collection practices. The largest and more ambitious 
banks would go on to lobby for bank centred privatisation, as a means for both the banks and 
the state to raise much-needed funds. This would go on to form the basis of the loans-for-shares 
scheme, which would see bankers become inordinately wealthy, and the state continue to 
struggle to make ends meet. 
Examining the loans-for-shares programme from the perspective of the banks sheds 
light on how it reinforced the partially reformed nature of the Russian economy. One of the 
reasons the scheme initially had support was not just that it was supposed to supply the state 
with funds, but also because it would finally restructure and re-orient the incentives in some of 
WKH VWDWH¶V PRVW SURPLVLQJ HQWHUSULVHV104 In theory, because the 1992 nomenklatura 
privatisation shut out the banks, allowing profit driven bankers to privatise large enterprises 
would surely transition from command to market incentives. However, this was not the case. 
Replacing the nomenklatura managers with bankers did not remarkably improve the efficiency, 
productivity, or profitability of the enterprises.105 For example, Juliet Johnson shows that many 
of the enterprises privatised through loans-for-VKDUHV ORVWPRQH\1RULO¶VN1LFNHO ORVW
million in the first part of 1998 (pre-crisis), Sibneft lost $28 million, and many other enterprises 
became heavily indebted.106 While many would argue that these losses can be explained by 
venal corruption and rent seeking, I argue that these losses show how partial reform equilibrium 
has trapped the economy. Even these losses were due to corruption, the partially reformed 
nature of the economy skewed the incentives of the bankers to asset strip and rent seek instead 
of invest and restructure. 
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The actions of the government and CBR undermine the role that the banking industry 
is supposed to play. Financial market development should stimulate economic growth and 
diversification, but the state of the banking industry in Russia reinforced its economic 
problems. The banking and financial industry are essential to the construction of a diversified, 
accountable, and profit driven economy.107  However, the explosion of banks in the early 1990s 
undermined this as many of the banks were unsound. Of the 2,000 plus banks that existed 
EHWZHHQDQGILYHRIWKHPKHOGSHUFHQWRIWKHVHFWRU¶VDVVHWV108 This is a strong 
indication that many of the remaining banks were undertaking little to no actual banking or 
investment, and that there were weak regulatory instruments. This lack of regulation 
undermined the development of a sound financial market.109 Because of the lack of regulation, 
insider loans, and mistrust of the CBR, investment lending was deemed too risky. As such, 
banks were not undertaking long-term loans, which not only shaped their incentives for long-
term investment, but hindered their ability to invest at all. More importantly, the weakness of 
banking regulation is directly tied to the protection of property rights. Without sound property 
rights, neither financial markets, nor economies more broadly can flourish. This perpetuates 
the need for a social economy because short-term thinking and planning persists. This is not 
conducive to the construction of a market economy and merely uses market means to obtain 
command ends.   
 
The 1998 economic crisis 
The instability of the banking sector, and the weakness of the CBR to regulate it, culminated 
in the 1998 economic crisis. Risky lending practices, liquidity problems, asset stripping, and 
reckless currency and treasury speculation caused the government to default on its international 
loan payments, and the CBR to devaluate the ruble overnight. Many scholars have argued that 
exiting crisis necessitated institutional development, which resulted in a stronger economy that 
finally completed the transition from a command to market economy.110 However, upon closer 
inspection, this logic does not stand. Much of the economy and the banking sector remains 
partially reformed. An analysis of how economic crises can lead to institutional development, 
and a subsequent application of this to the 1998 and 2008 economic crises in Russia is the 
subject of the remaining chapters of this study.  
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3.4 Conclusion and outlook  
5XVVLD¶VEDQNLQJLQGXVWU\KDVHYROYHGVLQFHWKHPLG-1990s. The Central Bank of Russia and 
the government eventually learned to cooperate, although the two still differ on how tackle 
monetary problems from time to time. It has seen its share of trouble, including two major 
financial crises in 1998, 2008, and has been grappling with a protracted economic decline since 
2012. These will be discussed in more detail in the proceeding chapters. There have been some 
successes: a deposit insurance scheme was created, capital requirements were increased and 
are better enforced, and regulation in general has improved. While these successes must be 
applauded, there ae many underlying issues that undermine the industry and maintain partial 
reform equilibrium. The first problem is the continued involvement of the state at the expense 
of industry competitiveness and growth. The state has remained the majority shareholder in 
Sberbank and VEB, and has increased its influence. Second, there are still many regulatory 
issues that hamper industry transparency and growth. Each of these issues will be explored in 
turn.  
At the end of 2010, there were 20 banks in which the state owned the majority share, 
and these banks controlled 46 percent of industry assets.111 Moreover, the government 
increased its role in the financial sector by obtaining shares in over 400 banks (many of these 
shares are less than 25 percent), some of which are strategic banks.112 While there have been 
some proposals to sell CBR or government shares and privatise the banks, only once has this 
happened: when the state privatised 10 percent of its stake in VTB in 2011.113  This creates a 
conflict of interest: the CBR largest creditor, holding 39 percent of outstanding credit to the 
non-financial private sector; it holds 79 percent of retail deposits; and is the sector regulator.114  
Additionally, the role of the state distorts competition and maintains soft-budget constraints as 
a means of compensation. As state banks attract most deposits and assets, other banks are 
deprived of the capital and assets needed to build up their reserves, which is especially needed 
during economic crises.115 It was assumed that the creation of the deposit insurance scheme in 
2003 would break the state monopoly, and create opportunities for banks to build their long-
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term liabilities portfolios.116 This did not happen as state owned banks still control over three 
quarters of the deposit market.  
Although controversial, there are several reasons why the state has maintained its 
participation in and control over the banking and financial market industry. To begin, the CBR 
maintains control of Sberbank because it can influence monetary and social policy more easily: 
it can restrict lending, increase or decrease interest rates, provide emergency liquidity and so 
on.117 Additionally, because of its present dominance and its historical role, it is the bank with 
the most physical presence throughout the country. This allows the state to reach vulnerable 
pensioners and provide banking services where there may otherwise be none.118 Thus, while 
there is no question that state owned banks need to be privatised if the sector is to be 
competitive and stimulate economic growth, it must be acknowledged the state maintains 
control in these banks for reasons beyond the promotion of personal interest.  
Regarding the regulation of the industry, there has also been mixed progress. The CBR 
has struggled to revoke banking licenses from banks since the 1998 economic crisis, peaking 
in the early 2000s and again after 2013.119 In 1996, the Federal Commission for the Securities 
Market (FFMS) was created to regulate the non-financial banking sector.120 It regulated bonds 
and securities and advocated for investors.121 This body was dissolved in 2013, and its 
responsibilities were allocated to the CBR.122 International accounting standards were adopted 
in 2004 and there has been greater shift to focus on transparency. 123 There has also been a 
change in focus on ensuring that banks are sound, rather than meeting bureaucratic 
requirements. For example, the April 2004 ODZµ2Q%DQNV0DQGDWRU\1RUPV¶UHTXLUHG&%5
to evaluate the health and state of banks in addition to and sometimes above the bureaucratic 
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regulations.124  
Yet, there are fundamental problems with banking regulation that prevent the transition 
WRDPDUNHWHFRQRP\1RWDEO\WKH&%5¶VKLVWRU\RIUHJXODWRU\IRUEHDUDQFHERWKEHIRUHDQG
after the 1998 crisis undermines its capacity and credibility to enforce regulations.125 This has 
led to risky lending activities, as evidenced by the low diversification of loan portfolio risks.126 
As of 2010, the largest 30 borrowers in the country accounted for 56 percent of the loan 
portfolio.127 The CBR has undermined its own credibility as a regulator by providing liquidity 
to banks that should otherwise be liquidated and by forestalling or delaying the implementation 
of regulatory requirements. To be fair, part of the reason for this is that CBR only gained power 
to force banks to increase their prudential requirements in 2015.128 Thus demonstrating that 
HYHQZKHQWKH&%5KDVWKHWRROVQHFHVVDU\WRSHUIRUPLWVUROHSURSHUO\LWGRHVQ¶WDOZD\VKDYH
the power to do so. There are many consequences of the failure to properly regulate the banking 
aQGILQDQFLDOVHFWRU)XQGDPHQWDOO\LWSUHYHQWVWKHFUHDWLRQRIDQµHQDEOLQJHQYLURQPHQW¶D
combination of regulatory policies and legislation that encourages investment and profit 
maximisation, such as sound property rights and a strong rule of law.129 The lack of these things 
requires most banks to have social / political connections to undertake most of its business, 
thus reinforcing the social economy maintaining partial reform equilibrium.  
The CBR has a fundamental role to play in the transition to a market economy. It was 
unable and unwilling to aid the shock therapy liberalisation, which led to massive inflation and 
multiplying of small banks. It was left out of much of the privatisation programme, as it became 
aOLHQDWHG IURP WKH JRYHUQPHQW DQG WKH EDQNLQJ VHFWRU 2YHUDOO WKH &%5¶V VWUXJJOHV WR
undertake sound monetary and regulatory policies have resulted in skewed incentives for the 
industry. It is important to emphasise, again, that these incentives are shaped by a system over 
which there is little control. Thus, like the CBR and the government, economic actors undertake 
those activities that are in their best interest and help them get the most out of their 
environment. However, while there has been change there have also been opportunities for 
change that have been wasted. This will be the subject of the following case study chapters.
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CHAPTER 5 
 THE 1998 ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
The VWXG\¶VPDLQDUJXPHQWLVWKDW5XVVLD¶Vbanking institutions, as manifest in agencies like 
the Central Bank of Russia, are trapped in partial reform equilibrium. This chapter presents a 
case study in three parts, to examine how the 1998 economic crisis did not result in crisis 
modernisation. First, it analyses the causes of the crisis to highlight opportunities for crisis 
modernisation. Second, it enumerates and evaluates the crisis containment and crisis resolution 
measures implemented to stabilise the economy in the wake of the crisis. Finally, it synthesises 
these two components by testing the three hypotheses put forth in chapter two. These measures 
test whether the responses to the crisis were appropriate, if they were implemented efficiently 
and effectively, and thus, whether institutional development has taken place. The chapter 
concludes that while the measureable change that can be observed results from the 2001 tax 
reform, it does not amount to crisis modernisation and the CBR remains a partially reformed. 
7KLV VWXG\ ILQGV QR HYLGHQFH WKDW FULVLV PRGHUQLVDWLRQ UHVXOWHG IURP5XVVLD¶s 1998 
economic crisis. The crisis fulfils all the conditions under which crisis modernisation should 
occur, thus making it ideal for understanding why it failed to take place. Of course, there were 
other economic crises throughout the early 1990s that tested the government and Central Bank 
of Russia (CBR), yet these crises were brief and did not require the CBR to address institutional 
problems or systemic vulnerabilities. For example, in 1994, a sudden 27 percent ruble 
depreciation caused a currency crisis and led to the dismissal of then Central Bank Director 
Viktor Geraschenko.1 It also ushered in a period of cooperation and policy coordination 
between the government and the CBR, resulting in a reduction of the fiscal deficit to 5.4 percent 
of GDP, an end to subsidies for certain enterprises, and thus a further reduction in rent-seeking 
to 8 percent of GDP.2 <HWWKHVHFKDQJHVZRXOGQRWODVWDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHEWWR*'3
ratio would rise again. While the government did learn to control its spending and the CBR 
more effectively managed the exchange rate after the crisis, these things happen independent 
of institutional development.   
In theory, the 1998 crisis should have forced the government to address the structural 
problems within the economy that created instability, such as the existence of predatory banks, 
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inadequate liquidity ratios, risky lending practices, poor tax collection mechanisms, and so on. 
Yet, each of the proposed hypotheses that measure institutional development are false. One of 
the most effective reforms to result from the 1998 crisis was the improvement of tax collection 
mechanisms, which simplified the procedure and, according to some scholars, improved 
voluntary compliance by 70 percent.3  However, this did not strengthen the tax collection 
institutions, as the state undermines the fair and universal enforcement of the tax reform. This 
case study will first examine the causes and effects of the crisis, followed by an analysis of the 
crisis containment and crisis resolution reforms that were undertaken in response. Finally, it 
will test the three hypotheses to determine whether crisis modernisation indeed took place. 
 
5.1 The 1998 economic crisis  
Many, including the Central Bank of Russia, consider the crisis to have been primarily a 
currency crisis, caused by a debt crisis, that also affected banks.4 Yet, it was really a triple 
crisis, that was caused by poor macroeconomic policies and poor banking regulation. The CBR 
failed to ensure that banks met adequate reserve requirements and engaged in responsible 
OHQGLQJ DQG RWKHU ILQDQFLDO PDUNHW SUDFWLFHV 6LPXOWDQHRXVO\ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V QHHG IRU
revenue in the absence of a proper tax collection mechanism led it to work with banks and sell 
high yield treasury bonds (GKOs).5 However, because few banks had the capital to sell GKOs 
securely, this was a risky endeavour. To top it all off, the CBR was maintaining a pegged and 
overvalued ruble, while asset stripping, rent-seeking, and capital flight failed to generate the 
value needed to justify that exchange rate.6 Understanding the primary cause of the crisis is 
vital for determining what the most effective crisis resolution measures should be, and thus 
what needs to occur to result in crisis modernisation. If the crisis was primarily a banking crisis, 
then it is expected that crisis resolution mechanisms would focus on liquidating and 
restructuring insolvent banks, as well as improving sector regulation. Ideally, crisis resolution 
would address all the causes of a crisis, both primary and other. To best understand those 
factors that led to the 1998 crisis, each will be examined in turn. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the banking sector swelled, with the number of 
registered banks reaching an estimated 2,300 in 1996.7 Of these, only around 100 were 
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commercially viable.8 Because of this, CBR was overstretched, and unable to effectively 
regulate the sector, particularly regarding reserve requirements.9 For example, most banks had 
less than 4 percent capitalization, which was the official requirement at the time.10 Banks 
exploited this through collective non-compliance, making it even harder for the CBR to enforce 
regulations.11 As such, there was little financial discipline, which provided an incentive for 
banks to asset strip and evade taxes.12 There were plenty of opportunities to undertake these 
predatory activities because there were few private bank accounts to service.13 As a result, a 
handful of banks acted as financial mediators and were insolvent long before the crisis.14 
However, as the CBR spent much of its time funding and defending the ruble rather than going 
after predatory banks, it could be argued that its priority was not ensuring that banks adhered 
to regulations. As such, banks were not motivated to develop and strengthen the sector via 
regular profit maximising and commercial banking practices. 
In the absence of undertaking normal commercial and financial services, most banks 
worked with government accounts. This led to a high degree of state capture as the banks and 
the government became closely intertwined, creating more connections to undermine CBR 
regulations.15 These Authorised Banks often stole money the government had given them to 
disperse, and funnelled CBR loans off-shore, along with state and private assets.16 Martinez-
Vazquez et al., have described the 1990s banking industry like a casino, and government and 
banks like gamblers, because they sought revenue from high-risk government securities rather 
than normal banking practices.17 This was a dangerous combination, because the banking 
sector was severely undercapitalised given the high-risk activities it was undertaking, thus 
making it vulnerable to speculative attacks. Thus, there was no development of regulatory 
mechanisms prior to the 1998 crisis as the CBR either failed, or did not care to, ensure that 
banks did not expose the economy to shocks via liquidity shortage or currency devaluation. 
Just as the CBR was unable to force banks to adhere to regulations, so too were banks 
unable to force enterprises and firms to repay their loans. The result is that enterprises remained 
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unprofitable and inefficient, often generating negative output.18 To save these firms from 
failing, the state would provide indirect subsidies by allowing firms to accrue wage debts and 
by forgiving tax arrears.19 As a result, economic growth stagnated and the tax base began to 
shrink as firms avoided making profits to dodge taxes.20 For example, there was an increase in 
barter transactions from 10 percent in 1992 to 45 percent in 1997.21 There was also no way to 
find firms insolvent, as bankruptcy laws would only force the firm to be reorganised rather 
than liquidated.22 As such, this formed a de facto soft-budget constraint that undermined the 
profit maximisation drive necessary for firms to repay loans.23 This was a further incentive for 
banks to undertake predatory activities as they were unable to profit from normal lending. 
Because banks were unable to force firms to repay their loans, there was no incentive for firms 
to maximise their profits. As a result, parallel to the vulnerable banking sector was the failure 
to create solid economic growth as the establishment of market economy practices were 
undermined by the maintenance of command economy practices. 
The lack of economic growth generated by maintenance of soft-budget constraints only 
H[DFHUEDWHGWKHVWDWH¶VZHDNWD[FROOHFWLRQSUDFWLFHV7RPDNHPDWWHUVZRUVHWKHVWDWHFRXOG
not agree on the best way to reform the tax code. Many assumed that there was no need to 
reform the code at all, as the development of a market economy would result in the growth of 
a private industry whose profits could be taxed, while the gas and oil profits would cover social 
spending.24 The problem was that energy prices were declining and the gas and oil companies 
were evading taxes.25 Gazprom and other state-owned enterprises owed ༦139 billion in tax 
arrears.26 Rather than revising the tax code, the government turned to the banks. For example, 
the loans-for-shares programmes was the first of many schemes created to help the state 
compensate for its inability to collect revenue. However, this too failed to produce the revenue 
the state needed, so the government adopted two coping mechanisms to deal with the liquidity 
shortage: issuing IOUs and selling government bonds (GKOs).  
$VHDUO\DVDIWHU<HOWVLQ¶VVHFRQGHOHFWLRQWKHJRYHUQPHQWVWDUWHGWRORVHPRQH\
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In addition to the shrinking economy and poor tax collection practices enumerated above, the 
state began receiving less financial support from the intHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\RQFH<HOWVLQ¶V
victory was assured and the threat of a communist revival had been neutralised.27 Additionally, 
the World Bank stopped disbursing its loans as many of its conditions, including development 
of banking sector regulations, had not been satisfactorily met.28 To cope with the loss of 
income, the government began issuing IOUs to its employees, including those employed by 
state owned enterprises, and its suppliers.29 By 1997, 50 percent of wage arrears were held by 
the state, and the state was only able to collect 50 percent of taxes due, resulting in tax arrears 
of $13 billion.30 The problem is that paying wages is an essential foundation of a market 
economy.31 Because, as wage arrears mounted, it began a vicious cycle of non-payment that 
OHDGWRWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDYLUWXDOHFRQRP\RQHµEDVHGRQDQLOOXVLRQRISULFHVDOHVZDJHV
WD[HV DQG EXGJHWV¶32 So when the government stopped paying workers or suppliers, they 
bartered, traded, or issue their own IOUs to obtain the goods, services, and materials they 
needed.  
$VDUUHDUVPRXQWHGIHZFRXOGDIIRUGWRSD\WD[HVWKHUHE\ZRUVHQLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
liquidity shortage.33 The resulting deficit required enterprises and the government to borrow 
money from the banks, which significantly increased the interest rate. This made the use of 
barter transactions even more appealing because of the cost of currency.34 Eventually, however, 
the government became so indebted that even the banks could not help as they had with loans-
for-shares.35 The government still received a little aid from the IMF, but it once it met its debt 
obligations there was little left to use for budgetary purposes. For example, federal spending 
averaged 40 percent GDP in 1998, but revenue collection did not raise enough to cover these 
expenses.36 The deficit was five percent GDP in 1998 ² with internal debt payments 
comprising 2.5 percent and external debt payments totalling 1.5 percent, the government was 
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spending a total of four percent GDP on its debt payments.37  Thus, the government ended up 
indebted and overspending, and was unable to collect enough taxes to meet these obligations. 
The government resorted to alternative means of earning liquidity by selling 
government bonds, or GKOs. The CBR processed and registered GKOs worth $62 billion by 
September 1997, and was using these sales to pursue monetary policy.38 Because investors 
bought up GKOs, the government used them to fund the budget and maintain soft-budget 
constraints.39 The problem is that the GKOs had a rapid maturity date, so while they sold 
quickly, they also had to be repaid quickly. By the summer of 1998, the weekly turnover of the 
GKOs totalled $32.7 billion, and the government could not sell enough bonds to honour 
previous holdings and fund the budget.40  In June 1998, the international community bailed out 
the government, but this only delayed the crisis, although some would argue this is when the 
crisis began.41 Finally, on 17 August 1998, the ruble was devalued, the government announced 
a ninety-day moratorium on private international debt payments and the restructuring of all 
domestic debt due by the end of 1999. These problems were exacerbated when the CBR floated 
the ruble on 2 September 1998. The cost of the crisis was enormous: the CBR spent $30 billion 
trying to defend the ruble, and foreign currency debt amounted to $20.5 billion, of which $16 
billion was accumulated in the four months preceding the crisis.42 The failure to regulate the 
banking sector and implement hard budget constraints resulted in an overreliance on treasury 
bonds to fund the budget, which ended up being very costly both for Russia and its international 
investors. 
Many economists and analysts working with Russia just before the crisis claim that it 
could have been avoided as late as the beginning of August 1998, mere weeks before the ruble 
collapsed and the government defaulted on its debt.43 +RZHYHUWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHIXVDOWR
address the structural weaknesses in the economy and financial sector demonstrate the potential 
for crisis modernisation. For example, the government had been trying to pass several laws on 
tax collection in July 1998, the month before the crisis. One of these laws was the adoption of 
a VAT tax that would have allowed the government to tax the vast amount of bartering that 
took place.44 Additionally, the Duma failed to impose additional taxes prescribed by the IMF 
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anti-crisis programme in the summer of 1998, in order to protect natural monopolies.45 The 
failure to do this resulted in a potential revenue of only ༦3 billion, instead of the potential ༦71 
billion that would have come from the original IMF proposal.46 Furthermore, the longer the 
reforms were debated and the more they were redrafted, the more they increased rent-seeking 
capabilities of the elites and the members of their social network, or blat.47 It was not that the 
government was unable to work on institutional development before the crisis, but it did not 
realise it needed to.  
The 1998 crisis took a massive toll on the Russian economy, resulting in a 4.9 percent 
decrease in real output and a 75 percent loss in market value during a year when growth was 
expected.48 Within two years, however, Russia recovered spectacularly, seeing an average of 
6.7 percent GDP growth per year until the 2008 financial crisis.49 However, much of this 
growth and recovery can be attributed to the effects of import substitution and an increase in 
the price of, and demand for, oil.50 When Putin became president in 2000 he passed a series of 
economic reforms aimed and strengthening the economy and providing the state with the 
resources it needed to survive future economic crises. One of the reforms that he passed was 
the long-awaited tax reform that simplified the tax code and closed several loopholes.51 While 
long-term financial stability increased, this study argues that this is less attributable to post-
crisis tax reforms, and more because of the increase in oil and gas rents. 52 The tax reforms 
indeed led to an increase in compliance from 2002, but gas and oil prices drastically increased 
fURPZKLFKDOVRLQFUHDVHGHQHUJ\FRPSDQLHV¶DELOLW\and willingness to pay taxes. Thus, 
though the economy recovered quickly from the 1998 crisis, the extent to which this recovery 
is due to the government and CBR addressing and fixing the systemic vulnerabilities is 
analysed below. 
The crisis was a triple one. A currency crisis occurs when a currency loses 30 percent 
of its value, at a depreciation rate of 10 percent faster than the previous year.53 Additionally, a 
currency crisis occurs when DVWDWH¶V&HQWUDO%DQNFDQQRWDIIRUGRUFKRRVHVQRWWRVSHQG, the 
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foreign exchange reserves needed to defend the currency.54 1998 was a currency crisis because 
after the ruble was devalued on 17 August, it lost two thirds of its value.55 When the devaluation 
initially happened, the CBR said it would defend the ruble at an exchange rate of 6 ± 9.5 rubles 
to the dollar. However, the value dropped far below 9.5, and the CBR free-floated the ruble on 
2 September 1998.56 Until the crisis, the CBR had been defending the exchange rate as a means 
of controlling inflation, but this required it to spend most of its foreign exchange reserves.57 As 
a result, in the aftermath of the crisis, inflation soared to 43 percent over three weeks.58 
$GGLWLRQDOO\SHUFHQWRIEDQNV¶FDSLWDOORVVHVZHUHDWWULEXWHGWRWKHFROODSVHLQWKHUXEOH¶V
value, compared with 13 percent of losses due to GKOs.59 The problem is that, while the 
currency devaluation resulted in inflation and other liquidity problems, it was a symptom of 
more serious problems rather than the cause of the crisis itself.  
7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶V EXGJHW DQG VSHQGLQJSUREOHPV KDYHEHHQ HQXPHUDWHG DERYH. As 
such, the sovereign debt crisis was caused by a deficit in both expenditures and revenues. The 
problem was so bad that government revenues declined from 12 percent in December 1997, to 
10 percent in June 1998.60 The government had tried to compensate for this by selling treasury 
bonds, but this ended up adding to its problems. One of the reasons it is argued that 1998 was 
primarily a currency crisis rather than a debt crisis is because the defence of the ruble obscured 
how much trouble the government was in. Investors knew that a crisis was imminent, but they 
expected the CBR to devalue the ruble, not the government to default on its debt payments.61 
Because of this, investors kept lending to Russia, expecting a bailout from the CBR or the 
international community in the worst case, which contributed to the $16 billion increase in debt 
between 1 June and 17 August 1998.62 The JRYHUQPHQW¶Vsudden insolvency and its default 
qXDOLILHV WKH FULVLV DV D VRYHUHLJQ GHEW FULVLV +RZHYHU ZKLOH WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V GHEW
undoubtedly resulted in the currency devaluation, and is a significant cause, the foundations of 
the crisis are rooted in problems in the banking sector. For example, had bankruptcy laws been 
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more effective, and the CBR more capable of cracking down on predatory banks, the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VEXGJHWZRXOGKDYHEHHQPRUHEDODQFHG 
The 1998 crisis was primarily a banking crisis, caused by poor sector regulation and a 
weak regulator, the CBR. The banking sector was insolvent months before the crisis hit, and 
the CBR was bailing out several large banks.63 As early as 1996, the total issued GKOs 
exceeded the deposits in the entire banking system.64 The stock market had lost 75 percent of 
its value between January and August 1998.65 Most of the banking sector was insolvent in the 
aftermath of the crisis.66 Yet, the banking sector was wreaking havoc on the economy long 
before 1998. As described above, banks were not normal financial mediators, were engaged in 
predatory practices, such as asset stripping, and few of them were sufficiently capitalised. The 
CBR struggled to revoke banking licenses and end these practices, because its authority to do 
this was not clear.67 Additionally, there were no effective bankruptcy laws to dissolve bad 
banks or even bad enterprises. Before the crisis, courts had heard only 4,300 bankruptcy cases 
even though 65,000 firms and banks were in arrears. If the CBR had been able to effectively 
regulate the sector, there would have been fewer banks, which would have been better 
capitalised, and it would have been less likely that a default would have occurred. Additionally, 
if there had been more effective bankruptcy laws, the government and CBR would not have 
had to expend resources maintaining soft-budget constraints. Weaknesses in the banking sector 
exacerbated other economic problems that also contributed to the crisis. Therefore, the root 
cause of the crisis lies more with poor macroeconomic practices and poor banking regulation. 
The 1998 crisis was a triple crisis: banking, sovereign debt, and currency. While the 
sovereign debt and currency problems need to be addressed, the weaknesses in the banking 
sector must be the primary focus of crisis resolution to successfully exit the crisis. Appropriate 
crisis resolution measures would include clarifying the &%5¶V UROH DV D VHFWRU UHJXODWRU
liquidating insolvent banks, implementing a more effective bankruptcy law, ending state 
subsidies and hardening budget constraints, and improving tax collection mechanisms. The 
problem is that the government considered the crisis to be primarily caused by poor tax 
collection, so that is where the primary resolution measures were undertaken. The positive 
change that came these measures is indisputable, and will be analysed below. However, 
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because the crisis was not primarily caused by poor revenue collection, the failure to address 
bank regulation meant that the CBR would remain weak and underdeveloped, and the banking 
sector would remain partially reformed. 
Each of the reforms discussed will be classified as either crisis containment or crisis 
resolution. As discussed in chapter two, these two categories classify the reform measures 
undertaken during economic crises. Crisis containment reforms are those which are aimed at 
restoring or maintaining confidence in investors, and generally preventing the economy from 
completely collapsing and minimise the damage done by the crisis.68 These measures are 
further categorised as liquidity assistance, such as bailouts and financial assistance; regulatory 
forbearance, which is a temporary suspension of regulations; and deposit freezes, which 
prevent people from withdrawing their money from the banks at the same time. On the other 
hand, crisis resolution reforms address the structural and operational weaknesses that may have 
caused or exacerbated the effects of the crisis, and often target financial institutions.69 These 
measures are new laws and regulations that seek to reduce the economic vulnerabilities, and 
thereby the likelihood of causing a crisis, by changing the practices and expectations of 
economic actors. When successful, these reforms result in crisis modernisation. Yet, 5XVVLD¶V
responses to the 1998 economic crisis did not result in crisis modernisation. 
 
5.2 Crisis containment and resolution measures 1998 
In chapter two, three hypotheses were stated to test the extent to which the Russian economy 
experienced crisis modernisation in the aftermath of the 1998 economic crisis. The hypotheses 
measure whether the right and necessary policies were enacted; how long it took to implement 
them; and whether they changed behaviours and expectations. The main agency under study is 
the Central Bank of Russia, how it undertook crisis containment and resolution, and if these 
measures resulted in institutional development. Because the CBR does not have power to 
XQLODWHUDOO\GUDIWDQGLPSOHPHQWOHJLVODWLRQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUROHLQFULVLVUHVROXWLRQLVDOVR
examined. Because crisis containment does not necessitate strong institution, the CBR is more 
successful in this area than crisis resolution. This is particularly important as too much crisis 
containment undermines attempts at crisis resolution. Because crisis containment seemingly 
solved the problems caused by the 1998 crisis, there is a failure to undertake serious crisis 
resolution. Therefore, all three hypotheses are false.  
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First, those reforms that qualify as crisis containment will be enumerated and examined. 
These reforms are split into three categories: government liquidity assistance, regulatory 
forbearance, and deposit freezes. Additionally, the various problems that arose from the 
containment measures will be discussed. Second, crisis resolution attempts at asset 
management, bank restructuring, privatisation, and tax reform will be analysed. Specifically, 
this section analyses the scarcity of crisis resolution programmes, and the difficulties in 
drafting and implementing them. In doing so, it will rely primarily on qualitative sources, such 
as reports, statistics, and other accounts of how the CBR managed the crisis, and what resulted 
from the containment and resolution measures. This enables the hypotheses to be tested and 
demonstrate how the crisis responses did not result in any meaningful institutional change.  
 
1998 Crisis containment 
While the government did not default on its payments until 17 August 1998, it was in May 
1998 that state and CBR implemented containment measures. The goal was to prevent the debt 
crisis from becoming a banking and currency crisis, but they failed to do this. The government 
and CBR were nearly insolvent, and options for how best to contain the crisis were limited. 
Nevertheless, the CBR enacted several programmes and schemes to give the banking sector 
even small amounts of liquidity and some time to replenish reserves. Crisis containment 
measures do not require strong institutions to be effective. However, the weakness of the CBR 
even in these measures is demonstrated as banks and enterprises found ways to stay solvent. It 
can indeed be argued that the CBR avoided exerting direct power on the sector so as not to 
appear overly harsh, but that it exerted a considerable amount of indirect power to get banks 
and enterprises to adopt harder budget constraints. The following section will examine the three 
main forms of crisis containment: liquidity assistance, deposit freezes, and regulatory 
forbearance, and how they were implemented in 1998. 
 
i) Liquidity assistance. Prior to the 17 August default, The CBR used various forms of liquidity 
assistance to prevent the debt crisis from becoming a banking and currency crisis. Primarily, it 
undertook currency interventions to maintain the pegged value of the ruble and avoid rapid 
currency devaluation and inflation. The CBR spent $800 million in May, $2.4 billion in June, 
$3.8 billion in July, and in the first half of August alone, $3.2 billion trying to stabilise the 
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ruble.70 The estimates of how much was spent on currency intervention range from the CBRs 
total of $15.5 billion, to the $27 billion total that is put forth by most scholars.71 In addition to 
currency interventions, the CBR converted short-term GKOs into long-term Eurobonds in July 
1998, with the help of various organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and Goldman 
Sachs.72 The plan was that by converting GKO bonds to Eurobonds, banks would not be liable 
to fulfil GKO obligations for seven WR\HDUVEDVHGRQWKHERQG¶VGXUDWLRQ73 This converted 
$2.97 billion GKO to seven year Eurobonds at a 15.4 percent interest rate, and $3.47 billion to 
a 20 year Eurobond at a 15.7 percent interest rate.74  The problem is that this kind of fiscal debt 
restructuring is complicated and its effects on bank restructuring during crisis resolution 
measures are understudied.75 These measures did little to prevent the banking and currency 
crises that would follow, and they only prolonged their eventuality from May 1998 to 17 
August 1998. 
 While there was no official blanket guarantee that the CBR would bailout the banking 
sector, it managed to provide a significant amount of liquidity assistance.76 One of the first 
bailouts came just before the default in August as the CBR lent SBS-Agro $100 million.77 The 
CBR would continue issuing stability loans to large banks to keep them solvent over the next 
few weeks.78 Banks such as Avtobank and Promstroibank pledged 75 percent plus one of their 
shares to the CBR as collateral in exchange for loans.79 Additionally, the CBR injected ༦46 
billion immediately after the 17 August default, with ༦11 billion used for short-term 
stabilisation loans, ༦9 billion lent to Sberbank as a long-term loan, and 17 banks received long-
term loans of various amounts.80 It is estimated that the CBR spent anywhere between ༦46 
billion and $3.5 billion at the low end, and ༦105 to 120 at the high end on liquidity assistance.81 
These programmes were funded by a combination of reserves, monetary expansion, and tax 
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revenues.82 Because of the ways the CBR attempted to hide and maintain inflation, as well as 
other backdoor negotiations, the amount spent on liquidity assistance and the source of its 
funding is debatable. Liquidity assistance kept banks solvent, but it did not force them to 
restructure or adopt hard budget constraints. 
 The CBR also engaged in debt swapping to provide a de facto form of liquidity 
assistance so banks could continue serving commercial accounts.83 Johnson claims that the 
CBR did this by swapping frozen GKO bonds for Lombard credits, and estimates that this 
alone cost ༦14.8 billion rubles in the first two months after the crisis hit.84 CBR statistics show 
that it extended ༦11.4 billion to 62 banks in June 1998, ༦5.7 billion to 40 banks in July 1998, 
and ༦14.5 billion to 68 banks in August 1998.85 Additionally, banks and enterprises undertook 
more creative debt swapping between themselves.86 For example: Enterprise A is owed 
100,000 rubles by X Bank, which is insolvent. Enterprise B owes X Bank 100,000 rubles. 
Enterprise A sells Enterprise B its ༦100,000 credit from X Bank for only 50,000 rubles. 
Enterprise B then uses this ༦100,000 credit to cancel its ༦100,000 debt. Enterprise A now has 
an ༦50,000 surplus, and Enterprise B and X Bank are debt free.87 The problem, however, is 
that the banks did not use the extra liquidity to its advantage as many banks and enterprises 
still defaulted on their debts.88 Debt swapping provided some banks with liquidity, but 
ultimately did not encourage banks to meet their financial obligations. 
 While each of these liquidity assistance measures appear innocuous and what would be 
expected of most central banks in a time of crisis, the results were not what many would expect 
to come of these measures. It is expected that liquidity assistance contains the crisis by 
preventing banks and enterprises from defaulting on their debts. This prevents further 
cascading events such as rising unemployment, rising interest rates, and even higher inflation 
rates. It also lowers the risk that the crisis could become contagious by defaulting on foreign 
debt obligations. This was not the case in Russia. In fact, while the government used the money 
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it borrowed from the CBR to meet its debt obligations, the same cannot be said of the private 
banks and enterprises as many of them would later become insolvent. In economies with weak 
institutions, this is not uncommon. Studies show that aiding banks during a crisis can be 
counter-SURGXFWLYHEHFDXVHLWGRHVQRWLPSURYHWKHEDQNV¶ILQDQFLDOGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ89 Many 
banks did not meet or even partially fulfil their debt obligations even after debt swaps and 
bailouts, nor did they replenish their reserves.90 The CBR had the tools to provide the banks 
with liquidity when they needed it, but it could not make them responsible. However, few 
banks were brought under state administration and / or liquidated. More will be said on this in 
the section on Government Owned Asset Management. 
 
ii) Regulatory forbearance. 7KHDLPRIWKH&%5¶VUHJXODWRU\IRUEHDUDQFHPHDVXUHVDOORZHG
banks to recapitalise and become solvent, and they are credited with helping banks recover 
from the crisis.91 There are two forms of forbearance that concern this study. The first is the 
more traditional definition of forbearance, whereby the CBR does not enforce those regulations 
that would otherwise cause banks to close. The problem is that the CBR struggled to ensure 
banks were solvent in the first place, so this can hardly be a special dispensation. 92 One of the 
first regulations to be relaxed was allowing banks to draw from their CBR reserves to pay down 
their debts, prior to the 17 August default.93 After this, the reserve requirement ratio for bank 
accounts was halved from seven percent to 3.5 percent to enable banks to remain solvent and 
for the CBR to clear the payments system.94 This is where it becomes difficult to disentangle 
regulatory forbearance from poor regulatory enforcement. Western auditing firms found banks 
had been hiding their insolvency, that their asset to liability ratio was much smaller than 
reported, and that they were much more exposed and unstable than they appeared.95 
Additionally, years after the crisis in 2001, studies found that banks were still undercapitalised 
with liabilities dangerously outweighing assets.96 Therefore, traditional regulatory forbearance 
indeed prevented many banks from becoming insolvent, which contributed to future economic 
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growth. However, it did not eliminate risky lending practices or improve regulatory capacity. 
The second form of regulatory forbearance was the exemption of the gas and oil sector 
from IMF proposed pre-crisis measures.97 By extension, this included oil and gas pocket banks 
as these banks depend on their parent companies for assets and liabilities.98 This took the 
pressure off natural resource industry, but it also cost the state ༦71 billion.99 This delayed the 
reintroduction of export quotas and tariffs.100 A significant contributing factor to the 1998 crisis 
was a drastic drop in oil prices.101 Given the revenues that come from this industry it is not 
surprising that the last thing the government would do is place anti-crisis measures on the one 
industry that brings in money. Furthermore, while the gas and oil industry was the largest 
exemption from the anti-crisis measures, it was far from the only one.102 By extension, all 
pocket banks continued to escape CBR regulation. It is argued that these exemptions had less 
to do with protecting the economy, and more to do with protecting the oligarchs.103 Like the 
other forbearance measures, these practices may have shielded the industries from undue 
hardship during the crisis. Yet, they also hindered the proper restructuring of the industry by 
protecting the status of pocket banks that did not contribute to the banking sector. This further 
exposed the banking sector and the entire economy to continued risk.  
 While regulatory forbearance is a way to ease pressure on banks and enterprises in the 
face of a crisis, it ultimately failed to make much difference in Russia in 1998. The key 
difference between Russia and other established market economies where regulations are 
properly enforced is that in the latter, banks fulfil a specific role and relaxing the regulations 
allows them to continue performing that role at little extra cost to the economy and society. 
However, the role of banks in RussLD¶VHFRQRP\ZHUHQRW\HWIXOO\HVWDEOLVKHGQRUZDVWKH
role of the banking regulator. Thus, while regulations existed in theory, they were rarely 
adhered to or enforced in practice. The relaxation of these regulations did little more than 
provide more loopholes for the bankers and managers to slip through.104 The difficulty of 
reasserting the relaxed regulations would be one of the more serious long-term consequences 
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of the crisis and would further complicate crisis resolution. 
 
iii) Deposit freeze / bank holiday. Deposit freezes are enacted as a measure of last resort to 
prevent bank runs and ensure absolute monetary control.105 The CBR did not implement an 
outright deposit freeze out of fear of further damaging confidence in the industry. However, it 
did forbid six commercial deposit banks (except for Sberbank and VTB) from servicing their 
accounts as a means of encouraging the banks to transfer these deposits to Sberbank.106 This 
was to protect the accounts, because the banks did not have deposit insurance and Sberbank 
did.107 Hoelscher and Quintyn argue that moving most of the commercial accounts to Sberbank 
prevented a bank run.108 However, consumer confidence in the sector was weak prior to the 
crisis, with accounts only comprising seven percent GDP.109 As such, there was a decline in 
the number of deposit accounts after the crisis.110 Additionally, while there was no official 
deposit freeze, some banks unilaterally implemented their own and discouraged large 
withdrawals.111 The CBR managed to maintain monetary control without implementing an 
official bank holiday. However, its unofficial actions implied one nonetheless. 
Additionally, the 90-day moratorium on foreign debt payments is considered a bank 
holiday as it destroyed investor confidence, and caused banks and the state to default on 
financial obligations. The moratorium was one of the first steps taken to ensure that the state 
would have the liquidity it needed and slow capital flight.112 The CBR also implemented 
various forms of capital controls, such as: restricting foreign exchange trading among small 
and medium sized banks, and increasing required reserves on corporate ruble deposits.113 This 
cost investors and debtors to Russia dearly. It is estimated that overall losses amounted to 80 ± 
90 percent of the value of GKOs, or around $33 billion.114 The exact total of losses is hard to 
determine as the devaluation of the ruble and its subsequent fluctuations make it difficult to 
approximate how much could not be recovered. For example, in September 1998, WKHUXEOH¶V
value increased just before the state had a large loan payment due, but then it decreased once 
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the transaction was completed.115  
While the CBR never implemented an actual deposit freeze, the controls it did 
implement served a de facto freeze. These measures had a similar effect in that it ruined 
investor confidence both domestically and internationally: consumers lost confidence in the 
banking system, the government defaulted on its debt and suffered a $2 billion decline in 
foreign direct investment that year.116 However, these actions demonstrate the inability of the 
CBR to control the crisis. Numerous attempts were made since May of 1998 to prevent the 
debt crisis from spreading, but none of the containment measures taken succeeded in doing so. 
While the containment measures did indeed provide the banking and financial sector with some 
much-needed breathing space, they did little to impose hard budget constraints on the banks. 
In fact, many of these measures would provide loopholes for banks to exploit the crisis and 
undermine resolution measures. 
  
1998 Crisis resolution 
Russia undertook few crisis resolution measures, and many of the de facto measures were 
undertaken informally. When examining crisis resolution measures, it is important to analyse 
whether the policy objectives address those issues that caused or exacerbated the crisis. These 
often include the measures discussed in chapter two: government owned asset management, 
sale of government assets, and bank restructuring. Additionally, measures that address banking 
and larger systemic problems that do not fit neatly into these categories, but are important 
nonetheless. However, the consensus of scholars is that none of these measures were actively 
pursued, and that the sector was not reformed.117 Few banks were liquidated, few licenses were 
revoked, and little actual restructuring took place. The problem is that crisis resolution 
measures should attempt to fix structural weaknesses, yet this necessitates strong institutions. 
As the CBR lacked proper institutional development at the time, its ability to enact crisis 
resolution measures was compromised. The few measures that were enacted were messy and 
are difficult to categorise. This section will illustrate both official and unofficial measures, and 
attempt to untangle them to determine how the CBR responded to the larger systemic issues 
the crisis presented. 
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i) Government owned asset management. In theory, banks would become government owned 
assets as they were liquidated or found insolvent through bankruptcy proceedings. In practice, 
no official government asset management program was undertaken, but the government often 
merged state banks with failing banks, or took on the assets of other banks.118 There were two 
main problems that impeded a government owned asset management programme: the inability 
of the CBR to revoke banking licenses, and the inadequacy of bankruptcy laws. As the crisis 
wore on, the state would come to control most of the banking sector through one of its state-
run affiliates, such as Gazprom, the CBR, or a regional or city administration.119 This was done 
to keep banks operational, since liquidation was not an option, and it benefitted both the bank 
and the government. 
First, the CBR struggled to revoke banking licenses, and force bank closures in the few 
instances where licenses were withdrawn.120 Its supervisory capacity was overwhelmed before 
the crisis, and it did not improve in the immediate aftermath.121 Furthermore, the CBR was 
unlikely to rescind the licenses of those banks in which it owned a majority or minority stake. 
As a result, fewer licenses were revoked after the crisis than in the year preceding it. According 
to the CBR, 229 licenses had been revoked by December 1998, including three of the top 
twenty banks, MOST-bank, SBS-Agro, and Inkombank.122 However, scholars point out that 
334 licenses were revoked in 1997.123 Where the Central Bank did revoke a license, it was 
unable to force the bank to cease operations, resulting in phantom banks. For example, only 75 
percent of registered banks had licenses between 1997 and 2001.124 The foundation of 
government owned asset management programmes is the ability of a central bank, or other 
authority, to force the closure of risky or insolvent banks by revoking their licenses and 
absorbing what remains of their assets. Thus, because the CBR unable to do this, the ability to 
carry out a government owned asset management programme was compromised. 
Second, bankruptcy laws were weak and did little to facilitate bank liquidation.125 
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Rather, they required restructuring that protected owners at the expense of investors.126 As a 
result, inefficient and insolvent banks remained operational.127 Although the CBR knew it 
needed new bankruptcy legislation to facilitate liquidation, it delayed drafting it.128 The 
Primakov government wanted to end bankruptcy proceedings altogether, and require state 
approval for bank liquidation.129 As such, few bankruptcy cases were undertaken.130 Combined 
with various regulatory freezes, this did not incentivise banks to recapitalise, and did little to 
mitigate moral hazard problems.131 )XUWKHUFRPSOLFDWLQJPDWWHUVZDVWKHVWDWH¶VRZQHUVKLSRI
WKHFRXQWU\¶VODUJHVWEDQNVDQGLWVPLQRULW\VWDNHVLQKXQGUHGVRIVPDOOHUEDQNV132 This makes 
it hard to take insolvent banks into state administration, as the state already controls them. 
7KXVWKHVWDWH¶VFRQFHUQZDVOHVVZLWKLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHvelopment and structural reform than it 
ZDVZLWKUHFDSLWDOLVLQJWKHEDQNVWRVXSSRUWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQGXVWULDOSROLF\133  Thus, there 
was little incentive to pursue a government owned asset management programme that actively 
sought to thin the banking industry, because doing so would threaten the government as well. 
The only official government owned asset management programme was the transfer of 
household deposits from private commercial banks to Sberbank.134 At the time of the 1998 
crisis, Sberbank was the only bank to offer deposit insurance, which caused the CBR to fear a 
bank run on other commercial accounts. To this end, it coerced the six private banks that held 
70 percent of the retail deposits outside of Sberbank (SBS-Agro, Menatap, Inkombank, Most 
Bank, Mosbiznesbank, Promstroibank, and Rossiiskii CUHGLW E\ RIIHULQJ WKHP D µFKRLFH¶
transfer their deposits to Sberbank, or lose access to the accounts for a year at a significantly 
reduced interest rate.135 In the end 12 percent, or ༦7.1 billion of these deposits were 
transferred.136 As a result, Sberbank once again monopolised the banking industry, controlling 
88 percent of the deposit market by 2000.137  The move is not entirely unjustified. With few 
regulatory alternatives, the transfer was vital to securing the deposits and retaining some 
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measure of confidence in the banking system. 
 As discussed in chapter two, government owned asset management is complicated as 
the state often lacks the knowledge to properly restructure banks. Furthermore, where the state 
has a vested interest or connection to the bank(s), it will find it difficult to objectively liquidate 
them.138 7KLV LVZKDWZHVHH LQ5XVVLD WKH&%5RZQHGFRQWUROOLQJVKDUHV LQ WKHFRXQWU\¶V
largest banks and minority shares in smaller banks. This provided the CBR and government 
with no incentive to strengthen bankruptcy laws, which would have been essential to 
undertaking an asset management program. Both because of the lack of incentive to reform 
bankruptcy proceedings, and the necessity to maintain control over the banking sector, no real 
government owned asset management program was enacted. 
 
ii) Bank restructuring. The difference between government owned asset management and bank 
restructuring is that the former requires the state to seize the assets of liquidated banks, whereas 
the latter does not. Restructuring seeks to reorganize banks and their assets and make them 
more efficient and crisis resistant. Furthermore, restructuring does not have to be carried out 
by the state. While it most often takes place during the implementation of new regulations and 
requirements, it can also be part of a change in ownership or merger, or some combination of 
the two. Bank restructuring usually follows regulatory forbearance, and in the absence of a 
stronger bankruptcy law, bank restructuring was the only recourse the CBR had to try and 
manage insolvent banks. However, the CBR often found its attempts to introduce new 
SUXGHQWLDO UHTXLUHPHQWV EORFNHG E\ WKH 'XPD ZKLFK XQGHUPLQHG WKH IRUPHU¶V DELOLW\ WR
resolve the crisis.139 While there were several mergers, very little restructuring took place. For 
example, non-performing loans were neither restructured, nor resold.140 As such, little was 
done to strengthen systemic weaknesses or increase efficiency via restructuring. 
 To avoid falling under state administration, many banks attempted to restructure by 
PHUJLQJE\IRUPLQJµEULGJHEDQNV¶141 Bridge banks are financial institutions built to absorb 
and manage the assets of one or more failed banks.142 Because the bankruptcy law protected 
the owners and shareholders over the creditors, bankruptcy cases did not seek to liquidate the 
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EDQN¶VDVVHWVLQRUGHUWRDFFRXQWIRULWVOLDELOLWLHV143 The result was that bankers could keep 
WKHLUEDQN¶VDVVHWVDQGFRQWLQXH WRXQGHUWDNHSUHGDWRU\SUDFWLFHVDVEHIRUH144 Banks would 
move assets to a new bank, or merge them with another bank, without also transferring the 
liabilities.145 For example, Oneximbank became Rosbank, and Menatap became Menatap-St 
Petersburg.146 The old bank would fall under state administration or collapse, leaving all but 
the most lucrative customers without their deposits. Restructuring via bridge banks made the 
banks neither more efficient nor more profitable. 
In order to resume receiving funding from international organisations, the state created 
DQµREMHFWLYH¶RUJDQLVDWLon to restructure the banking sector, the  Agency of the Reconstruction 
of Credit Organisations (ARCO).147 The aim of ARCO was to evaluate each of the banks, 
determine how healthy they were, and decide which to leave alone, which needed to be 
restructured, and which needed to be closed.148 The problem is that the CBR strongly opposed 
the creation of ARCO from the start, and did its best to ensure it remained weak and 
ineffective.149 For example, it was supposed to be a completely objective organisation, yet it 
was subordinated to the CBR.150 As such, ARCO was never granted the authority to revoke 
licenses, close banks, force restructuring, or even observe banking operations without a 
PDQDJHU¶VSHUPLVVLRQ nor did it attempt to stop the rampant asset stripping. 151 It was only 
given a budget of ༦10 billion, most of which it spent on buying frozen GKO bonds and lending 
Alfa Bank ༦1 billion.152 In sum, ARCO participated in a total of 21 projects, restructured 
fourteen banks, and liquidated only three.153 Thus, ARCO was a largely ineffective 
organisation that undertook very little restructuring, and did not contribute to any institutional 
development.  
Finally, banks restructure after a crisis through the changing of reserve and other 
requirements. The problem is that reserve and other prudential requirements were not properly 
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re-introduced. Generally, the regulatory environment did not improve after the crisis as new 
banks had stringent capital requirements placed upon them, but older banks largely avoided 
these requirements.154 For example, the CBR abandoned a regulation that would require banks 
with less than $1 million to restructure as non-banking organisations.155 Had this been enacted, 
it would have attempted to crack down on small shell banks used for asset stripping and money 
laundering. Instead, most of the regulation the CBR enacted post-crisis was regarding foreign 
exchange and government securities. These regulations included requirements on the level of 
capital needed to purchase securities, and ensuring that export earnings were transferred to 
accounts in a timely manner.156 The problem is that none of these new requirements addressed 
the structural problems that led to the crisis in the first place: the inability of the CBR to regulate 
the sector and the proliferation of predatory, under capitalised banks. 
Bank restructuring failed to take place after the 1998 crisis. Mergers between banks 
were not aimed at improving efficiency and increasing profit maximisation, and new prudential 
regulations did not DGGUHVV WKH LQGXVWU\¶VXQGHUO\LQJVWUXFWXUDOSUREOHPV ,QVWHDG WKH&%5
focused on the things it could immediately control: foreign exchange and GKOs. It is unclear 
to what extent the CBR tried to correct the fundamental issues with the banking system. On 
the one hand, it encountered resistance from the Duma and government when it tried to redraft 
the bankruptcy and insolvency law; on the other, it strongly opposed the creation of ARCO. 
$VDUHVXOWWKH&%5¶VLQFRQVLVWHQF\SHUSHWXDWHGV\VWHPLFSUREOHPVDQG its own institutional 
weakness. 
 
iii) Sale of government owned assets. In theory, the sale of government owned assets occurs as 
part of the government asset management programme, either after the assets have already been 
restructured, or for investors to restructure themselves. These measures would ensure the assets 
DUHSURGXFWLYHEXWDOVRWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWUHFRYHUVSDUWRIWKHFULVLV¶VFRVW157 As there was 
no official asset management programme, it follows that there would be no selling of assets. 
However, the concept of government asset management was complicated by the fact that the 
government already owned or had a stake in a large part of the banking industry. As such, if 
the government were to pursue this measure, it would be concerned with straight forward 
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privatisation. However, the state was more interested in nationalisation rather than privatisation 
in the aftermath of the crisis. For example, it would not provide struggling banks with liquidity 
assistance, but it would provide a state-owned bank with the capital to buy struggling banks.158 
Observers noted that privatisation would be unlikely, and that the consequences of this would 
impact the stability of the sector more than the development of private banks because the state 
has an interest in favouring itself.159 There were calls from international advisors and even 
some Russian bankers for privatisation, but none of them resulted in anything. 
 The most well-developed programme for sector development and privatisation was 
called the Mamut Plan, which sought to increase reserve requirements, privatise state banks, 
convert accounting practices to the International Accounting Standard, and introduce a three-
tiered banking system.160 The plan would require banks to have ༦1 billion ($33 million) of 
capital to start a bank, which would have to increase to ༦3 billion ($100 million) within two 
years.161 It also wanted to create two kinds of licenses based on reserve levels, with larger 
banks getting full licenses that would allow them to operate anywhere in the country, and 
smaller banks restricted to the services they provide and where they are located.162 
Additionally, one of the compromises was to create deposit insurance that would cover all 
EDQNV WKHUHE\EUHDNLQJXS6EHUEDQN¶s monopoly.163 This would have allowed the state to 
maintain control over Sberbank, while giving depositors and investors confidence to do 
business with other banks. The plan was supported by the Russian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs, and other banking oligarchs, but because it was opposed by the CBR and the 
Duma, it failed.164 This plan was not implemented, although some of its suggestions, such as 
deposit insurance and the conversion to IAS, would later be adopted. 
The CBR is no different from the government when it comes to privatisation. In the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis, there was a proposal to slowly decrease the CBRs role in 
Sberbank and other banks, but there was a general reluctance to do so, and it was perpetually 
postponed.165 There was additional legislation to continue the privatisation of state-owned 
banks and enterprises that had begun in 1992, yet this proposal was highly contentious and 
while the state agreed to break-up some unitary enterprises, it again exempted strategic national 
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enterprises and banks from the process.166 In the end, the Duma did not approve the proposal 
and privatisation was again postponed. Therefore, there were no privatisation or other policies 
targeting state banking monopolies as a measure of crisis resolution. Because the CBR remains 
an active player in the banking industry instead of a regulator or mediator, it maintains its 
partially reformed nature. While this may be beneficial to the CBR, it undermines the 
development of a market economy.  
 
iv) Tax reform. Most of the measures necessary to resolve the 1998 crisis neatly fall into the 
programmes discussed above, and tKH &%5 DQG JRYHUQPHQWV¶ IDLOXUH WR LPSOHPHQW WKHVH
measures will be discussed below. There is one important measure that does not fit into any of 
the categories above, yet was vital to preventing future crises: tax reform. At first glance, this 
may not seem like an apposite crisis resolution measure. However, the reliance on GKOs to 
provide revenue stemmed from the inability of the state to collect taxes. Thus, improving tax 
collection mechanisms was of the utmost importance in ensuring the government had access 
to the revenue it needed. While it is undisputed that the state also needed to cut down on 
spending, this section is more concerned with tax collection since it directly involves and 
affects the CBR. The CBR largely failed to implement the other crisis resolution reforms, but 
tax collection is the one that it seems to have done right. 
7KH&%5¶VUROHLQWD[FROOHFWLRQLVLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVe of the kartoteka system.167 Gaidar 
wanted to implement tax reform in the early 1990s, by taxing the private sector instead of the 
public sector, under the assumption that the later would replace the former.168 However, as the 
state undermined and delayed privatization, this shift did not happen. Additionally, the 
incentives for avoiding taxation were strong. Tax collection mechanisms were unfair and 
complex, with each collector imposing a different set of regulations and criteria.169 Thus, it is 
estimated that 90 percent of tax payers were involved in the shadow economy to avoid paying 
taxes, and there was no punishment for not doing so.170 The government did not help this by 
IRUJLYLQJHQWHUSULVHV¶ WD[DUUHDUVDQGFUHDWLQJVSHFLDO WD[H[HPSWLRQVWKDWZRXOGFRVWWhem 
upwards of $6 billion in lost revenue.171 By 1996, tax arrears accounted for five percent of 
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GDP, and by January 2001 it was eight percent.172  The government needed to improve both 
tax collection and compliance, and given its role in the existing system, the CBR was a vital 
part of this.  
Tax reform was implemented in April 2001, which was nearly three years after the 
1998 crash, and two years after growth resumed. The main parameters of the reform reduced 
profit tax from 32 percent to 24 percent, introduced a flat income tax of 13 percent, and a flat 
tax for small businesses of 15 percent.173 There is, however, a debate surrounding the 
effectiveness of the reforms, with scholars pointing out that the revenue rate and welfare 
spending has not changed.174 As Vladimir Pastukhov explains, the reform should have 
simplified social taxes by reducing them from four to one. While the tax payer receives a bill 
for one amount, it is broken down into four taxes, and it is up to the tax payer to ensure all four 
taxes have been paid.175 However, when tax evasion was made a criminal offence, compliance 
increased by 9 ± 12 percent, government revenues rise by 25 percent, and the economy grew 
by five percent.176 Yet, there are also questions about causality. It could be possible that tax 
compliance increased as the economy strengthened and people could afford to pay taxes. 
Additionally, Putin¶V UHQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ RI 5XVVLD¶V PRVW OXFUDWLYH HQWHUSULVHV PD\ KDYH
increased compliance. Even so, except for nationalisation, the increase in tax collection cannot 
be ignored or denigrated as it is a tiny, promising step toward institutional predictability and 
strength. 
The weakness of the CBR can be seen in the responses to the 1998 economic crisis. It 
effectively implemented crisis containment measures by preventing a systemic wide collapse, 
EXW WKLV GRHV QRW UHTXLUH VWURQJ LQVWLWXWLRQV ,W ZDV GLUHFWO\ ZLWKLQ WKH &%5¶V SXUYLHZ WR
increase liquidity assistance and relax regulations; there was no need for it to seek approval 
from or cooperate with the government to enact these measures. However, the CBR struggled 
to implement in-depth and far reaching reforms that would restructure the industry and 
strengthen the institution. It lacked the ability to unilaterally withdraw banking licenses, and to 
IRUFHEDQNV¶FORVXUH7KXVZKLOHWKH&%5FRXOGSUHYHQWWKHV\VWHPIURPLPSORGLQJLWZDV
unable to implement resolution measures that would secure those vulnerabilities that caused 
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the crisis in the first place.  
 
5.3 Hypothesis testing 
To determine whether crisis modernisation has occurred, the above analysis will be used to 
measure the hypotheses presented in chapter two. These hypotheses are testing for institutional 
GHYHORSPHQWE\PHDVXULQJLI$WKHJRYHUQPHQWDQG&%5¶VFULVLVPDQDJHPHQWUHVSRQVHs were 
appropriate and addressed the causes of the crisis; B) the government and CBR were able to 
implement crisis containment and resolution measures effectively and efficiently, and C) if the 
reforms strengthened institutions by changing the behaviours and expectations of economic 
actors. Each of the three hypotheses is measured against the null hypothesis, which states that 
economic crises have do not affect institutional development in Russia. Each hypothesis will 
evaluate the evidence presented above. As the hypotheses progress, any evidence that does not 
support one hypothesis is excluded from testing the ensuing hypothesis. This narrows the 
analysis to those measures most likely to result in crisis modernisation. The only measure that 
receives full consideration is tax reform. However, even where it does result in some change, 
there is not enough evidence to support the hypothesis that it has led to institutional 
development. 
 
Hypothesis I: The government and Central Bank of Russia will undertake the appropriate 
policy responses to resolve the crisis at hand. 
In the aftermath of the 1998 crisis, Russia needed to cut spending by 11 percent of its GDP, 
achieve a budget surplus of two percent GDP, reduce the deficit, improve bankruptcy 
procedures, reform the banking sector, and improve the exchange rate.177  These are complex 
measures for any economy to undertake, much less one that is partially reformed. Thus, it is 
expected that the CBR and the government would have a difficult time resolving the crisis. 
Yet, these measures were essential for the CBR and government to exit the crisis and strengthen 
the economy in the process as each of them targets a specific weakness. For example, the 
directive to reform the bankruptcy law was to facilitate the dismantling of insolvent banks that 
increased the risk for the industry. Therefore, despite the difficulty in undertaking these 
measures, for the first hypothesis to be true, we examine whether attempts were made to 
undertake them. 
 On the face of it, the CBR implemented appropriate crisis containment measures by 
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providing some liquidity assistance to prevent banks from defaulting on loan obligations and 
worsening the crisis, relaxing regulations and giving banks time to replenish their reserves, and 
avoiding a deposit accounts freeze. The government did cut spending in the aftermath of the 
crisis, resulting in a 3.4 percent of GDP surplus by 2001, with the budget expecting a surplus 
from 2002 on.178 The CBR continued to accumulate reserves, which appreciated the exchange 
rate by 30.7 percent from the end of 1999.179 This also helped offset the increases in currency 
emission, which would otherwise lead to inflation as the monetary base rose by ༦110 billion in 
2001, but reserves increased by the equivalent of ༦218 billion.180 However, this is not 
particularly surprising as these measures are text book crisis containment, which do not 
necessitate strong institutions, or the creation of new ones, to be implemented.181 Thus, the 
basic fiscal and monetary issues that caused the crisis were addressed. 
7KH&%5¶VKDQGOLQJRIFULVLVUHVRlution, on the other hand, is far more complex. The 
simple answer is that it failed to implement the appropriate crisis resolution measures, with the 
exception of tax reform. The lack of proper bankruptcy proceedings, the inability of the CBR 
to withdraw licenses, and the entanglement of the state in the banking sector all complicated 
WKH&HQWUDO%DQN¶VDELOLW\ WRFRUUHFWDQGVWUHQJWKHQV\VWHPLFIODZV$OVR LQWKHDEVHQFHRI
official programmes, LW¶V difficult to disentangle which programmes fit into each category. Yet, 
this is not for lack of trying. As such, it is necessary to evaluate the attempts that were made at 
crisis resolution. 
Government owned asset management would have enabled the government to more 
efficiently liquidate insolvent banks. This could have strengthened the systemic vulnerability 
WKDW SDUDVLWLF EDQNVSRVHGE\ OLTXLGDWLQJ WKHLU DVVHWV DQGXVLQJ WKHP WRSD\ RII WKHEDQNV¶
liabilities. However, the bankruptcy laws in place at the time made this impossible since it 
favoured owners and managers over shareholders. As such, where banks were forced to declare 
bankruptcy, they were not liquidated, but reorganised. This is why the IMF and other 
international advisors encouraged the CBR and the state to focus on redrafting a new 
bankruptcy law. While there was an attempt to amend the law to protect investors, it failed to 
pass a Duma vote in 1999 and was not implemented.182 ,WZDVQRWXQWLOWKDWWKHODZµ2Q
WKH,QVROYHQF\RI&UHGLW2UJDQLVDWLRQV¶DOORZHGDEDQNWREHGHFODUHGEDQNUXSW183 Although, 
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by this time, the concern for liquidation had faded as new economic growth occurred. Overall, 
there was no government owned asset management programme to liquidate insolvent banks. 
There are three best practices for bank restructuring programmes: they need to be 
comprehensive; they should be undertaken by the government and funded by the tax payer 
rather than a central bank to increase accountability and transparency; and they must begin 
immediately.184 According to this and other measures, bank restructuring failed take place as 
banks moved their assets to bridge banks rather than restructure. This did not make them more 
efficient or increase their profits, and investors and depositors were often left empty handed. 
ARCO was created to facilitate restructuring, since that is what the bankruptcy law at the time 
provided, but it failed to do so. It had no power to even properly assess banks and lacked the 
authority to restructure them. The CBR itself was not very preoccupied with restructuring the 
banking sector in the aftermath of the crisis. Most of its efforts went into tackling requirements 
for foreign exchange and buying government securities. While this is not unimportant given 
how the lack of oversight on these issues contributed to the crisis, these did not force banks to 
increase their reserve requirements or otherwise become less vulnerable to crises, and less 
likely to cause them. 
There was no selling of government owned assets; neither from the asset management 
programme that never occurred, nor privatisation of state owned banks. In fact, in the absence 
of an official programme to liquidate banks, the CBR lent capital to state owned banks so that 
WKH\PD\EX\DQGPHUJHZLWKLQVROYHQWEDQNVZKLFKLVQRWWKHVDPHWKLQJDVWKHODWWHUEDQNV¶
assets are not being used to offset their liabilities. Additionally, the World Bank reported in 
2001 that much of the desire to accelerate market reforms in the years following the crisis 
would require the state to relinquish its control on the economy, yet there were never plans for 
this to take place.185 While the 2001 report says there is no reason to doubt the state will remove 
itself as an economic player, the problem of nationalisation over privatisation only worsens 
from 2000 on. 
Unlike the other crisis reform measures, tax reform was the only successful policy to 
be implemented after the 1998 crash. The revenue collection mechanisms were broken, which 
OHGWRWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHOLDQFHRQVHOOLQJ*.2VWRUDLVHEXGJHWDU\UHYHQXH:KLle the selling 
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of securities was not the sole cause of the crisis, it was a symptom of a larger problem: the 
inability of the government to collect taxes and the failure of banks to generate profits 
independent of the government that did not involve asset stripping or other predatory practices. 
While tax reform does not address the larger systemic problems, increasing the ability of the 
government to collect taxes is no small feat and adequately addresses one of the causal factors 
of the crisis. 
Overall, the CBR failed to implement the appropriate measures necessary to resolve the 
crisis. The crisis containment measures were adequate, but they did not resolve the crisis. 
Furthermore, they did not require strong institutional foundations to be enacted. So, while the 
CBR implemented these policies as needed, it failed to address larger systemic problems such 
as liquidating insolvent banks and encouraging banks to restructure in a manner that is 
beneficial to the sector. Therefore, the first hypothesis is mostly not true, and institutional 
development is not likely to result from the 1998 economic crisis. However, as tax reform was 
implemented, it is important to see if it led to institutional development. Furthermore, by 
examining how the other hypotheses are false will shed light on why institutional development 
failed to take place after the 1998 economic crisis. 
 
Hypothesis II: The Central Bank of Russia is strong enough to implement crisis resolution 
measures effectively and efficiently. Reforms also seek to improve institutional efficiency. 
5XVVLD¶VHFRQRPLFLQVWLWXWLRQVVXFKDVWKH&%5ZHUHQRWVWURQJHQRXJKWRLPSOHPHQWFULVLV
resolution reforms, and it is this weakness that led to the crisis in the first place. As such, if 
institutional weakness caused the crisis, then crisis resolution measures should focus on 
institutional development. As mentioned above, most of the reforms suggested by international 
DGYLVRUV FRQFHUQHGSURFHGXUDO LVVXHV WKDWZRXOG HQKDQFH WKH&%5¶V DELOLW\ WRPDQDJH WKH
crisis¶V recovery more efficiently. Yet, by the time these issues were addressed, the crisis had 
passed, and the effect on institutional strength is debatable. Therefore, if reforms that sought 
WRLPSURYHWKH&%5¶VHIILFLHQF\ZHUHQRWLPSOHPHQWHGDQGWKH&%5ZDVVXEVHTXently too 
weak to undertake crisis resolution measures, then both parts of the hypothesis are false. 
 Government owned asset management programmes could not be undertaken because 
no credible bankruptcy law existed. As such, there was no means for the CBR or a government 
DSSRLQWHG RUJDQLVDWLRQ WR DFTXLUH WKH DVVHWV RI LQVROYHQW EDQNV $GGLWLRQDOO\ WKH &%5¶V
authority was not clearly defined as it struggled to dissolve problem banks since the withdrawal 
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of a license did not force banks to close.186 The closest approximation of an asset management 
programme was ARCO, which was able to liquidate banks in theory, but in practice it aimed 
at restructuring banks since few provisions for liquidation existed. Bankruptcy legislation was 
not reconsidered until two years after the crisis. Not only was the bankruptcy procedure 
inadequate, but the government and CBR did not address the problem it posed until after the 
crisis had passed. Therefore, the second hypothesis is not true for government owned asset 
management. 
Because the CBR largely considered 1998 to be a liquidity crisis, not a banking crisis 
or even a triple crisis, it sought to recapitalise banks rather than force them to restructure.187 
There were no measures that explicitly required banks to restructure in the aftermath of the 
crisis. As such, productive bank restructuring was not really possible. Even after the crisis 
passed, banking reform was not a priority.188 Many laws that would consolidate the sector and 
increase its competitiveness were continually being debated, redrafted, and delayed.189 In 
JHQHUDOWKH&%5¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOfoundation prevents it from adequately regulating the industry, 
thus impairing its ability to restructure.190 )HZPHDVXUHVZHUH WDNHQ WRHQKDQFH WKH&%5¶V
regulatory powers as a means of resolving the crisis. Thus, the CBR was neither strong enough 
to carry out every day banking regulation or bank restructuring, nor was there an attempt to 
address these weaknesses. As such, the second hypothesis is not true for bank restructuring. 
Additionally, it is not so much that the CBR is not strong enough to undertake 
privatisation, rather, that it has no interest in doing so. As previously discussed, Sberbank¶s 
ubiquitous presence throughout the country provides access to banking services people might 
not get in a purely competitive market. Additionally, as Putin renationalises much of the 
FRXQWU\¶VPRVWSURILWDEOHVRXUFHVLWIROORZVWKDWWKHVWDWHZRXOGZDQWWRPDLQWDLQFRQWURORI
the financial apparatus as well. Of course, the inability WRGLVHQWDQJOH WKH&%5¶V UROHVDVD
regulator and economic actor poses several problems, the most important of which is the poor 
enforcement of property rights as the state encroaches on the assets and investments of private 
investors.191 This problem is not just in the financial sector: investing in or purchasing 
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government property has become more difficult since the 1998 crisis.192 Therefore, because no 
attempt was made at privatising government owned assets as a means of crisis resolution, the 
second hypothesis is not true for privatisation as a means of crisis resolution.  
Tax reform is the only measure taken where the hypothesis has a degree of truth. This 
is because the measure itself appears to strengthen one of the systemic weaknesses that caused 
the crisis. Unfortunately, this reform was not a priority. It was debated after the crisis, but it 
was not implemented until 2001, well after the crisis had been resolved. This time lag raises 
questions about the nature of the reform as well as its effectiveness.  On the one hand, Putin 
and others close to the reform have argued that the crisis had such devastating economic effects 
that implementing it before the economy had started to grow again would only have encouraged 
evasion.193 And, there is evidence that the reform indeed increased the percentage of voluntary 
tax compliance and reduced the instances of evasion after it was implemented.194 On the other 
hand, there are debates over how successfully tax reform was achieved. Some scholars argue 
that it is because Putin, the Central Bank, and the hydrocarbon leaders negotiated a deal, and 
thus tax compliance has been non-coercive.195 Others point out that in renationalising many of 
the banks and extraction companies, there was little resistance to either the reform or its 
implementation.196 The distinction between these two arguments is crucial to determining 
whether tax reform actually strengthened the CBR and tax collecting institutions. Thus, the 
second hypothesis is true for tax reform and its role in crisis modernisation is discussed below. 
 
Hypothesis III: New regulations are fairly and universally enforced, leading to reliance on 
formal rules and organisations to resolve conflicts. 
This hypothesis is false. It tests how much institutional development has resulted from crisis 
resolution reforms, and whether crisis modernisation has taken place. The stronger the 
institution is, the more formal rules are enforced above informal norms.197 When this fails to 
take place, relations between actors remain erratic and insecure as the institutions can only 
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meet the needs of the elite.198 As such, societies with stronger institutions tend to have more 
economic opportunities as the implementation of rules is more stable and predictable.199 Had 
crisis resolution measures resulted in institutional development, the CBR would have increased 
its authority and more consistently enforced regulations across the entire sector, resulting in 
restructuring. As demonstrated above, the CBR and state largely failed to restructure the 
banking sector in the wake of 1998. Apart from tax reform, there was little development of the 
&%5¶VHQIRUFHPHQWPHFKDQLVPVAdditionally, there is doubt that tax reform is as successful 
as it appears. Therefore, this hypothesis is false. 
 There was no sector wide restructuring in the aftermath of the crisis. The CBR 
attempted to regulate the banks in the aftermath of the crisis. However, of the 1,271 institutions 
the CBR identified as problems, only 229 banking licenses were revoked.200  Undercapitalised, 
non-viable banks continued functioning in Russia, able to avoid hard budget constraints even 
when their licenses had been revoked.201 In some instances, bankers whose licenses had been 
revoked had the license returned.202 As a result, there were several phantom banks that emerged 
out of the 1998 crisis: never more than 75 percent of licensed banks were operational between 
1997 and 2001.203 Additionally, banks that remained open opted to engage in market 
speculation and treasury operations, rather than more traditional commercial banking.204 Thus, 
WKHUHZDVQRLQFUHDVHLQWKH&%5¶VUHJXODWRU\SRZHUVDVDUHVXOWRIWKHFULVLVZKLFKGLG
not lead to more predictability or stability. 
)XUWKHUPRUH WKH&%5¶V LQYROYHPHQW Ln the banking sector skews incentives against 
strict regulation and the maintenance of partial reform. The CBR undertook no privatisation as 
either an act of crisis resolution, nor after the crisis had passed.205 On the one hand, the CBR 
stopped absorbing acquiring failing banks, but it refused to privatise state banks.206 This 
LPSHGHV WKH &%5¶V DELOLW\ WR IDLUO\ REMHFWLYHO\ DQG FRQVLVWHQWO\ UHJXODWH WKH VHFWRU DQG
complete the transition to a market economy.207 This bias undermines the formal rules and the 
CBR, resulting in a lack of confidence that the institution can be used for conflict resolution or 
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to mediate transactions. 
 As a result, the social economy flourished in the absence of a market after the 1998 
crisis. Many scholars note the need for social connections with the CBR to avoid regulatory 
infractions. For example, banks owned by gas and oil companies are the best capitalised in the 
state, so they seemingly adhere to CBR regulations.208 Yet, they flouted CBR regulations that 
require investors who purchase more than 20 percent to be identified.209 In response, 35 percent 
RI5XVVLD¶VWRSEDQNVSRVVHVVHGQRLQYHVWRUVZKRRZQPRUHWKDQSHUFHQWRIVKDUHV\HWWKH
CBR was reluctant to force banks to disclose the identities of said shareholders.210 This 
XQGHUPLQHG WKH&%5¶VFUHGLELOLW\DVD IDLUDQG WUXVWZRUWK\UHJXODWRU6LQFH WKHFULVLV
many businesses and investors found regulatory uncertainty is one of the primary investment 
constraints in Russia, with most lacking confidence that their property rights will be protected 
because well connected firms receive preferential treatment.211 Thus, the unpredictability of 
regulatory enforcement necessitates social connections to navigate the banking industry in the 
absence of a strong regulator. 
 Tax reform appears to be the one measure taken that has resulted in some institutional 
development, and it is important not to belittle the progress made. The number of taxes people 
must pay have been reduced, collection has been simplified, and exemptions and loopholes 
have been closed.212 Also, tax evasion was made a criminal offence.213 Yet, there are still issues 
that question the enforcement and implementation of the reform. Notably, the CBR was not 
removed from the tax collection process. There was never an intention of outsourcing tax 
collection to an independent body as the government wanted to continue using the CBR as a 
means for tax collection and project financing.214 Because the CBR oversees the payments 
system, it transfers taxes from the Ministry of Finance to the government budget, and it carries 
out orders to forcefully withdraw payments for violators.215 However, there is little evidence 
that this power has been abused. Although there are several high-profile cases centred on tax 
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arrears, the CBR has never been directly involved. 
Tax evasion continues, although schemes have become more elaborate as it is difficult 
to undertake. Employers often collude with their employees to avoid paying taxes by 
underreporting wages in return for cash payments.216 The larger the firm, the less likely it is to 
get away with tax evasion as they are subject to more scrutiny, but the state is often the worst 
offender.217 0DQ\EXVLQHVVHVGLVDJUHHZLWKWKHUHIRUP¶VLPSOHPHQWDWLRn, and surveys taken 
during the early 2000s show that Russian businesses spent more time dealing with tax 
authorities than other state in the region.218 Additionally, the new tax system was not automatic; 
firms had to register for it, of which 38 percent have not.219 While no tax collection system will 
HYHUEHSHUIHFW5XVVLD¶VVWLOOKDVQRWDEOHIODZV  
 Finally, tax reform is often hailed as an example of institutional development in Russia 
as the elites now pay their taxes, rather than use connections to evade them. Many scholars 
argue that this is because the elites and the state negotiated the reform together, a sign of 
conflict resolution. For example, the state promised to keep foreigners out of the gas and oil 
industry (or at least make it more difficult for them to invest) if the companies pay their taxes.220 
However, as pointed out by Andrew Barnes, oligarchic support for passing new laws is not the 
same thing as the strengthening of the rule of law, or the submission of the state to law. 221 As 
such, it is no coincidence that this happened as the state began to renationalise the gas and oil 
industry. While the state lowered profit taxes on many industries, but the trade-off was 
increasing taxation on the hydrocarbon industry.222 In fact, the new tax measures greatly 
HQKDQFHGWKHVWDWH¶VDELOLW\WRUHQW-seek in the gas and oil industry.223 Thus, the state has often 
undermined the progress that has come from the reform measures so far. 
The institutional development that resulted from tax reform crisis resolution measures 
is questionable. One the one hand, market economy development is seen in the reduction of 
loopholes, increasing compliance, and streamlining enforcement. On the other, command 
economy practices are also reinforced as the state used tax reform to increase its power and 
undermine the strength of the tax collecting institutions. If the laws are not fairly enforced 
because the state is the main violator of the law, and if the state is using the law as a tool to 
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acquire more power, then the tax collection institutions cannot be relied upon to resolve 
conflict. Therefore, the CBR and the tax collection institutions remain partially reformed in the 




FRQWULEXWHGWR5XVVLD¶VUHFRYHU\SRVW-crisis growth resulted from a combination of the import 
substitution effect and an increase in oil prices. FurtheUPRUH5XVVLD¶VILQDQFLDOSUXGHQFHWKDW
emerged from 1998 is not a positive change, but rather further evidence of partial reform 
equilibrium. The sudden ability of the government to pay its debts and create an emergency 
stabilisation fund did not come from its new ability to effectively and efficiently collect taxes 
or a concerted effort to control spending. Rather, it came from the sense to save oil profits 
when they came pouring in between 1999 and the early 2000s. While this indeed is a good 
change, it does not speak to or illustrate an improvement in the movement of the economy 
toward a market by improving its business culture, increasing the scale and scope of private 
enterprises, or increasing economic diversification. 
To transition to a market economy, firms, including banks, must be subject to the laws 
of supply and demand, or hard budget constraints. This did not happen in Russia. For example, 
banks knew that the state would not force them to close or repay loans. Additionally, where 
the CBR refused to directly help banks, it used its position to take control of the bank, but then 
not reprivatize once the crisis had passed. As such, post-1998 Russia did not enter a new period 
of economic transition DV WKH JRYHUQPHQW DQG &%5¶V DFWLRQV XQGHUPLQHG RQH Rf the 
fundamental dynamics of a market economy: the state versus the private enterprise.224 While 
the tax reform is a good example of crisis modernisation because it resulted in tangible change, 
there are still problems with enforcement and expectation because government is part or 
majority owner of those enterprises that get away with tax evasion.225 Because the government 
RZQVWKHPRVWSURILWDEOHHQWHUSULVHVWKDQNVWR3XWLQ¶VQDWLRQDOFKDPSLRQ¶VSODQWKLVPHDQV
WKDWWKHVWDWH¶VPRVWSURILWDEOHHQWHUSULVHVDre not paying taxes.226 Most of these enterprises did 
not reinvest their tax breaks to update infrastructure or undertake exploration. 227 Additionally, 
in the years after the crisis, the new tax reforms would be used as a tool to renationalise 
                                                 
224
 Barnes, 2003. 156. 
225
 Appel, 2004.; Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia (2010).  
226
 Appel, 2004. 
227
 Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia (2010).; Price, 2007.  
   
 151 
oligarchic enterprises. Therefore, while the tax reform did result in a more clear and efficient 
WD[FROOHFWLRQPHFKDQLVPWKLVLVXQGHUPLQHGE\WKHUHIRUP¶VVHOHFWLYHHQIRUFHPHQW 
During the 1998 crisis, the government passed both containment and resolution 
reforms, yet the former were far more effective than the latter. Furthermore, the crisis 
containment reforms, although successful, undermined the implementation of successful 
resolution measures.228 This is because they maintained soft-budget constraints and reinforced 
the social economy, when the necessary crisis resolution measures would have imposed hard 
budget constraints. While it is okay to suspend enforcing regulations temporarily, continually 
delaying their implementation makes it difficult to fix problems.229 As Michael Ellman 
observes, µ7KHIDLOXUHWRHVWDEOLVKDKHDOWK\SULYDWHEDQNLQJV\VWHPLQWKHVZDVRQHRI
WKHELJJHVWIDLOXUHVRIWKH<HOWVLQSHULRG¶230 Furthermore, immediate growth post-crisis that 
weakened the urgency to undertake institutional development. Therefore, the CBR remained 
partially reformed in the aftermath of the 1998 economic crisis, because none of the reforms 
targeted weaknesses that caused the crises in the first place. 
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CHAPTER 6  
THE 2008 ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
This chapter presents a case study that examines how the 2008 economic crisis did not result 
in crisis modernisation. It is split into three sections. The first analyses the causes of the crisis 
and highlights the opportunities for crisis modernisation. This section is particularly important, 
as it demonstrates that the underlying cause for both the 1998 and 2008 crises is poor 
development of the banking sector and its regulation. Second, it enumerates and evaluates the 
crisis containment and crisis resolution measures implemented to stabilise the economy in the 
wake of the crisis, and how they differ from the 1998 economic crises. Finally, it synthesises 
these two components by testing three hypotheses. These hypotheses measure whether the 
responses to the crisis were appropriate, if they were implemented efficiently and effectively, 
and thus, whether institutional development has taken place. The chapter concludes that while 
the most measureable change that can be observed is in the consolidation of the Central Bank 
of Russia and the Federal Financial Market Service¶V regulatory powers, it does not amount to 
crisis modernisation and the CBR remains limited by its partially reformed institutional 
capacities. 
The 2008 economic crisis was like the 1998 crisis in that both were banking crises, yet 
in both cases the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) failed to enact proper crisis resolution measures 
by addressing the vulnerabilities within the banking sector. There were many differences 
between the 1998 and 2008 crises: there was no sovereign debt crisis as the government had 
exercised reasonable fiscal discipline during the oil boom; there was no currency crisis as the 
ruble was not artificially inflated (although it did depreciate considerably); the government had 
not been relying on bonds and securities to finance the budget; and both crises were caused by 
external factors. However, the exogenous shock of both the 1998 and 2008 crises highlight the 
fundamental vulnerability that makes the country not only susceptible to crises, but makes the 
effects worse than they need to be: poor development of the banking sector. As such, the failure 
to consistently address systemic weaknesses perpetuates partial reform and undermines critical 
junctures wherein the banking sector could be strengthened. This is particularly important as 
many scholars overlook the fact that both crises were exacerbated by exogenous shocks that 
expose systemic weaknesses.1 ,Q IDFW3XWLQKLPVHOIVWDWHGµ:HKDYHKDGQR OLTXLGLW\FULVLV
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and no mortgage loan crisis of a kind that some European and American markets experience. 
:HGLGQRWKDYHLWZHKDYHDYRLGHGLW¶2  
%HIRUH DQDO\VLQJ WKH &%5 DQG JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHVSRQVHV WR WKH crisis, we will first 
examine how this crisis qualifies as a banking crisis, and the ways in which it differs from the 
1998 crisis. This is important as different crises necessitate different responses, yet the 
fundamental causes of both crises and the response to them remains the same. This chapter will 
first examine the similarities and differences between the 1998 and 2008 crises.  Next, we will 
analyse the crisis containment and crisis resolution responses that were undertaken. Finally, 
we will use this analysis to test the three hypotheses to demonstrate that the null hypothesis is 
true, and that the 2008 economic crisis did not result in crisis modernisation. 
 
6.1 The 2008 economic crisis 
7KH  HFRQRPLF FULVLV ZDV D EDQNLQJ FULVLV FDXVHG E\ 5XVVLD¶s corporate debt, and 
exacerbated by a rapid decline in oil prices. Reinhart and Rogoff define the characteristics of 
banking crises as: large-scale mergers or takeovers by the state, accompanied by large-scale 
government assistance to important institutions that sets off a similar pattern of assistance 
throughout the sector.3 Similarly, Laeven and Valencia define a banking crisis as an increase 
in financial and corporate sector defaults as banks and corporations struggle to meet debt 
obligations, and financial market capital is exhausted.4 This is an important distinction as these 
GHILQLWLRQVILW5XVVLD¶VH[SHULHnce of the 2008 economic crisis. The government and Central 
Bank of Russia largely ignored the role banks played in causing the crisis, instead blaming it 
on the USA and the decline in oil prices. Understanding this is fundamental to analysing the 
VWDWH DQG &%5¶V DSSURDFK WR FULVLV FRQWDLQPHQW DQG FULVLV UHVROXWLRQ DQG KRZ LW IDLOHG WR
address the causes of the crisis. 
 Initially, the 2008 crisis did not hit Russia the same way it did other states because 
oil prices did not start to decline until late 2008. Furthermore, the crisis exposed just how 
much the state was reliant on gas and oil revenues to support economic growth. The largest 
FRQWULEXWLQJIDFWRUWR5XVVLD¶V*'3FRQWUDFWLRQLQZDVWKHUDSLGGHFOLQHLQJURVVFDSLWDO
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investment, not a fall in domestic consumption.5 This signifies that the banking sector was not 
investing in long-term projects, which undermines economic dynamism and growth. Thus, if 
there were few long-term investments in the years preceding and during the crisis, then 
economic growth was driven by gas and oil rents. As such, without these revenues, the 
economy collapsed. The projected GDP contraction for 2009 was 4.5 percent, but the actual 
contraction was 7.9 percent after an average of 8.2 percent growth per year since 2000.6 
 Because of gas and oil rents, the state was unconcerned with actively attracting 
investment of any kind, but was especially hostile to foreign investors. This is because, as 
discussed in chapter three, the Putin administration embarked on renationalising the economy 
and using rents from these industries to develop and modernise the economy. Thus, foreign 
investors were crowded out as the government limited potential investment opportunities and 
expanded its own presence. For example, from 2004 to 2006 the state acquired the controlling 
stake of an additional 22 companies either by increasing a minority share it already held or 
securing the majority share in a private firm.7 Furthermore, the number of banks directly and 
indirectly controlled by the state increased from 35 to 47 between 2000 and 2009. In fact, from 
WKHUHZDVDQLQFUHDVHLQUDLGLQJGHILQHGE\6DNZDDVµWKHKRVWLOHDWWDFNRIRQHFRUSRUDWH
HQWLW\ DJDLQVW DQRWKHU RIWHQ DFFRPSDQLHG E\ SK\VLFDO UDLGV E\ DUPHG VWDWH RUJDQV¶8 The 
Khodorkovsky affair was one of the earliest, and remains the most famous, of the raiding cases 
to date.9 As a direct consequence of raiding and other instances of renationalisation, the private 
VHFWRU¶VVKDUHRI*'3IHll from 70 percent in 2004, to 65 percent in 2006.10 
Additionally, raiding cases, as well as the general renationalisation of the economy, 
have undermined the security of property rights in Russia, which is a serious disincentive to 
long-term investment for domestic investors.11 This was further reflected LQWKH:RUOG%DQN¶V
µ(DVHRI'RLQJ%XVLQHVV¶VXUYH\ZKLFKUHOHDVHGLWVILUVWRIILFLDOZRUOGUDQNLQJLQUDQNHG
Russia as 97th out of 175 countries for 2006, and as 96th for 2007.12 What is even more telling 
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about these rankings is that on individual measures, Russia ranked 159th for ease of getting 
credit, 163rd for ease of obtaining licenses, and 143rd on ease of trading across borders.13 
+DQVRQLOOXVWUDWHVWKDWWKHODFNRIWUXVWLQ5XVVLD¶VHFRQRP\LQWKHPLG-2000s is demonstrated 
by the amount of capital flight from Russia alongside an increase in foreign borrowing.14 This 
signifies that Russians do not trust the economy enough to invest long-term. Making matters 
ZRUVHLQ$SULODIHZPRQWKVEHIRUHWKHFULVLVKLWµ7KH/DZRQ)RUHLJQ,QYHVWPHQW in 
6WUDWHJLF6HFWRUV¶ZDVSDVVHG15 This law listed 42 industries that required state approval before 
any foreign investment could take place.16 This raised concerns of further national control over 
certain sectors of the economy, particularly in hydrocarbons and minerals.17 The result was a 
39 percent decline in FDI between 2008 and 2009, which prompted the government to begin 
discussing relaxing the legislation.18 This became yet another motivation for the state to rely 
on external borrowing to compensate for the decline in FDI, as discussed above.  
As a result, iQ WKH \HDUV LPPHGLDWHO\ SUHFHGLQJ WKH  HFRQRPLF FULVLV 5XVVLD¶V
banks were heavily indebted both to domestic and foreign lenders borrowing an estimated $115 
billion annually.19 A higher refinancing rate a few months before the crisis hit drove banks to 
LQFUHDVHERUURZLQJIURPDEURDGLQFUHDVLQJ5XVVLD¶VSULYDWHIRUHLJQGHEWE\SHUFHQWLQWKH
span of a few weeks.20 By June 2008, total external borrowing had reached $200 billion or 40 
percent GDP.21 Importantly, the majority of this debt was short-term loans, or loans of one to 
three years.22 Furthermore, the average loan-to-deposit ratio in 2008 was 125 percent, 
signalling both a reliance on foreign banks and increasing sector wide vulnerability.23 This 
creates a problem because although the Russian economy had been steadily growing since the 
1998 crisis, this growth was driven by oil prices rather than demand or increased productivity 
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DV 5XVVLD¶V HFRQRP\ UHPDLQHG XQGHUGHYHORSHG24 In fact, the GDP contribution of those 
industries that were stimulated by the import substitution effect in the wake of the 1998 ruble 
devaluation (such as food production, metallurgy, chemical production, and so on) declined 
from 45 to 50 percent between 1998 and 2000, to about 15 percent between 2001 and 2002.25 
Even where domestic demand for consumption and investment is a driver of growth, it is 
fuelled by rising oil prices that increase personal incomes.26 Thus, because the state becomes 
so reliant on oil and gas prices instead of more domestic, consumer demand based industries, 
when the price of oil drops, there are few resources for banks to meet their mounting debt 
obligations. 
 7KHRLOERRPRIWKHHDUO\VZDVXVHGWRERRVW5XVVLD¶VFUHGLWUDWLQJDV windfalls 
were saved in the Stability Fund and pay off sovereign debt, which helped demonstrate strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Banks then used this reputation to secure loans from foreign 
banks and investors.27 If oil prices stayed high, banks would be able to retain investors and 
repay their loans.28 Additionally, the strong credit rating, a low level of sovereign debt, 
VLJQLILFDQWLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHVHUYHVDQGWKH&%5¶VUDLVLQJWKHLQWHUHVWUDWHZKHQRWKHUVWDWHVZHUH
lowering them, made Russia appear like a safe haven for investors.29 However, this led to 
economic overheating as the output and production failed to match the rapidly rising value of 
the ruble, which was overvalued by nearly ༦20 to $1.30 As such, the Russian economy entered 
the 2008 economic crisis when the price of oil dropped from $150 per barrel in July 2008 to 
$65 per barrel in October 2008. Investors began to withdraw, and capital flight increased.31 To 
make matters worse, a nearly $11 billion decline in foreign direct investment in 2008 was 
supplemented by external borrowing.32  
 7KHZD\5XVVLD¶V banking system is structured strongly encourages external borrowing, 
because there are few sources of domestic non-bank financing compared with a variety of 
foreign lending.33 In fact, getting credit is one of the largest hurdles for current and would-be 
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investors in Russia.34 As such, banks borrowed too much short-term debt, creating a large roll-
over risk that was magnified by the decline in oil prices.35 Furthermore, the risk of default 
increased from zero to 20 percent in seven years as risk management deteriorated with the 
creation of the Deposit Insurance Agency.36 )LQDOO\5XVVLD¶VRYHUO\ ODUJH IUDJPHQWHGDQG
poorly regulated banking sector remained a source of economic vulnerability. In 2008, there 
were 1,172 banks in Russia, but only 1,058 of these had a license to operate from the 
CBR.37 Yet, Sberbank and 46 other state controlled banks held 57.4 percent of household 
deposits, and 46.4 percent of household loans.38 Of the smaller banks, some were attached 
directly to corporations and undertook banking practices exclusively for their employees, such 
as issuing or cashing pay cheques. However, many others were shell banks used to abet capital 
flight and money laundering.39 These banks had access to both domestic and international 
lines of credit. Yet, because these banks did not engage in regular banking activities, they did 
not have the necessary commercial deposits, reserve requirements, or collateral to support 
themselves.  
As such, this highlighted the need for the CBR to address the plethora of banks and 
their practices, and its ability to effectively regulate the sector. Furthermore, although the 
2008 crisis was a private debt crisis, that does not absolve the state of responsibility. As the 
state controlled the largest banks, as well as most of the banking sector, then a good portion of 
the debt that caused economic instability was borrowed by these banks, and by extension the 
state itself. Addressing these problems, then, would require the CBR to become a more 
effective regulator with clearly defined authority over both private and state controlled banks. 
,WZRXOGQHHGWRDVVHVVWKHTXDOLW\RIEDQNV¶DVVHWVDQGHQVXUHWKH\PHHWUHVHUYHUHTXLUHPHQWV
improve risk assessment to decrease moral hazard; and diversify sources of liquidity to 
discourage banks from borrowing abroad.40 To tackle some of these issues, the CBR merged 
ZLWK WKH )HGHUDO )LQDQFLDO 0DUNHW 6HUYLFH LQ  WR LQFUHDVH WKH IRUPHU¶V UHJXODWRU\
authority. In theory, this appears to be a promising start of institutional development, even if it 
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is too late to be considered crisis resolution. However, there is little strong evidence to support 
this, which will be discussed below. 
The Russian financial crises of 1998 and 2008 are largely incomparable as the country 
suffered different effects during both. Russia suffered more from the effects of the 2008 crisis 
than the 1998 crisis because of the lack of control that the government had over the crisis, the 
slowness of the economy to recover, and the uncertainty of future growth. While the rapidity 
RIWKHFULVLV¶VSHUFHQWGHFOLQH LQ*DP was more severe, it grew by six percent the 
following year.41 Conversely, the 2008 crisis did not immediately hit Russia, and it was two 
years before the economy experienced a low 3.5 percent growth. Furthermore, the 
sustainability of this growth was questionable as the government continued to depend 
exclusively on the energy sector despite the rhetoric of fostering economic diversification.42 
On the one hand, Russia was a victim of the 2008 global financial crisis rather than an 
instigator, because it was not government insolvency that caused the crisis. Yet, the economy 
was vulnerable to the crisis because of irresponsible and unregulated borrowing on the part of 
private banks. As such, the 2008 crisis has more far-reaching implications for institutional 
development than the 1998 crisis. 
In 1998, Russian debt was overwhelmingly the result of years of poor fiscal policies. 
This debt had accumulated for several reasons: economic stagnation, poor fiscal and monetary 
policies, relying on the sale of treasury bonds to compensate for monetary and fiscal 
shortcomings, mounting wage arrears, and a pegged exchange rate that was hiding inflation 
costs.43 As a result, investor confidence eroded and the government was forced to devalue the 
ruble and suspend all loan payments. Second, while the 1997 Asian financial crisis certainly 
played a role in increasing investor sensitivity to the Russian financial market, it was the 
instability of the Russian government¶V ILVFDO DQG PRQHWDU\ SROLFLHV, and an unregulated 
banking sector exposed by the crisis, that caused the most damage. Finally, oil prices rose 
drastically in 1999, leading to economic recovery, illustrated by rapid GDP growth, reaching 
12 percent growth by the end of 1999.44 
In contrast, the debt that made Russia susceptible to the 2008 crisis was private rather 
than public. Because banks had borrowed money both domestically and abroad, the economy 
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was more susceptible to the effects of the global financial crisis.45 As global and domestic 
demand decreased, businesses and enterprises could not earn the profits needed to meet their 
loan payments, sending them into default. Thus, the economic decline that Russia experienced 
in the 2008 crisis is just severe if not more so than that of 1998, it just did not manifest itself 
as violently.46 Russia lost USD 1 trillion in 2008 and its GDP shrank by 7.9 percent in 2009 
from an average of seven to eight growth per year since 2000. Whereas the GDP only shrank 
about 6 percent in 1998 and recovered a year later. 
Thus, the challenges posed by the 2008 economic crisis were different from those in 
1998 as the latter was a triple crisis, and the former is a straight-forward banking crisis. Banking 
crises are difficult to resolve, and this is made even harder when the state owns or controls 
most of the banking sector.47 First, to resolve the crisis, the state needed to restructure the sector 
by selling its assets to private interests. This would make the sector more efficient and 
profitable by consolidating and liquidating inefficient and insolvent banks. Additionally, this 
would implement hard budget constraints where the state struggled to do so. Second, the CBR 
must increase its regulatory abilities. Privatisation would directly contribute to this because it 
would allow the CBR more effectively regulate the sector by removing its direct interest as an 
economic player. As such, for crisis modernisation to arise out of the 2008 economic crisis 
these two issues, privatisation and regulation, must be addressed through crisis resolution. 
However, because the state itself was not the immediate cause of the problem, which was 
reinforced by its ability to provide the necessary liquidity to keep the economy stable, the state 
undertook very little crisis resolution at all. Instead, it focused primarily on liquidity measures 
through crisis containment, which contributed to poor economic recovery as it allowed 
unprofitable banks and enterprises to remain operational. The following section will analyse 
the crisis containment and crisis resolution measures enacted to manage the 2008 economic 
crisis.  
  
6.2 Crisis containment and resolution measures 2008 
This section will analyse the crisis containment and crisis resolution measures undertaken by 
the Central Bank of Russia and the Medvedev government. This will provide the basis to 
determine whether the 2008 economic crisis resulted in crisis modernisation using the three 
hypotheses stated in chapter two: was the CBR and government able to undertake the necessary 
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and appropriate measures to resolve the crisis; were these measures undertaken in a timely and 
efficient manner; and did the implementation of these measures result in institutional 
development by changing behaviours and expectations. Overwhelmingly, little crisis 
modernisation resulted from 2008 crisis resolution, as few measures that could result in 
institutional development are undertaken. The Central Bank and government focused primarily 
on liquidity assistance, with most measures aiming to increase the ease with which the state 
could inject funds or create more liquidity. The Stabilisation Fund was used to help stabilise 
the banking sector from the moment the crisis began in mid-2008.48 While all states 
undertook some form of liquidity assistance to cope with the 2008 crisis, Russia spent seven 
percent of its GDP on stimulus programmes, which was higher than the international 
recommendation of no more than two percent.49 Yet, these measures both increased state 
control in the economy and undermined fundamental market principles, such as hard budget 
constraints. Thus, the following analysis provides little evidence to support the hypotheses. 
In the first part of this section, we will analyse the following crisis containment 
measures and how they were implemented: liquidity assistance, regulatory forbearance, and 
bank holidays. Furthermore, the negative effects of these measures and how they undermined 
future economic growth will be discussed. Second, this section examines the crisis resolution 
measures government owned asset management, bank restructuring, privatisation, and 
LQFUHDVLQJ WKH &%5¶V UHJXODWRU\ SRZHUV 6SHFLILFDOO\ WKLV VHFWLRQ GHPonstrates that the 
government did not actively undertake these measures, and that the failure to do this 
undermined the development of the banking sector as it became more reliant on the state. 
Whereas the CBR struggled to implement crisis resolution in 1998, there appears to be little 
evidence of active crisis resolution on the part of either the government or the Central Bank in 
7RWKLVDTXDOLWDWLYHDQDO\VLVRIWKH&%5DQGJRYHUQPHQW¶VDFWLRQVLVGHULYHGIURPD
combination of various economic reports, statistics, and other scholarly sources. This provides 
enough evidence to test the three hypotheses in the next section to determine that crisis 
modernisation does not occur.  
 
2008 Crisis containment 
As the CBR remained a relatively weak institution after the 1998 crisis, it is expected that it 
would rely on containment measures rather than resolution measures, as the latter are harder to 
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implement. There were no bank holidays, deposit freezes, or strict capital controls. The crisis 
containment measures during the 2008 crisis primarily focused on liquidity assistance and 
regulatory forbearance, which was paid for by the government and CBR. In fact, Russia 
provided more liquidity assistance to banks and enterprises than any other G20 state, spending 
more than ༦29 trillion, or 6.7 percent of its GDP, well over the recommended two percent GDP 
by early 2009.50 These policies primarily benefited those banks and enterprises that were 
directly and indirectly state-owned, by buying up their debt, and / or delaying tax deadlines 
and lowering tax rates.51 There was little to no assistance to households, and private industry 
also struggled with many banks, such as Globex and Sobin Bank, being bought by the state to 
avoid insolvency. Thus, rather than diversifying and safeguarding the private sector, or 
protecting households from the effects of the crisis, the containment measures were undertaken 
WRSURWHFWWKHVWDWH¶VRZQLQWHUHVWVDQGUHLQIRUFLQJWKHVRFLDOHFRQRP\LQWKHSURFHVV,QWKH
end, these measures were soft budget constraints that afforded the state nothing but the ability 
to delay institutional development. 
 
i) Liquidity assistance. Liquidity assistance was provided by the government, the Ministry of 
Finance, and the CBR. In total, over $100 billion was spent on stabilising the ruble, reducing 
the rollover risk, offering low interest rate loans, and generally bailing the state out of the 
economic crisis.52 Most of this money came from the National Wealth Fund and the Stability 
Fund, totalling $35.4 billion by March 2009, which was half of the 2009 crisis budget set in 
2008.53 The CBR flooded the market with ༦1.9 trillion worth of cheap, unsecured loans, 
draining one-WKLUGRIWKH&%5¶VUHVHUYHV54 Additionally, the Central Bank spent ༦300 billion 
on Lombard loans to strategically important firms, mortgage backed bonds, ༦2.4 trillion on 
further uncollateralised loans, and ༦220.2 billion in repo loans in 2009.55 Currency swaps and 
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cost the CBR a further ༦1.91 trillion in 2008, though this declined to ༦540 billion in 2009.56 
After spending $100 billion trying to stabilise the ruble, it lost 20 percent of its value in two 
months.57 The state and CBR also promised to compensate banks who suffered losses on 
interbank loans, and provided ༦700 billion to compensate banks for losses on corporate loans.58 
Finally, the CBR provided liquidity for banks by depositing budgetary funds in their accounts 
for up to three months, totalling ༦1.79 trillion in 2008, and ༦690 billion in 2009.59 This figure 
would rise substantially as these deposits were converted to uncollateralised loans.60  
 Half the cost of the crisis was spent on bailing out and merging with banks (discussed 
below), costing 3.3 percent of GDP by early 2009.61 The CBR began by increasing the interest 
paid to banks for maintaining their deposit accounts to both decrease the need for banks to use 
the funds in said accounts, but also as an incentive not to do so.62  Liquidity totalling ༦60 billion 
for Gazprombank, Sberbank and VTB was announced as early as September of 2008, and 
measures later that year would include ༦725 billion for Sberbank, VTB, and Rosselkhozbank.63 
For VEB alone, the CBR allocated most of a $3 billion general liquidity injection, as well as a 
recapitalisation deposit of $50 billion to reduce its loan roll-over risk.64 VEB was given ༦450 
billion to provide subordinated loans to banks other than Sberbank, which itself was given ༦500 
billion for the same purpose.65 For example, VEB used these funds to inject $2.5 billion of 
liquidity into Svyaz Bank, and $2 billion into Globex in late 2008.66 In this capacity, we begin 
to see large state owned banks use CBR and government liquidity to merge with or invest in 
failing banks as a means of supporting them, which will be discussed in the crisis resolution 
section.  
The shHHUFRVWRIOLTXLGLW\DVVLVWDQFHGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDW5XVVLD¶VHFRQRPLFHIILFLHQF\
                                                 
56
 The Central Bank of the Russian Federation, "Banking Supervision Report 2009," 2009. 36. It should 
be noted that this decrease in currency swaps is not due to ruble stabilisation, rather it is because the 
CBR gave up trying to stabilise the ruble. For more information, see Aleksashenko, 2012. 42. 
57
 Ericson, 2009. 221. 
58
 OECD, "Making the Banking Sector More Efficient and Resilient," 2009. 113.; Bogetic, "Russian 
Economic Report No. 17," 2008. 7KHVWDWH¶VLQVXULQJRIFRUSRUDWHORDQVRQO\DSSOLHGWRVWDWHRZQHG
corporations, which comprised 70 percent of total outstanding loans.  
59
 Bogetic, "Russian Economic Report No. 17," 2008. 30.; The Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 
"Banking Supervision Report 2009," 2009. 36.  
60
 Aleksashenko, 2012. 42. 
61
 Bogetic, "Russian Economic Report No. 18," 2009. 9. 
62
 OECD, "Making the Banking Sector More Efficient and Resilient," 2009. 113. Box 4.4. 
63
 Bogetic, "Russian Economic Report No. 17," 2008. 29. 
64
 Ibid. 19, 31, 32. 
65
 OECD, "Making the Banking Sector More Efficient and Resilient," 2009. 113. 
66
 Bogetic, "Russian Economic Report No. 17," 2008. 30. 
  163 
has not improved since 1998. The government and CBR spent ༦5 trillion bailing itself out of 
the economic crisis, more than most other countries, and it still suffered one of the worst GDP 
contractions, 7.9 percent. This was not only worse compared to more developed countries, but 
also compared to countries with similar economic profiles such as Brazil, China, and India, 
with the latter two experiencing economic growth from 2009.67 Furthermore, capital flight 
increased significantly during the crisis, suggesting that not an insignificant portion of funding 
was funnelled out of the country.68 Thus, that the government spend so much on aid that did 
not successfully protect the economy from the worst of the crisis indicates that the economy is 
still unable to maximise capital inputs, and undermines the idea that the elites are investing in 
the economy. 
)LQDOO\WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VYDULRXVIRUPVRIOLTXLGLW\DVVLVWDQFHWKDWLQWHQGHGWRVWDELOLVH
the economy were ineffective. On the one hand, Russia did not suffer the collapse or insolvency 
of high profile banks. On the other, very little economic stabilisation occurred. While all 
countries will use some form of liquidity assistance during a crisis, most of this funding is used 
to stimulate domestic demand by targeting households via personal income tax cuts and 
government investment in infrastructure projects, thereby keeping businesses afloat. Russia 
well outspent most countries, with revenue measures to the banking and financial sector 
accounting for one-third of the total spent.69 The government increased some unemployment 
benefits, but the crisis containment measures largely ignored the need to increase demand. This 
was a fundamental oversight as the non-oil economic growth that did occur in the years 
preceding the crisis was demand driven.70 The fall in investment accounted for 14 percent of 
the GDP contraction, whereas domestic consumption contributed by 4 percent.71 As such, 
ZKHUHGHPDQGIRFXVHGPHDVXUHVVWLPXODWHGJURZWKDQGUHFRYHU\LQRWKHUFRXQWULHV5XVVLD¶V
consumer demand did not pick up. One could argue that the because crisis hit Russia so late, 
LWVHFRQRPLFJURZWKPLJKWEHWKHODVWWRUHFRYHU+RZHYHUDVODWHDV5XVVLD¶VGRPHVWLF
demand had not recovered.72  
There are two main problems with the approach to liquidity assistance as a response to 
the 2008 crisis. First, liquidity assistance is an emergency measure, not a panacea. The 
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government used these measures to stop the crisis from destroying the system, but at the cost 
of not fixing what made the system so vulnerable in the first place. Even where the CBR does 
address the weakness in the banking industry, it is as an afterthought and more of a response 
to how the banks used and abused the stimulus funds rather than an active attempt to strengthen 
the industry. Second, this massive assistance package did not actually result in proportional 
economic recovery. Russia still suffered the largest GDP contraction, and it has not recovered 
since as the 4.5 and 4.2 percent growth for 2010 and 2011 respectively was much lower than 
the nearly seven percent average leading up to the crisis.73 Liquidity injections targeted 
strategic industries and banks, and favoured state-owned enterprises and the elites rather than 
stimulating domestic demand.74 This shows not only a fundamental misunderstanding about 
the causes of the crisis itself, but also the continued reliance on gas and oil rents. Thus, because 
the government and CBR had the liquidity to bail out financial sector, and because they blamed 
the crisis on exogenous factors, they assumed that there was no need to undertake reform and 
that they coulGµSD\WKHLUZD\¶RXWRIWKHFULVLV 
 
ii) Regulatory forbearance. In addition to the liquidity assistance measures listed above, the 
regulatory forbearances allowed during the crisis was also costly for the government and CBR, 
but provided many banks with additional liquidity. To begin, in September 2008, just as Russia 
was beginning to feel the effects of the crisis, the CBR cut the reserve requirements for banks.75 
This provided banks with an extra ༦400 billion in liquidity, but at an estimated cost of ༦300 
billion to the CBR.76 Reserve requirements were cut again in October 2008, but this time the 
CBR extended the cut until early 2009, costing an additional ༦100 billion.77 As the crisis 
deepened, the CBR allowed banks to average all their required reserves to meet the lower 
minimum reserve requirements and mitigate the increasing roll-over risk.78 The cuts to the 
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reserve requirements were held in place until 2011, and the ability to average reserves to be 
maintained until 2010.79 
 The CBR also worked with the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) to suspend regulations 
and create more liquidity for the banking sector by decreasing, and in some instances delaying, 
insurance payments.80  To assuage concerns that this could risk the security of commercial and 
household deposit accounts, the DIA increased insurance limits from ༦100,000 and ༦400,000, 
to ༦200,000 and ༦700,000.81 Given the accusations of capital flight, this was a very costly move 
for both the CBR and the DIA, as it was more expensive to bailout banks when liquidity 
injections were not being used for restructuring.  
 The CBR and government also made several fiscal forbearances. The most prominent 
was cutting different taxes, particularly the Mineral Excise Tax and export taxes to the 
hydrocarbon industry in 2008, which cost the government more than ༦200 billion in lost 
revenue.82 These measures were extended as the crisis deepened, aiming to both supply the 
industry and its banks with more liquidity, and to attract more investment.83 Again, this did not 
have the intended effect as it helped relieve pressure on the hydrocarbon industry without 
taking additional measures to stimulate demand in that industry. Various organisations 
demonstrated that the revenue would have been better spent on infrastructure investments or 
social spending.84 Additionally, the CBR extended repayment schedules and suspended 
lending requirements in order to provide banks with the additional liquidity discussed above.85 
For example, uncollateralised Lombard loans were extended for up to 365 days, and 90 repo 
loans were extended for up to a year.86 
 The various forbearances were extended until 2011, well after the crisis ended.87 Banks 
remained undercapitalised, and the quality of the capital that banks possessed was hard to asses. 
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Additionally, up to 15 percent of loans in between 2010 and 2012 were uncollateralised, which 
was almost double the eight percent of uncollateralised loans in 2005.88 This is a problem as 
studies demonstrate that the failure to reintroduce regulatory prudence in a timely manner 
increases the stress on the banking sector and the real economy.89 This is what happens to 
Russia in the aftermath of the crisis: the CBR struggles to reinforce prudential requirements 
and asset quality, and the government struggles to reinstate taxation mechanisms.90 As such, 
while the regulatory forbearance measures were successful in reducing the stress on the 
banking sector and provided it with non-inflationary liquidity, it has been more detrimental 
over the long-term and allowed the banking system to remain vulnerable.  
 
iii) Deposit freeze/ bank holiday. There was neither an implicit nor explicit bank holiday as 
there was in 1998. The priority was to maintain depositor and investor confidence, and 
implementing a bank holiday would have drastically undermined that. However, there is some 
debate over whether capital controls were introduced. Officially, the CBR implemented 
controls on currency swaps that would vary daily, depending on the exchange rate, to combat 
currency speculation.91 This would qualify as capital control as it was used to control the 
exchange rate and prevent money from leaving the country. However, Jacques Sapir and Sergei 
Aleksashenko argue that these restrictions were not capital controls because the CBR was 
relying on the interest rate to stabilize the exchange rate and inflation simultaneously.92 Both 
say that these actions undermine both objectives as they contradict the reasoning behind pegged 
exchange rate, thus implying that the currency is unstable.93 Additionally, this policy is ill-
suited to a currency whose value is tied to the price of one volatile commodity.94   
:KLOH 6DSLU DQG $OHNVDVKHQNR DUH QRW LQFRUUHFW LQ WKHLU DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH &%5¶V
misguided attempts to manage inflation, the measures taken in 2008 are not merely an 
extension of these policies. Pegging the ruble and managing the money supply was indeed the 
most effective tool the CBR had to combat inflation, and this remained the main policy until 
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November 2014, when the CBR unexpectedly floated the ruble.95 Yet, the additional 
restrictions during the 2008 crisis were specifically implemented as a means of trying to slow 
WKHUXEOH¶s depreciation, which had increased by 10 percent in September 2008, then another 
10 percent in October. 96 Thus, the controls on currency swaps were intended as capital 
controls. In the end, this did not help stabilize the currency as it continued to devalue, and CBR 
had to widen the currency board to defend it without draining all its reserves to do so. The 
problem is that while the CBR and government undertook the above listed measures as a means 
of instilling confidence in investors, they had the opposite effect: the ruble still depreciated 
significantly and capital flight still increased. As such, this only contributed to the 7.9 percent 
GDP contraction that occurred in 2009.   
The containment measures undertaken during the 2008 economic crisis 
overwhelmingly focused on liquidity assistance, with other measures aimed at finding 
additional sources of revenue for the banks and spending over $100 billion. In the end, while 
the government succeeded in preventing the banking system from collapsing, it failed to 
contain the effects of the crisis. Additionally, it demonstrates a lack of understanding or naiveté 
RIZKDWPDGH5XVVLDYXOQHUDEOHWRWKHFULVLVLQWKHILUVWSODFHDVHYLGHQFHGE\3XWLQ¶VDVVHUWLRQ
WKHFULVLVZDVWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶IDXOW+RZHYHUWKHVHPHDVXUHVDUHDOVRHYLGHQFHRIWKH&%5
and government¶VLQDELOLW\ to reform the banking system. Rather than using liquidity assistance 
to support the sectors most viable banks and shut down those that are draining resources, the 
measures targeted all banks, particularly those owned by the state. Instead of using the 
reinforcement of regulations as a means of bank restructuring, forbearance was extended well 
after recovery began to take place, which only hurt the possibility of future growth. As opposed 
to using the crisis as a means of developing new tools for lowering inflation and stabilizing the 
exchange rate, the CBR continued to rely on methods that contradict their stated goals. As such, 
the state is protecting its own interest rather than the interest of the banking sector, and 
economy, which is a poor foundation for crisis resolution.  
 
2008 Crisis resolution 
The Central Bank and government did not consider the 2009 crisis to be a banking crisis 
because the there was enough revenue to bailout the banks. As such, there was little focus on 
crisis resolution. However, there were several de facto crisis resolution measures that took 
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place. The primary measure was the use of state owned banks to merge with and take over 
IDLOLQJEDQNVWKHUHE\LQFUHDVLQJWKHVWDWH¶VVKDUHRIWKHEDQNLQJVHFWRU$VDUHVXOWWKHUHZDV
little need to restructure the banks or the banking sector because the state had more direct 
control over them. Because of this, there was no effort to privatise either as a resolution 
measure or once recovery began. Therefore, the main areas of crisis resolution were ignored 
and very little institutional development or crisis modernisation takes place.  
 
i) Government owned asset management. The government owned asset management 
programme enacted in 2008 appears to be a means of increasing state control over the banking 
sector. Government owned asset management normally involves the state taking control over 
insolvent or non-performing banks to restructure and resell them. While, the 1998 economic 
crisis did not see much government owned asset management either by official measure or 
default, the government enacted several measures to undertake asset management in 2008. The 
Russian economy was slowly renationalised from 2000, and then more aggressively from 2004, 
DVDSDUWRI9ODGLPLU3XWLQ¶Vplan WRFRQWUROWKHVWDWH¶VVWUDWHJLFLQGXVWULHV97 The percentage of 
SULYDWHVHFWRU¶VVKDUHRI*'3ZDVVWHDGLO\LQFUHDVLQJXQWLOZKHQLWUHDFKHGSHUFHQW
but declined to 65 percent by 2004.98 At WKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHFULVLVLQWKHVWDWH¶VVKare of 
GDP was 50 percent, and rises to 75 percent if you include the indirect control the state had in 
many banks and enterprises.99  
In September 2008, the government amended the 2008 - 2010 budget to allow liquidity 
from the National Wealth and Stability Funds to purchase shares of underperforming and 
insolvent banks. VEB was allocated ༦75 billion in 2008 and ༦175 billion in 2009, the Deposit 
Insurance Agency was allocated ༦200 billion in 2008, and the State Mortgage Agency was 
allocated ༦60 billion also in 2008.100 By the end on 2008 alone, the government controlled half 
the banking market, and this share increased to 55.8 percent by 2012.101 Furthermore, 
according to The Federal Agency for State Property Management, there was no intention of 
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privatising state controlled banks as of 2014.102 Even where the state does not directly control 
banks, they have still become reliant on the support that comes from indirect control, which 
reinforces the social economy and creates more opportunities for corruption.103 The 
government argues that it has relinquished some of its control over the economy, including the 
banking sector since 2010.104 However, much of this claim comes from the occasional selling 
of a few shares, but not the controlling share. As such, the state remains in control of much of 
the industry, as will be discussed in the section on the sale of government managed assets. 
The 2008 economic crisis allowed the government to renationalise the banking 
industry. However, the motives were not to profit from the sector as it did from the national 
champions, but to shelter the industry from the effects of the crisis and keep banks solvent. 
7KLVLVGLIIHUHQWWRSUHYLRXV*RYHUQPHQW2ZQHG$VVHW0DQDJHPHQWSURJUDPVERWKLQ5XVVLD¶V
past and in other states. Normally, a government will purchase or takeover a failing bank, 
restructure it, and then sell it. In Russia, the government took over banks that were insolvent 
to justify providing them with stimulus funds and subsidies during the crisis. In a few cases, 
the bank regained control after the crisis eased, but many did not. It must be noted that many 
banks are happy with this arrangement ² it absolves them of the responsibility to respond to 
market pressures, and places them in the hands of the government instead. This will not result 
in FULVLVPRGHUQLVDWLRQEHFDXVHWKHVWDWH¶VVRIWHQLQJRIWKHEXGJHWFRQVWUDLQWVSUHYHQWVit from 
taking place. As such, market institutions are unlikely to develop and partial reform equilibrium 
is maintained. 
 
ii) Bank restructuring. Most bank restructuring that took place during and after the 2008 
economic crisis was in the form of mergers and acquisitions of smaller banks by the state. The 
World Bank argued that these measures were productive and helpful as it consolidated the large 
and fragmented banking sector that was overpopulated with small banks that did little actual 
banking.105 Yet this was not as productive as it may seem at first glance, as little restructuring 
of the banks ensued. As Frye and Iwasaki argue, state controlled firms, including banks, would 
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merge and send government directors to manage them and not to restructure or discipline 
existing management, but collude and rent-seek.106 This demonstrates that the state is not 
taking over firms to rescue or restructure them as a means of crisis resolution.107 By 2010, the 
state controlled more banks than it could effectively manage, and little was done to consolidate 
or restructure them.108 For example, the state used VTB to merge with Globex in 2009, but this 
bank would have its licenses withdrawn after the CBR determined that there was a $1.5 billion 
discrepancy between the official assets listed and what the bank actually had.109 
Thus, any restructuring that occurred because of these mergers was a beneficial by-
product, as there was very little active restructuring of debt obligations and, as discussed above, 
constant postponing of regulatory reinforcement. Private banks reduced their external debt by 
$100 billion by the end of the first quarter in 2009, and up to 23.8 percent of loans had been 
restructured by the end of July 2009.110 However, banks still owed about $90 billion in 
payments for the remainder of the year, and meeting these obligations would prove difficult as 
non-performing loans continued to mount and liquidity was hard to come by.111 By the end of 
2010, the long-term performance of restructured loans was questionableGXHWREDQNV¶XQGHU-
performance and under-capitalisation.112 Additionally, in March of 2009, no bank had fallen 
below the ten percent requirement for capital reserves, and in 2011, the CBR attempted to raise 
reserve requirements by three and three and a half percent for domestic and foreign banks 
respectively.113 Yet, the quality of assets used to meet these requirements is unknown and 
difficult to assess.114 In fact, for all his faults, one of the issues Alexei Navalny exposed was 
how the assets banks officially declared did not match what they actually had.115 This was 
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largest banks failed to comply with CBR statutory regulations and capital reserve 
requirements.116 
Meaningful and productive bank restructuring failed to take place after the 2008 
economic crisis. While some restructuring did occur, very little of it resulted in a more efficient 
or stable banking sector. The CBR was more interested in keeping banks solvent than 
restructuring their debt, resulting in the massive amounts of liquidity assistance offered. Again, 
we see the CBR substituting crisis containment for crisis resolution, which is unlikely to result 
in institutional development. Whether the CBR substituted liquidity assistance for bank 
restructuring in 2008 because it was incapable of undertaking the latter or because it felt 
restructuring was unnecessary is difficult to discern. It is likely a result of a combination of the 
two: the CBR may have recognised the need for restructuring, but felt it was disruptive and 
XQQHFHVVDU\LQWKHPLGGOHRIDFULVLV1HYHUWKHOHVVWKH&%5¶VIDLOXUHWRXQGHUWDNHHIIHFWLYH
restructuring only maintained sectoral vulnerabilities.  
 
iii) Sale of government owned assets. The state used liquidity assistance measures to gain 
control over a sizeable amount of the banking industry during the 2008 crisis as a means of 
keeping the sector solvent. It is expected that as the economy began to exit the crisis, the state 
would sell the assets it acquired, to private interests that would restructure them and make them 
profitable.117 In this scenario, the failure of the state to actively restructure the banking sector 
can be overlooked as the state expected someone else to do it. The problem is that very little 
privatisation occurred after the crisis. WKLOH WKH VWDWH¶V FRQWURO ZDV GLOXWHG LW UHWDLQHG WKH
controlling share of most banks and other firms it merged with or took over during the crisis.118 
According to the Federal Agency for State Property Management, between 1995 and 2010, 
privatisations made up 10 percent of total business transactions.119 Yet, the Agency also clearly 
states that the government and CBR intent to maintain the controlling share of banks at 50 + 1 
percent.120 
 In 2011, 10 percent of VTB shares were sold to Bank of America for ༦97.5 billion, and 
was the largest transaction that year.121 In 2012, the state auctioned a 7.58 percent share of 
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Sberbank for ༦159.30 billion to a variety of buyers including JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs.122 
However, if the state is only selling minority shares, and still retains the controlling share of 
50+1 percent, then privatisation has not occurred. Because the Federal Agency for State 
Property Management has clearly indicated that the state has no intention of doing this, then it 
can be assumed that the banking sector will not be privatised soon. Additionally, this is not 
taking into consideration the indirect control the state has in many banks and firms that occurs 
in opaque, shady privatisation deals in which control changes hands from the state to a state 
confidants or lesser known government officials, or investors who remain unknown and 
untraceable.123 For example, Bank Rossiya, which is chaired by several Putin confidants 
including Sergei Rodlugin and Gennadi Timchenko, privatised Gazenergoprombank and Sobin 
Bank, which are both Gazprombank subsidiaries.124  
   
iv) Regulatory reforms. As noted, in 2012, it was announced that the state was merging the 
Federal Financial Market Service (FFMS) with the CBR to improve regulation of the banking 
sector. This was a means of addressing those problems in the banking sector that were exposed 
by the 2008 economic crisis, primarily, that it is too large to be properly regulated.125 The sector 
was disproportionate ² banks were either small and ineffective, or large, state controlled 
enterprises.126 For example, in 2011, there were over 1000 banks in Russia, and only 20 of 
them controlled 70 percent of banking assets.127 $GGLWLRQDOO\WKHVWDWH¶VGRPLQDWLQJSUHVHQFH
inhibited the development of private and foreign competition. This prevented the development 
of proper financial intermediation because it favoured larger, well known clients to individual 
households.128 Finally, the existing regulations were more rules based than risk based, which 
hindered efficient banking operations without ensuring viability and stability.129  
At the time of the 2008 crisis, the CBR regulated banks while the FFMS regulated 
the financial and securities markets and non-credit banks, and the Ministry of Finance 
supervised the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA). In the aftermath of the crisis, the 
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government and CBR were criticised for not including banking reforms in a list of measures to 
be undertaken.130 ,QWKH2(&'UHOHDVHGDUHSRUWRQ5XVVLD¶VEDQNLQJVHFWRUGHVFULELQJ
what needed to be improved, including: a need for more consistent capital adequacy ratios, 
better risk management, increased transparency, and a need to do more actual banking.131 In 
July 2013, the FFMS was dissolved and its regulatory responsibilities were handed over 
to the CBR, requiring the CBR to restructure itself into three regulatory divisions: banking 
supervision, financial market regulation, and monetary policy.132 The goal of this merger was 
to improve regulatory and supervisory capacity and efficiency by reducing bureaucratic 
red tape and closing the loopholes that were created by dividing the regulator.  
In theory, it is easier to streamline and regulate the sector with one institution than two 
in Russia due to the number of licenses banks require and the number of shell banks that do 
not perform banking services. This is because one bank could have multiple licenses, each 
requiring a different agency to rescind it.133 For example, revoking a banking license should 
have fallen under the jurisdiction of the CBR, but if the violations banks undertook fell under 
the jurisdiction of the FFMS, there was little either agency could do. The consolidation of the 
two into one mega-regulator, as it is being called, has allowed the CBR to reduce the number 
of banks in Russia by enforcing reserve requirements and other violations of licensing 
agreements, and finance related crime more broadly, without having to work with the FFMS. 
For example, under the direction of Elvira Nabiullina, the CBR closed one of 5XVVLD¶V largest 
banks in November 2013, Master Bank. The bank was well connected to Putin as his cousin 
was on the board of directors, and thus should have been untouchable because it falls within 
3XWLQ¶V blat.134 The CBR claimed that Master Bank had undertaken ༦200 billion worth of 
illegal transactions over the previous year, maintained a capital deficit of ༦2 billion, and 
falsified statements about the EDQN¶V financial situation.135  
Aside from Master Bank, there have been other high-profile closures, but there is 
evidence that these are politically motivated. Additionally, there are other instances where the 
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CBR has deliberately turned a blind-eye to egregious violations, such as the controversial Bank 
Rossiya. The total number of banking licences revoked in 2013 was only 32, but this 
rose to 87 in 2014.136 While the number of banks closed in 2014 is not as high as the number 
of banks closed per year in the early 2000s, it is still a significant change year-on-year. 
Most of these bank closures are small banks engaging in money laundering practices, doing 
very little banking, and generally reducing competition. However, there are still major 
weaknesses that need to be addressed and will be the subject of the next chapter, which 
discusses the 2014 crisis.  
Little crisis resolution occurred during the 2008 economic crisis. The government and 
CBR were resigned to weathering the crisis until it was resolved, without taking active steps to 
resolve it. Like the aftermath of the 1998 economic crisis, very little was done to address the 
vulnerabilities that caused the crisis in the first instance. The difference is that the state took 
advantage of the oil and gas windfalls from 1998 and early 2000s paper over the weaknesses. 
This did not occur in the wake of 2008. Gas and oil prices rose, but not to the same levels as 
1998. Additionally, the maintenance of soft budget constraints to keep the sector was very 
costly, and the failure to restructure banks only increased the liquidity needed to keep the 
industry operational. Some restructuring occurred and measures were taken to improve 
regulation, but as Russia entered another economic crisis in 2014, it was revealed that many of 
the same vulnerabilities remained. State controlled banks remained deficient in risk evaluation, 
banks retained high-levels of external debt, foreign investment continued to decline, and bank 
evaluation and supervision remained inconsistent, unclear, and opaque. This demonstrates that 
the CBR and various government agencies failed to address and strengthen industry 
weaknesses. Therefore, because the state undertook little crisis resolution in 2008, crisis 
modernisation did not take place. 
 
6.3 Hypothesis testing 
To determine whether crisis modernisation has occurred, the above analysis will be used to 
measure the hypotheses presented in chapter two. These hypotheses test for institutional 
GHYHORSPHQWE\PHDVXULQJLI$WKHJRYHUQPHQWDQG&%5¶VFULVLVPDQDJHPHQWUHVSRQVHVZHUH
appropriate and addressed the causes of the crisis; B) the government and CBR were able to 
implement crisis containment and resolution measures effectively and efficiently, and C) if the 
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reforms strengthened institutions by changing the behaviours and expectations of economic 
actors. Each of the three hypotheses is measured against the null hypothesis, which states that 
economic crises do not affect institutional development in Russia.  
 
Hypothesis I: The government and Central Bank of Russia will undertake the appropriate 
policy responses to resolve the crisis at hand. 
The government and CBR failed to implement the appropriate policy responses to resolve the 
2008 economic crisis. Rather than measures that may have resulted in crisis modernisation, the 
steps taken to mitigate the crisis only reinforced the partially reformed nature of the banking 
industry. At first glance, it appears that the CBR indeed enacted the measures necessary to 
prevent the banking sector from collapsing: it provided liquidity assistance, eased fiscal 
regulations, and worked with the government to buy struggling or failing banks. However, the 
World Bank noted that in order for Russia to productively exit the crisis, it would need to 
increase economic diversification, reduce dependence on foreign loans, improve transparency, 
and become more profit driven.137 Indeed, by 2009, the government announced it would focus 
on seven priorities to expedite exiting the crisis: protect the vulnerable, stimulate demand, 
diversify the economy, ease the business environment, strengthen the financial sector, and 
maintain sound macroeconomic policies.138 However, few of the measures implemented 
addressed these issues.  
 The crisis containment reforms focused heavily on liquidity assistance, spending over 
$100 billion. Bailouts and other forms of financial assistance, including regulatory forbearance, 
are indispensable tools to help banks avoid bankruptcy during a crisis. Superficially, it appears 
WKDWWKH&%5¶VDSSURDFKZDVVXFFHVVIXODVQREDQNVKDGIDOOHQEHORZWKHSercent capital 
reserve requirement by March 2009.139 However, several studies demonstrate that when 
institutions are weak and cannot attach conditions to liquidity, or when liquidity is handed out 
too easily, it creates a moral hazard problem and banks are less likely to restructure.140 This is 
ZKDW RFFXUUHG LQ WKH 5XVVLDQ EDQNLQJ LQGXVWU\ EHFDXVH RI WKH &%5¶V OLTXLGLW\ DVVLVWDQFH
programme: there was no incentive for banks to become more profitable or risk averse. The 
roll-over risk for banks remained high well into 2009 because debt was not restructured, and 
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the macroeconomic fundamentals of the industry were weak.141 Additionally, banks showed 
no signs of increasing risk aversion or profit maximisation, nor did they improve 
transparency.142 Thus, while the CBR had the liquidity to help the banks, it failed to use it in a 
way that created hard budget constraints. The level of crisis resolution is therefore limited, and 
so too is the institutional development that can take place. 
 As Laeven and Valencia demonstrate, poorly implemented crisis containment policies 
will undermine the implementation of constructive crisis resolution reforms.143 As such, the 
failure of the CBR and the government to undertake appropriate crisis resolution measures is 
where the first hypothesis is proven false. While Putin was right that Russia did not cause the 
2008 economic crisis, the crisis greatly affected the banking industry because of endogenous 
institutional weaknesses. For example, Dudin et al list three main steps the CBR should have 
taken to mitigate creating future financial bubbles: requiring and enforcing adequate reserve 
requirements, limiting lending, and taxing consumer credit.144 Successful and appropriate crisis 
resolution measures would have addressed these issues, but they do not. Even where it appears 
the government is taking the right steps, it fails to result in meaningful change.  
 The government owned asset management programme indeed saw the government buy 
failing and insolvent banks to prevent them from exacerbating the crisis, but it also allowed the 
government to increase its control over the banking sector. As demonstrated above, by 2009, 
the state had increased its share of banking assets to 55 percent. While this may have prevented 
insolvency, little to nothing was done to make banks more efficient or profitable. This creates 
a barrier to institutional development and crisis modernisation by maintaining soft budget 
constraints. Hard budget constraints force banks to invest wisely in innovative practices and 
technology that will increase efficiency and maximise profits, Yet, the state itself has not done 
this in the past, and is unlikely to do so in the future.145 Rather, the CBR hopes to attract foreign 
investment to do it for them.146 <HWEHWZHHQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLFies that restrict and alienate 
IRUHLJQ LQYHVWPHQW DQG LQYHVWRUV¶ scepticism of state control, this is unlikely to happen.147 
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Thus, government did not use government asset management as a means of crisis resolution, 
but as a way of protecting a bloated banking industry.   
Bank restructuring also failed to initiate proper crisis resolution as very little of the banking 
sector was restructured, nor was the debt it held. For Russia, the 2008 crisis was largely a 
private debt crisis, rather than sovereign debt crisis.148 As such, bank restructuring measures 
should have both encouraged and helped banks tackle their debt, as well as develop regulations 
to mitigate this risk in the future. Yet, the sector¶s non-performing loans increased over the 
course of 2009, and were projected to hit 10 percent by the end of the year.149 While banks 
repaid $40 billion of debt in the first part of 2009, this slowed in 2010 and banks were again 
borrowing short-term loans.150 Additionally, in late 2009 and into 2010, economists remained 
LQVLVWHQWWKDWWKHPRVWSUHVVLQJSUREOHPLQ5XVVLD¶VEDQNLQJLQGXVWU\ZDVWKHQHHGWRLPSURYH
capital adequacy regulations and enforce liquidity requirements.151 As such, the CBR failed to 
undertake a bank restructuring programme that would minimise the risks banks posed to the 
economy and strengthen its role as a regulator. 
Furthermore, the CBR did not privatise any of the assets it acquired at the outset of the 
crisis, nor did it privatise its controlling shares RIWKHFRXQWU\¶VODUJHVWEDQNVVXFKDV6EHUEDQN
In failing do this, the government and CBR have ensured that the banking industry will remain 
unproductive. This is supported by La Porta et al, who demonstrate that every 10 percent 
increase in government control correlates to a .1 to .2 percent decline in productivity.152  In 
IDFW5XVVLD¶VHFRQRPLFJURZWKKDVQRWUHWXUQHGWRLWVSUH-2008 levels: before the crisis, the 
economy had the potential to grow six percent per year, but has only averaged 2.5 percent 
growth since. 153 Thus, maintaining control of the banking sector by the state did not help the 
economy recover in the aftermath of the crisis, and created no opportunities for crisis 
modernisation.  
The only appropriate crisis resolution measure with the potential to result in crisis 
modernisation was the merging of the FFMS and CBR to improve regulation of the banking 
                                                 
148
 Bogetic, "Russian Economic Report No. 18," 2009. 8. 
149
 Bogetic, "Russian Economic Report No. 19," 2009. 8.; The International Monetary Fund. "Bank 
Nonperforming Loans to Total Gross Loans,"  Washington DC. 2016.   
150
 Ulatov and Bogetic, 2010. 9. 
151
 OECD, "Making the Banking Sector More Efficient and Resilient," 2009. 120 ± 121.; Bogetic, 
"Russian Economic Report No. 20," 2009. 11. 
152
 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, "Government Ownership of 
Banks," The Jounral of Finance 57, 1. (2002): 265 - 301. 288. 
153
 Aleksashenko, 2012. 33 ± 34.; Anders Åslund, "Sergey Glazyev and the Revival of Soviet 
Economics," Post-Soviet Affairs 29, 5. (2014): 375-86. 378.  
  178 
sector. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the sector has been too large to be effectively 
regulated because it has too many small banks that did not engage in legal banking practices. 
Consolidating supervision responsibilities was one of the keys to strengthening the CBR as a 
regulator and, by extension banking industry practices.154 This would help consolidate the 
banking sector by closing many of the small, unprofitable banks. There is some evidence that 
this has happened, albeit slowly and with little transparency. Importantly, this reform has not 
been able to address other regulatory weaknesses in the banking sector, such as the large 
discretion banks have over lending, the ratio of lending to investing, and the ability of the CBR 
WRYHULI\DQGDVVHVVEDQNV¶DVVHWV155 Additionally, there is evidence that the CBRs use of its 
new powers has been inconsistent, which raises dRXEWV DERXW WKHPHUJHU¶V DELOLW\ WR GULYH
institutional development. As such, while a promising step, there is not enough evidence that 
this reform will result in crisis modernisation, especially as it took place so long after Russia 
exited the crisis.  
The general response to the 2008 economic crisis was more concerned with preserving state 
control rather than protecting and strengthening the banking sector.156 Crisis containment 
measures were used as a means for the state to protect itself and its social network, instead of 
small to medium sized enterprises (SME) or economic diversification.157 As such, the majority 
of liquidity assistance was doled out to state controlled banks and enterprises that did not need 
the help as much as more vulnerable firms.158 FurtKHUPRUHWKH&%5DQGJRYHUQPHQW¶VRQO\
concern regarding the banking sector was keeping it solvent.159 As a result, the CBR helped 
the government protect the strategic sectors, such as military development, gas and oil, 
agricultural production, and various state projects, rather than focus on institutional 
development and more targeted banking sector reforms.160 While the CBR FFMS merger 
would eventually begin address some of these issues, its efficacy is still to be determined. 
Because neither crisis containment, nor crisis resolution measures addressed the vulnerabilities 
that caused the crisis in the first place, there were very limited opportunities for crisis 
modernisation. Thus, the first hypothesis is false. 
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Hypothesis II: The Central Bank of Russia is strong enough to implement crisis resolution 
measures effectively and efficiently. Reforms also seek to improve institutional efficiency. 
The CBR was unable to implement constructive crisis resolution measures that would have 
resulted in crisis modernisation. Until the merger between the CBR and the FFMS in 2013, no 
UHIRUPVKDGGLUHFWO\WDUJHWHGLQFUHDVLQJWKHIRUPHU¶VDELOLW\WRUHJXODWHWKHPDUNHW2QHUHDVRQ
for this is that the government felt that the crisis was not caused by the banks, even though the 
it was problems with the banking sector that exacerbated the crisis. Yet, this is compounded 
the inability of the CBR and government to implement resolution measures. Where institutions 
are too weak to implement crisis resolution, they rely heavily on crisis containment measures 
as these do not require the construction of new, or development of existing institutions to be 
effective.161 In fact, in the approach to the 2008 crisis, this weakness is most clearly seen in the 
overreliance on liquidity assistance, the increase in state control over banks, and the subsequent 
failure of the state to restructure the sector or increase economic efficiency. 
  Government owned asset management allowed the government to react quickly to 
ensure the banks received liquidity.162 The CBR used state controlled banks to quickly merge 
with or buyout struggling and insolvent banks, but also banks the state felt were strategically 
important regardless of their financial situation. Yet, the allocation of the liquidity itself was 
economically inefficient, which meant that the funding did not reach the places it was most 
QHHGHG$VDUHVXOW WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VXVHRIWKH&%5WR LQFUHDVH LWVGLUHFWFRQWURORYHUWKH
banking sector did not result in more stability, either for banks or the wider economy. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated above, the more the government increased its control over the 
banking sector, the less productive and efficient it became. While economic growth began to 
slowly resume in 2010, this growth was attributable to the increase in gas and oil prices, not 
increased demand or profit maximisation.163 Thus, although the government owned asset 
management programme was executed quickly, it was not efficient or effective as it did not 
seek to undertake institutional development that would foster the growth of a market economy. 
 The CBR did not undertake bank restructuring efficiently or effectively, because it 
enforced very little bank restructuring at all. The goal of crisis management was to keep banks 
solvent and prevent banks from collapsing. For the CBR to have imposed efficient and effective 
bank restructuring, it would have needed to attach conditions to liquidity assistance packages 
that would have required banks to increase their productivity and maximise profits. In some 
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instances, this means using the liquidity to pay down or restructure debt obligations, or 
restructuring the firm itself. While around a quarter of loans were restructured or paid down, 
the NPL and roll-over risk remained high. Furthermore, the CBR failed to effectively reinforce 
regulatory requirements after Russia began to exit the crisis. Both the lack of bank restructuring 
and the absence of normal requirements maintained systemic vulnerabilities that undermine 
FULVLVUHVROXWLRQ7KXVWKH&%5¶V failure to restructure banks or even properly address the risks 
banking practices posed demonstrates its weakness as a regulator as well as a missed 
opportunity for institutional development.  
There was no privatisation of the banking sector in the aftermath of the 2008 economic 
crisis. The state sold minority shares of VTB and Sberbank in 2011 and 2012 respectively, but 
officially stated that it has no intention of privatising its controlling share. This fails to increase 
institutional efficiency by maintaining the blurred line between the economic actor and banking 
sector regulator, and prevents the development of competition. Consequently, this puts the 
economy at risk as the underdevelopment of the banking sector forces it to rely on external 
lending for investment and growth, rather than generate its own.164  Furthermore, as stated 
above, by failing to privatise, the CBR was responsible for more banks than it could properly 
regulate. As a result, this maintained the partially reformed nature of the social economic 
relationship between the state and the banking sector, undermining prospects for crisis 
modernisation. 
 The merger between the CBR and the Federal Financial Market Service is the only 
crisis resolution measure that had the ability to result in crisis modernisation. However, because 
it took so long to do this, it fails the first part of the hypothesis as it was not undertaken 
efficiently. The reform itself was passed in 2012, three and a half years after crisis management 
measures were undertaken, and the merger was completed in 2013, which is a time difference 
RI IRXU DQG D KDOI \HDUV 7KXV ZKLOH WKH UHIRUP DLPHG WR LPSURYH WKH &%5¶V UHJXODWRU\
efficiency, the time it took for the measure to take place is far outside the two-year assessment 
mark in most studies, as well as the three-year mark specified in the methodology.165 Initially, 
it appears that the merger does lead to institutional development. Yet, there is evidence that 
this optimism may be unfounded, which will be discussed below. Nonetheless, because the 
reform ultimately falls outside the time-period specified, the hypothesis is false. Therefore, the 
CBR FFMS merger cannot be considered an instance of crisis modernisation. 
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The second hypothesis fails on each measure of crisis management. While the CBR and 
government indeed enacted emergency measures quickly, there was little long-term focus on 
strengthening the sector. The ability to implement crisis containment measures is not indicative 
of institutional strength because they do not require strong institutions to be implemented. 
Furthermore, the CBR was unable to undertake measures that aimed to improve institutional 
strength, and sectoral efficiency. If the CBR and government cannot implement long-term 
crisis resolution reforms, then it is unlikely that crisis modernisation has taken place. In fact, 
as Russia exited the 2008 economic crisis, with the state controlling more of the economy than 
it had since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and using it for market purposes, partial reform 
equilibrium was more strongly entrenched than ever. 
 
Hypothesis III: New regulations are fairly and universally enforced, leading to reliance on 
formal rules and organisations to resolve conflicts. 
The third hypothesis is false. It tests whether crisis modernisation occurred, and how it has 
affected institutional development, but there is little evidence to support that this has occurred. 
Had modernisation ensued, the CBR would have improved its ability to consistently enforce 
regulations that mLWLJDWHGEDQNV¶ borrowing risks, consolidated the swollen banking sector, and 
fostered competition among the remaining viable banks. The crisis containment measures that 
were implemented allowed Putin to stabilise the banking sector, but neglected to introduce 
reform measures that would ensure long-term stability.166 Instead, the CBR managed the 2008 
crisis by undermining market economy principles and increasing the power of the social 
economy as the state gained control over most of the banking sector. As a result, banks failed 
to evolve as financial intermediaries. Rather, they became a tool of the state. Additionally, none 
of the crisis resolution measures addressed the problems within the industry that made Russia 
so vulnerable to the crisis. Furthermore, while the consolidation of regulatory powers into the 
&%5ZDVDSURPLVLQJVWHSWKHODWWHU¶VXVHRILWVQHZSRZHUVUDLVHVFRQFHUQVDERXWIDLUDQG
predictable regulation enforcement. Therefore, crisis modernisation did not occur after the 
2008 crisis, and it is argued that the crisis management measures that were implemented only 
reinforced the social economy and partial reform equilibrium. 
 Because of the 2008 economic crisis, the government increased its control over the 
banking sector, which undermined the development of market institutions. While the state has 
privatised some of its stakes in a few banks, this does not mean the state has relinquished 
                                                 
166
 Robinson, "Russian Patrimonial Capitalism and the International Financial Crisis," 2011.  
  182 
control. The government has maintained indirect control through appointing low-level 
ministers or other members of the sistema to indirectly control or influence a bank. As a result, 
the state does not need to own the controlling share of a bank to have control over a bank.167 
In fact, banks have become a tool used by the state in raiding cases.168 Åslund explains, Putin 
has EHHQ XVLQJ KLV VRFLDO QHWZRUN WR UDLG DQG LQFUHDVH WKH VWDWH¶V VKDUH RI FRUSRUDWLRQV LQ
strategic sectors.169 As a result, since the crisis, the main source of corruption and threat to 
private property rights has stemmed from the state rather than gangsters.170 Thus, the 
JRYHUQPHQWDQG&%5¶VLQFUHDVHGLQYROvement in the banking sector resulted in failed reforms, 
or reforms that were contrary to or undermined the establishment of market institutions, or 
were incompatible with good governance.171 
  Consequently, instead of turning to institutions and formal rules to resolve conflicts, 
trust in said institutions has been eroded and they have become weaker as a result. On the one 
hand, people have more trust in the state to run banks and the economy than private entities.172 
Yet, the general trust in banks and the market is so low that this means very little.  As such, it 
is unfair to consider whether Russians trust the state over private economic actors when 
genuinely private enterprise and market competition has been unable to develop and 
individuals have so little interaction with it. For example, the extent to which interaction with 
banking services has increased since 2008 is debatable. There has been an increase in bank use 
as more employees are paid with plastic bank cards rather than cash or cheques, but the number 
of people who engage with banks for long-term financial services varies. The Financial 
Inclusion Project claims that 46 percent of individuals use banks to receive their salary, 
whereas only 18 percent have a deposit account.173 +RZHYHU 7KH :RUOG %DQN¶V *OREDO
Financial Development Indicators suggest that as few as 30 percent use banks to receive wages, 
and as much as 48 percent of the population has an account at a formal financial institution.174 
Finally, there were 37 bank branches per 100,000 adults in Russia in 2011, which is higher 
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than most developed countries.175 Although this may be an indication of the scope of the 
banking sector, the fact that only half the population interacts with banks demonstrates its lack 
of depth. Finally, there is little evidence that individuals trust the banking sector more after the 
crisis than they did before it.  
 Additionally, FDI has decreased since the crisis, with many investors stating that 
regulation is too inconsistent and the increasing reach of the state makes them nervous.176 In 
2010, Kearney reported that Russia fell from ninth to 18th place in its FDI confidence index.177 
Although this improved in 2012 as Russia prepared to join the World Trade Organisation, 
rebounding to 12th place with more respondents saying they expect the regulatory environment 
to improve.178 However, by demonstrating that access to finance is directly correlated to levels 
of investment, Connolly argues that while state control is a disincentive for both domestic and 
foreign investors to undertake long-term investment in Russia, poor financial mediation 
surpasses it.179 This is a problem because most developing economies are encouraged to invest 
up to 25 ± 35 percent of their GDP in order to compete with more developed economies, but 
the government only contributes a third of this amount, and FDI normally contributes 10 ± 15 
percent.180 Domestic investors cannot really contribute to this, however, because business 
lending or micro-lending is not sufficiently developed. While the government and CBR have 
GLVFXVVHGLQFUHDVLQJDFFHVVWRFUHGLWIRU60(¶V, firms consistently rank access to credit as one 
of the largest barriers to investment with over half of respondents in the Financial Inclusion 
Project stating that getting a business loan was difficult if not impossible.181 Admittedly, 61 
percent of firms said access to credit in 2011 was a problem, compared with in 75 percent 2008, 
so there has been some improvement.182 Nonetheless, barriers to credit remain high, which 
undermines economic investment and diversification.  
  The consolidation of regulatory responsibilities into the CBR is a promising step in 
addressing many of these issues, but it has not yet resulted in increased predictability or a 
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change in expectations. Although the merger took place too long after the crisis to be 
considered crisis modernisation, it is important to analyse its initial implementation to 
determine if concerns borne out of the crisis are addressed. On the one hand, the CBR has 
succeeded in accelerating the consolidation of the banking sector. However, IMF observers 
have noted that the there is no transparency regarding the decisions to revoke banking licenses, 
and there is no external supervision to ensure that these decisions are fair.183 Thus, if the 
revocation of banking licenses has been inconsistent, as discussed above, and there is no 
transparency to how these decisions are reached, then it is unlikely that the CBR has developed 
into an organisation that can reliably resolve or mediate conflicts fairly.  
 Furthermore, the inconsistent enforcement of regulations leaves the economy 
vulnerable to more economic crises. One of the key issues that needed to be addressed through 
crisis resolution was mitigating banks external borrowing, or ensuring banks are not borrowing 
more than they can repay. If banks know that they have a soft budget constraint, they will 
continue to borrow more than they can repay, thus perpetually maintaining a financial 
bubble.184 As demonstrated by Fungacova and Poghosyan, state controlled banks, which make 
up over half the banking sector, do not take credit risks into account when considering profit 
and efficiency maximisation.185 Given that the government or CBR controls most of the 
banking sector, this raises serious concerns about its ability to properly regulate the banks. 
While the IMF has found no concrete evidence of favouritism or leniency, it also admits that 
the lack of transparency makes this difficult to ascertain.186 Because that the merger between 
the CBR and FFMS has not helped implement hard budget constraints, risks remain and 
command economy practices remain in place.  
Because the merger takes place too long after the 2008 crisis, it fails to support the third 
hypothesis that it resulted in crisis modernisation by improving regulatory expectations and 
predictability. Additionally, it provides no solid evidence to support the hypothesis on its own, 
independent of the implementation efficiency hypothesis.  However, the CBR only existed in 
this new capacity for a little more than a year before the next crisis struck in late 2014. As such, 
it is fair to reserve judgement until more time has passed and trends can be established. A more 
detailed discussion will be included in the following chapter, which briefly discusses the 2014 
crisis. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
The Central Bank of Russia and government failed to undertake the appropriate crisis 
containment or crisis resolution measures in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis. As a result, 
crisis modernisation did not take place. In fact, because of the excessive liquidity assistance 
and increased state control, the economy struggled to grow as it exited the crisis, averaging 3.5 
percent per year. This is further reflected in the deteriorating post-crisis business and banking 
environment. The Ease of Doing Business Survey ranked Russia 118th in 2009, 166th in 2010, 
124th in 2011, and 120th in 2012.187 Furthermore, the difficulty in obtaining credit ranking 
remained low during this period, at 109th in 2009, 87th in 2010, 89th in 2011, and 97th in 2012, 
and the strength of legal rights pertaining to credit remained three out of ten.188 Though there 
is some variation among the rankings, there is a steady decline from the time Russia exits the 
crisis in 2010, indicating that no serious attempt to reform the business environment or 
strengthen institutions takes place.  
Thus, Russia suffered more from the effects from the 2008 economic crisis because the 
government did little to address the fundamental problems within the banking sector. The 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\ZDVWRµSD\IRUWKHFULVLV¶RULQMHFWDVPXFKOLTXLGLW\Qeeded to stabilise 
the economy, rather than initiate or undertake the reforms necessary to ensure the next crisis 
would not be as bad. These measures targeted banks and enterprises, and very little was spent 
on stimulating demand or protecting the population. Given the cost of these measures, it would 
have been better to invest in building new infrastructure, which the state badly needs, rather 
than softening budget constraints, which undermine market economic principles. As a result, 
Russia found itself in a position where it could not compete with either developing or developed 
economies.189 Although oil prices recovered, they did not return to a pre-2008 level. As such, 
the economy continued to experience low levels of growth until the next crisis hit a few years 
later when sanctions were imposed after Russia annexed Crimea. 
The 2008 global financial crisis challenged Russia in a very different way from the 
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1998 crisis. Yet, in both instances the CBR and the government failed to undertake proper 
crisis resolution reforms, which reinforced the partially reformed nature of the banking sector. 
The increase in state control over the industry reinforced the command economy institutions 
that necessitate the use of the social economy. The need for social connections to navigate 
HFRQRPLF WUDQVDFWLRQV LV UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH GHWHULRUDWLRQ RI 7KH :RUOG %DQN¶V 5XOH RI /DZ
Governance Indicator for Russia. It was at a low at -.95 on a scale of 2 to - 2 in 2008, it 
improved to -.77 during the crisis, but then worsened as the economy exited the crisis, declining 
to -.84.190 This demonstrates that the crisis management measures that were undertaken during 
the crisis indeed helped stabilise the economy temporarily, but ultimately failed to strengthen 
institutions or initiate economic development.  
Russia had ten years to recover and profit from oil wealth between the 1998 and 2008 
economic crises, but the government and CBR ignored fundamental institutional weaknesses. 
One of the patterns that emerges from the two crises is that, contrary to crisis modernisation, 
the most promising institutional reforms occur after the economy has exited the crisis, not as a 
resolution measure. The tax reforms were implemented three years after the 1998 crisis, and 
the consolidation of regulatory power in the CBR occurred nearly five years after the onset of 
the 2008 crisis. Although both reforms are imperfect, they are attempts to address issues that 
exacerbated the crises in the first instance, which must be commended. However, before a 
pattern of potential institutional development can be established, this must be compared to the 
crisis that occurred in 2014. As this crisis is too recent to justify an entire case study, it is briefly 
analysed in the following chapter before determining whether Russia defies crisis 
modernisation. 
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CHAPTER 7  
3/86d$&+$1*(« 
 
There are three kinds of reforms implemented during a crisis that make crisis modernisation 
more likely: numerical rules, procedural rules, and transparency rules.1 Crisis modernization 
did not occur as a result of the 1998 and 2008 economic crises as one or more of these reforms 
was lacking. During both crises, there are instances when promising reforms that signal 
GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH &HQWUDO %DQN RI 5XVVLD¶V &%5 UROH DQG SRZHUV DUH GUDIWHG DQG
implemented. Yet, the enforcement of these measures is often inconsistent, do not fully address 
the problem, and / or are subsequently undermined by the government. For example, the CBR 
))06PHUJHULQFUHDVHGWKHIRUPHU¶VDELOLW\WRFRQVROLGDWHWKHEDQNLQJVHFWRU+RZHYHUWKH
actual process of revoking banking licenses, forcing mergers, and closing banks lacks 
transparency or predictability, making it difficult for banks to understand which rules and 
regulations they must follow.2 As such, the CBR has remained an unpredictable and under-
developed agency. This fails to generate new expectations and behaviours, which prevents 
market institutions from being established and reinforces the need for social networks to 
mediate economic transactions. This chapter will first illustrate how the Russian economic 
1998 and 2008 crises fail to result in institutional development, and how this reaffirms the 
partially reformed economy rather than shifting toward a market. The tax reforms of 1998 will 
be discussed, followed by an analysis of the CBR / FFMS merger of 2008. Second, the 2014 
crisis will be examined for any evidence of potential crisis modernisation. To conclude, the 
chapter will evaluate what the implications of the case studies for institutional development 
and partial reform equilibrium.  
 
7.1 Summary of case study findings 
The 1998 and 2008 economic crises illustrate how RXVVLD¶V HFRQRPLF LQVWLWXWLRQV UHPDLQ
partially reformed, and that no transformation recession has taken place. Each of the crises 
appeared to have elements of crisis modernisation, because the reforms that were implemented 
addressed institutional weaknesses as the economy exited the crisis. However, the 
inconsistency with which these reforms were implemented, as well as the failure to undertake 
supporting crisis resolution measures result in weak incentives to change economic behaviour. 
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The two sections below will analyse the tax reforms to emerge from the 1998 crisis and the 
banking regulation reforms of the 2008 crisis respectively.  These reforms do not improve the 
long-term prospects of economic agents, and forces them to focus on the short-term. 
Furthermore, the measures do not encourage the use of institutions to mediate conflict or 
economic transactions, thereby strengthening the social economy.  
 
The 1998 economic crisis and tax reform 
Many scholars see the 1998 economic crisis as a major transitional crisis for the Russian 
economy ² if the transition to the market was incomplete before, then the crisis forced them 
to complete it.3 7KH HYLGHQFH IRU WKLV ODUJHO\ FHQWUHV RQ WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V LPSURYHG ILVFDO
position as it reduced spending and improved tax collection. While the government did cut 
spending, this was due to a lack of liquidity rather than more disciplined spending; and the two 
percent budget surplus in 2000 was due to an increase in oil prices, not austerity measures.4 
Tax collection improved significantly, partly because the 2001 tax reform simplified the 
procedure for paying, but also because profits and incomes increase as the economy grew.5 
However, while the 1998 economic crisis was a triple crisis (currency, sovereign debt, and 
banking), it was ultimately a banking crisis. Poor bank regulation, as well as the use of the 
banks to increase government revenue, allowed the government to maintain soft budget 




and positively correlated to the increase both in gas and oil prices, as well as production.6 As 
GLVFXVVHGLQFKDSWHUWKUHH3XWLQ¶V economic plan for Russia was the renationalisation of what 
KHWHUPHGWKHµ1DWLRQDO&KDPSLRQV¶5XVVLD¶VPRVWOXFUDWLYH industries ² mostly hydrocarbon 
based enterprises. To this end, the tax reforms of the early 2000s increased the taxes paid by 
the hydrocarbon industry, thereby forcing those firms that remained private to contribute to the 
revenue stream.7 Thus, it is in the pursuit to capture as much oil and gas wealth as possible that 
                                                 
3
 Åslund, "Why Market Reform Suceeded and Democracy Failed in Russia," 2009.; Åslund, 2001.; 
Ericson, 2009.; Tompson, "Financial Backwardness in Contemporary Perspective: Prospects for the 
Development of Financial Intermediation in Russia," 2000.; Hanson, 1999.. For more, see chapter two. 
4
 Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2001. 510.  
5
 Appel, 2004. 303. 
6
 Ahrend and Tompson, 2005. 7. 
7
 Ibid. 12. 
  189 
the state used tax reforms to renationalise many gas and oil companies.8  Putin used these gas 
and oil windfalls to establish the Stability Fund and the National Wealth Fund, and to repay 
the loans given to Russia by the IMF, World Bank, and other international agencies. It is 
important to understand that the increase in gas and oil prices and tax reform both contributed 
to post-1998 economic growth, but not because either strengthened institutions or encouraged 
market development. Income tax collection alone cannot account for to the improvements to 
WKHVWDWH¶VEXGJHWEXWLWGLGFRQWULEXWH 
Furthermore, the increase in tax collection is due to implementation of a flat tax, which 
lowered the number of taxes people were supposed to pay, and streamlined the process. In 
many ways, the tax reforms that spanned the first few years of the 2000s would be part of a 
shift toward economic and political stability in Russia that signalled a transition away from the 
chaotic Yeltsin era to the more predictable Putin presidencies. However, while the tax reforms 
did lead to some tangible change, the tax collecting institutions themselves were not developed 
or strengthened. This is primarily evidenced by the fact that tax evasion is still a large problem. 
Enterprises often collude with their employees to avoid paying taxes by underreporting wages 
in favour of cash payment.9 Furthermore, the worst offender regarding tax evasion is the state.10  
Additionally, the CBR¶Vmaintains its role in the tax collection process, so that the state can 
use it as a means for project financing.11 Finally, much of the evidence that is used to prove 
institutional change (increased revenue, etc.) is spurious when controlled for gas and oil 
revenues. As the gas and oil industry was renationalised, there was little resistance as the state 
increased its share of revenues from gas and oil windfalls.12 Thus, without sustained, high 
energy prices, the revenue the state earns from tax collection alone would not cover its 
expenditures.  
Furthermore, the tax reforms largely focused on individual income taxes, but not so 
much on corporate taxes. This left many large loopholes in the tax code for enterprises to 
exploit. The flipside, though, is that these loopholes also created more opportunities for the 
state to prosecute corporations for tax code violations. While on the surface this might seem 
like progress, it is not. Because the corporate tax code was not simplified, all corporations are 
violating it somehow. Some do it on purpose to illegally maximize profits or seek large rents; 
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others do it unknowingly or in small ways because the law itself is contradictory: in order to 
follow the law, you also have to break it.13 However, the state does not accuse the maximum 
number of corporations in order to create a precedent for new set of behaviours, it arbitrarily 
prosecutes them. These cases are often undertaken as a means for the state to liquidate or 
takeover a corporation itself. 
,WZRXOGEHIDOVHWRVD\WKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQFUHDVHGUHYHQXHVWUHDPGLGnot benefit 
from these measures, or that they had no positive effect at all. The tax reform made it easier 
for individuals to pay taxes and it relieved banks, and the Central Bank of Russia, of a large 
burden. This not only streamlined the collection of taxes, but went a long way in restoring trust 
in the banks. It can be inferred that if consumers mistrusted the banks before the crisis for fear 
of the banks garnishing their wages to pay tax arrears, then taking this responsibility from the 
banks also removes the source of mistrust. In 1994, only eight percent of individuals kept 
money in any kind of bank account; by 2014 that number increased to 48 percent.14 On the one 
hand this signifies that banks are being used to intermediate financial transactions. However, 
up to 30 percent of this number have an account for no other reason than to receive wages as 
more firms pay employees with plastic cards instead of paycheques.15  
 As such, the tax reform only addresses one of the issues that contributed to the 1998 
crisis. While the CBR¶V role in tax collection was restricted by the reform, it did not address 
the cause of the crisis. For institutional development to take place, crisis resolution reforms 
needed to concentrate on the banking sector, particularly bank restructuring. Thus, the tax 
reform did not result in crisis modernisation as it did not encourage banks to recapitalise, 
restructure, or improve their ability to meet their loan obligations. In fact, no structural change 
was attempted after the 1998 crisis.16 Even procedural reforms that took place long after the 
economy exited the crisis, such as the adoption of deposit insurance and the improvement of 
bankruptcy laws, did not actually develop and strengthen WKH&%5¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOIRXQGDWLRQV.17 
Additionally, the CBR used these measures to favour large banks with connections and increase 
its control over the sector by providing state banks with the liquidity to purchase failing banks, 
but not liquidate them. 
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Many of the reforms listed above were ultimately undermined by the Central Bank and 
the government for two reasons: they were implemented inconsistently, and they were used as 
strategic tools by the state. For example, many enterprises and firms, including banks, had their 
tax arrears forgiven in exchange for nationalisation.18 Where firms were uncooperative, the 
state became aggressive and used the new reforms as a tool to take what it needed. This is 
exemplified by the Khodorkovsky Case, as well as the cases of Bank of Moscow, Master Bank, 
and Globex. Thus, although the government addressed some institutional vulnerabilities, it 
undermined the strengthening of rule of law by violating them in spirit, if not by the letter. The 
reforms were merely parchment institutions, as the mechanism that was created to enforce the 
law, the creation of tax police, was perverted by the state. As a result, patterns of predictability 
and trust were not established. This, therefore, did not lead to the establishment of new 
institutions, but reinforced old command practices.  
 
The 2008 economic crisis and bank regulation reforms 
 7KHEDQNLQJUHIRUPVWKDWHPHUJHGIURPWKHFULVLVFRQFHUQHGLQFUHDVLQJWKH&%5¶V
regulatory powers, and consolidating the banking industry. However, while these reforms have 
produced some change, it was not progress toward a market economy. In fact, the consolidation 
of the industry involved the government and CBR merging banks with state controlled banks. 
These measures are more command in nature, and thus undermine any attempt to establish 
market institutions. Indeed, some positive change has arisen as banks have been closed and 
reserve requirements are more likely to be met. For example, the CBR only closed 32 banks in 
2013, but this more than doubled the following year.19 Yet, like tax reforms, these have not 
been consistently implemented long enough for meaningful institutional practice to emerge. 
This is important because the role and function of banks are vital to a market economy.  
 The merger of the CBR with the FFMS changed the composition and structure of 
banking regulation in Russia by increasing the power and responsibility of the former, and 
dissolving the latter along with other regulatory agencies. However, since the measurement of 
institutional change relies primarily on the behaviour of economic actors and not the 
composition of the regulator itself, this cannot signal more than the intention to change. In fact, 
when we actually examine the effectiveness CBR in this capacity, the evidence for institutional 
development is weak. As demonstrated in the case study, while the CBR has been able to 
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revoke more licenses since 2013 than the during the 2008 economic crisis, there has been little 
predictability in when and why the CBR revokes licenses, thereby failing to generate new 
expectations. For example, MasterBank was foreclosed in 2013 while Sberbank, Bank Rossiya, 
Otkritie Bank, and others that could be accused of the same violations remained operational.20 
Furthermore, the merger has not completely streamlined the process for closing banks. In order 
IRU WKH&%5WR UHYRNHDEDQN¶V OLFHQVH LWPXVWJHWSHUPLVVLRQIURPWKH'HSRVLW ,QVXUDQFH
Agency (DIA), which is located within the Ministry of Finance.21 While neither the DIA nor 
WKH0LQLVWU\RI)LQDQFHFDQSUHYHQWWKH&%5IURPUHYRNLQJDEDQN¶s license, its authority is 
required because it finances the liquidation and dissolution of a bank. This undermines the 
&%5¶VDXWKRULW\DQGGHFUHDVHVWKHHIILFLHQF\ZLWKZKLFKLWFDQFRQVROLGDWHWKHVHFWRU7KXVLI
the intention behind the reforms is to improve efficiency and reduce the number of shell banks, 
then this cannot be considered a success.  
 The enforcement of reserve requirements and other accounting standards has also 
proved to be ineffective. On the one hand, the OECD noted that no banks fell below the 10 
percent capital reserve requirement in 2009, indicating that the sector was solvent.22 However, 
it is worth noting that this is after the CBR allowed banks to average their reserves to meet this 
requirement. Furthermore, this is also before thH&%5¶VSRZHUV LQFUHDVHGDQG LQ WKH
IMF observed WKDWWKH&%5VWUXJJOHGWRYHULI\WKHTXDOLW\RIEDQNV¶DVVHWVDQGOLDELOLWLHV23 As 
such, if the CBR was having trouble verifying the quality of banks assets and liabilities in 2016 
after its mandate was increased, then it is likely it was also unable to do so during the 2008 
economic crisis. The result is that it is difficult to assess the level of risk that banks undertake 
ZKHQWKH\ERUURZRUOHQG7KLVLQFUHDVHVEDQNV¶UROO-over and default risk, and also increases 
the ease with which banking crises can be triggered.   
Exacerbating these risks is the increased level of state control. Vernikov illustrates that 
the number of banks directly and indirectly controlled by the state increased from 35 in 2000 
to 47 in 2009.24 While this number declined to 38 by 2011, the state still controlled 55.8 percent 
of banking sector assets in 2012.25 This indicates that, rather than privatise, the state officially 
merged some of the private banks it acquired through crisis containment with state controlled 
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banks such as VEB. However, state control often means soft budget constraints, which 
increases risk or default as it increases moral hazard. While injecting liquidity into otherwise 
productive banks during a crisis to prevent systemic upheaval is an acceptable form of crisis 
containment, supporting banks that would not survive under market conditions is not. Doing 
so prevents parasitic banks from being liquidated or foreclosed at the expense of a healthier, 
stronger banking sector and economy. 
Furthermore, that these regulations are interpreted in such a way that allows the state 
to increase its control over the banking sector undermines the rule of law. For example, because 
the CBR finds it difficult to assess the assets and liabilities of the largest banks in the sector, it 
is unclear why some banks have their licenses revoked and are liquidated, while others are not. 
The CBR revoked the licenses of Master Bank, Bank of Moscow, and Globex Bank between 
2011 and 2014 for violating reserve requirements and engaging in various illegal activities.26 
Conversely, there are numerous banks that blatantly flout regulations and avoid foreclosure, 
notably Sberbank and Bank Rossiya. For example, Sberbank was fined ༦50,000 for violating 
anti-money laundering laws in 2012, and Bank Rossiya openly undertook illegal transactions 
long before the Panama Papers were released; neither of these banks have had their licenses 
revoked.27  
If some banks are prosecuted for violations while others are not, then it is difficult to 
establish any expectations based on the predicted actions of the CBR. Furthermore, this 
reinforces the reliance of social networks and sistema to avoid liquidation instead of following 
the law. This creates two problems for the development of the banking sector. First, there is 
little assurance that long-term investments, of both domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, will 
not be confiscated. Second, it undermines consumer confidence in banks, making it less likely 
they will be used to mediate economic transactions and more likely that individuals will use 
cash or their blat. Therefore, as the CBR remains an underdeveloped institution and a weak 
industry regulatory, it incentivises command economy practices and the social economy at the 
expense of a market.  
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7.2 The 2014 sanctions induced crisis  
The 2014 economic crisis that struck Russia is classified as a currency crisis. The ruble lost 46 
percent of its value in less than a year, including an 11 percent devaluation in a single day, and 
inflation rose to 11.4 percent.28 However, it is different from the previous crises because 
economic growth began slowing before the crisis hit, indicating that it was an endogenous 
systemic problem that caused the downturn, not an exogenous shock. The source of economic 
malaise began in 2012, when the economy began reaching its productive capacity, meaning 
that without new inputs, future growth would be limited. This downturn turned into a currency 
crisis a few months after the West levied sanctions on Russia in response to the annexation of 
Crimea in March 2014. Like the crises before it, systemic vulnerabilities exacerbated its 
effects. As such, because the root of the crisis was institutional weaknesses within the economy 
itself, the 2014 crisis appears to force the state to address the partially reformed nature of the 
economy. Because the economy was headed for trouble both before oil prices fell and sanctions 
ZHUH LPSRVHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDSSURDFKWRFULVLVPDQDJHPHQWZDVGLIIHUHQW:KLOHFULVLV
containment reforms still aimed to recapitalise and stabilise the economy through 
renationalisation, there is undeniably more of a focus on crisis resolution at an ideal time to 
result in crisis modernisation. However, even before the crisis is resolved there is evidence that 
the state is again using crisis resolution reforms to increase its control over the economy, rather 
than complete its transition to a market.  
For example, given the scarcity of domestic financing and investment, the banking 
sector was on the verge of collapse. So in addition to the currency crash, the crisis exposed the 
ZHDNQHVVRIWKH&%5¶VUHJXODWRU\FDSDFLW\,QIDFWWKH,0)UHSRUWHGLQWKDWRQHRIWKH
&%5¶VJODULQJREVWDFOHV WRHIILFLHQF\ZDV WKDW LWVPDQGDWH WRPDQDJHPRQHWDU\SROLF\DQG
police the banking sector is too broad.29 This is illustrated by the deterioration of the banking 
sector in the years before the imposition of sanctions, and its misguided attempts to prevent 
the ruble from collapsing.30 As a result, several resolution measures are passed to help the CBR 
better mitigate these risks. For example, the ODZµ2QWKH6HFXULWLHV0DUNHW¶ was updated to 
better regulate foreign exchange dealers, and focus on improving supervision by adding a third 
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tier to the banking system. It is still too soon to tell whether or not these measures will lead to 
institutional development. However, preliminary analysis suggests that these measures only 
further undermine the transition to a market economy. 
The Russian economy began to recover from the 2008 crisis when oil prices increased 
again in 2010, but it was predicted that this trajectory would be short lived. In 2012, the GDP 
fell to 3.5 percent from 4.5 and 4.2 percent growth in 2010 and 2011 respectively.31 The most 
promising development at that time was that post-crisis economic growth was fuelled more by 
domestic production and consumption than exports.32 However, this growth was not very 
VXVWDLQDEOHGXHWRWKH&%5¶VDSSURDFKWRPRQHWDU\SROLF\ZKLFK heavily relied on increasing 
the interest rate to control for inflation. This only resulted in higher inflation, as it limited the 
amount of credit available for longer-term investments and economic growth.33 In fact, this 
contributed to the economic decline as it restricted the economy from producing at a higher 
capacity, which resulted in a decline in both production and consumption.34 Indeed, by late 
2012, and early 2013, the economy began to slow, output began to fall, and investment became 
even more dependent on public funds as foreign investors fled.35 In fact, in 2013, Russia was 
ranked 112th place out of 185 countries in the Ease of Doing Business ranking.36  
7KHWHUPVRI5XVVLD¶V:72DFFHVVLRQLQUHTXLUHGWKHVWDWHWRSULYDWLVHPRUHRI
the banking sector as a means of improving competition and creating opportunities for 
growth.37 Yet, the lack of economic diversification was beginning to slow the economy down, 
especially the banking sector. By the end of 2012 The CBR acknowledged the slowdown, but 
said it would not use either fiscal or monetary tools to intervene.38 The extent of government 
control prevented new banks and firms from competing with state banks, which also limited 
the amount of credit available, and by extension, new economic innovation and capacity for 
growth. In 2013, the inability of banks to increase their productivity or profitability was 
beginning to show as profits began to fall. Banks had begun to find other more volatile sources 
of profit even before sanctions were imposed 2014. For example, Sberbank began trying to 
compensate for these losses by increasing its lending portfolio despite the CBR urging it to cut 
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back.39  
The banking sector began to feel the effects of sanctions immediately as reserves fell 
below their 2008 level, the retail lending sector experienced a 10 percent decline in new loans, 
and private investment declined from $295 million in 2013 to $35 million in 2014.40 As a result, 
EDQNV¶ORDQWRGHSRVLWUDWLRLQFUHDVHGto 120 percent, and forced many of them to turn to CBR 
for assistance.41 Furthermore, Herman Gref, the head of Sberbank declared that Russia was 
facing a massive liquidity crisis and that 13 percent of the banking sector was operating on 
short-term loans from the CBR, making it difficult to fund long-term projects.42 By late 2014, 
Standard and Poor declared that over half of the banks in Russia had been directly affected by 
WKHFULVLVDVWKHVHFWRUIDFHGWLJKWHUILQDQFHUHVWULFWLRQVFDXVLQJVHYHUDOEDQNV¶PDUNHWYDOXH
to drop and further restricting their access to credit.43 This forced banks to resort to inter-bank 
lending, which is poorly regulated and only increased sectoral risk of collapse.44 Moreover, the 
&%5VWUXJJOHGWRHQVXUHEDQNV¶FDSLWDODGHTXDF\UDWLRVZHUHKLJKHQRXJKWRPLWLJDWHWKHULVN
of loans rolling over, or becoming delinquent.45 Thus, the banking sector posed a significant 
risk to the already struggling economy and in December 2014, Putin warned that the economy 
ZRXOG OLNHO\ IDOO LQWRD UHFHVVLRQ LQDQG WKDW5XVVLDQVVKRXOGSUHSDUH IRU µKDUG WLPHV
DKHDG¶46 
In addition to the risk of a banking sector collapse, the CBR struggled to control a 
rapidly devaluing ruble and currency speculation. The CBR intended to switch to a floating 
exchange rate in April 2015, so it implemented an exchange rate corridor, in which it would 
make QR LQWHUYHQWLRQV DV ORQJ DV WKH UXEOH¶V YDOXH remained WKH ZLWKLQ LW FRUULGRU¶V
boundaries.47 However, currency speculation made maintaining the corridor so costly that the 
CBR floated the ruble unexpectedly in November 2014, nearly six months earlier than planned. 
This allowed the CBR to cut currency interventions by 97 percent in November 2014 alone.48 
The effect was limited, however, and the CBR enacted a sudden increase in the interest rate 
from 10.5 to 17 percent on 15 December 2014 in an attempt to gain control over the run-away 
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ruble, but to no effect.49 The next day, the ruble collapsed falling from ༦58 to $1, to ༦88 to $1, 
constituting the single largest fall in value since 1998.50 As a result, foreign exchange dealers 
halted trading out of fear that the CBR was on the verge of implementing capital controls, 
although this never happened as both the CBR and Ministry of Finance insisted that this was 
never an option.51 2YHU WKHQH[W IHZGD\VPDQ\EODPHG WKH&%5¶V ODFNRI LQWHUYHQWion to 
support the ruble after the surprise interest rate hike for undermining confidence in the currency 
and causing the devaluation.52  
The most significant cause of the economic crisis, however, was not the sanctions, but 
WKH VWDWH¶V FRQWURO RYHU WKH economy. The economy had reached its maximum production 
capacity, or total factor productivity (TFP), meaning that there was no way to increase output 
or production in its current state. Because state control over the economy is very high, it limits 
the scope of both foreign and domestic private investment, which stifles the emergence of more 
efficient economic actors.53 As a result, the number and variety of inputs are considerably 
limited, and output is diminished. Thus, before the sanctions hit, the Russian economy was 
operating as efficiently as possible, but the resulting production was not profitable. This is also 
taking into account the slow improvements to infrastructure that began in 2007.54 As such, the 
amount of domestic capital available for increasing investment was constrained before the 
sanctions were imposed, and this only became more difficult when they were. Even without 
the sanctions Russia would have entered a recession as the economy had reached its maximum 
potential. Thus, the 2014 crisis was the result of the economy reaching its potential in a partially 
reformed state. If real economic growth, not oil fuelled growth, is to resume institutional 
development that would complete the transition to a market economy needs to be undertaken.  
In order for crisis modernisation to emerge from this crisis there must be a focus on 
institutional development, and the state must diversify its assets. A study on diversification and 
economic growth undertaken by the World Bank suggests a strong correlation of diversification 
of assets and increased efficiency, rather than diversification of exports.55 This is why state 
investment in, and control over the economy has not been able to increase TFP, because there 
is no diversification of inputs.56 Thus, institutional strength and privatisation are vital to strong 
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and sustained economic recovery because the state has a finite number of inputs it can 
contribute. In addition to the state allowing and encouraging more private investment, the best 
way to attract this investment is to make law enforcement and policy implementation more 
predictable.57 As such, reforms should aim to improve the fairness, transparency, and efficiency 
of regulation. 
Furthermore, the aforementioned World Bank report lists three roles that the Russian 
government must develop to support economic recovery and growth: fiscal, monetary, and 
exchange rate policies that help manage currency volatility; the ability to efficiently administer 
public services; and the ability to regulate private firms to foster and protect a competitive 
environment. 58  Of these three, the CBR fulfils two roles. Thus, ensuring that crisis resolution 
UHIRUPVDGGUHVVWKH&%5¶VFDSDFLW\WRHIIHFWLYHO\DQGHIILFLHQWO\IXOILOWKHVHUROHVLVQHFHVVDU\
for crisis resolution to take place and the partially reformed nature of its institution to be broken. 
When the ruble crashed, it was vital for the CBR to both stabilise and consolidate the banking 
sector to prevent the currency crisis from inciting a banking crisis as liquidity became scarcer 
and debt obligations mounted. 59 This required a careful mix of liquidity assistance, and asset 
management DQGUHVWUXFWXULQJDVZHOODVPRUHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH&%5¶VUHJXODWRU\Fapacity. 
As such, the CBR enacted a number of measures to recapitalise banks, lower the risks of their 
lending portfolios, and consolidate its own regulatory abilities so that it can more efficiently 
liquidate insolvent banks, and develop a more risk-based rather than rules based approach.60 
The latter is the most important as it is the difference between the CBR being an active versus 
passive regulator. As of 2017, the success of these measures is mixed, with crisis containment 
reforms being more effective. While crisis resolution measures are cautiously optimistic, there 
is plenty of room for doubt. 
The CBR implemented liquidity assistance and regulatory forbearance measures as a 
means of crisis containment. However, while liquidity assistance is still favoured by the CBR, 
it is the regulatory forbearance measures that maintain sector vulnerabilities during the 2014 
crisis. In January 2015, government issued a ༦2.4 trillion plan to stabilise the financial sector 
and other parts of the economy.61 The CBR made ༦100 billion worth of 28 and 365-day repo 
loans available in 2014 and 2015, in addition to various forms of liquidity assistance totalling 
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༦1 trillion.62 Several forms of regulatory forbearance freed up extra liquidity for banks. For 
example, until 2 January 2016, the CBR allowed banks to calculate foreign assets using a fixed 
exchange rate of ༦39, 45 and 55 per USD, in December 2014, 2015, and 2016 respectively, 
varying from the actual exchange rate by 25 to 30 percent on average.63 Additionally, banks 
were allowed to reclassify overdue loans, which enabled them to postpone or write-off debt 
that would otherwise make them insolvent.64 In fact, most banks only maintained the 10 percent 
capital adequacy ratio because of CBR assistance.65 The problem is that while the liquidity 
assistance measures prevented a banking crisis, they did not address the structural weaknesses 
within the CBR or the banking industry. It cannot substitute for bank restructuring or other 
crisis resolution measures, without which the sector remains vulnerable.66 
For example, because the forbearance measures allowed banks to calculate their assets 
based on pre-crisis values, NPL and capital adequacy ratios are likely higher than reported.67 
Specifically, while the CBR reported that NPLs were only at seven percent, the actual level 
was closer to 10 percent.68 To further obscure the risk level, the CBR maintained the Russian 
Accounting Standard (RAS) to reduce the number of banks that may have become insolvent or 
otherwise compromised when it was due to begin using Basel III accounting standards in 
2016.69 Basel III is a set of banking regulations and accounting standards used to calculate the 
amount of reserves banks must hold in order to meet the required capital adequacy ratio of 4.5 
percent. Furthermore, there is currently no deadline for shifting away from the RAS, and the 
only institution that uses Basel III exclusively is the Ministry of Finance.70 This increasingly 
complicates the consolidation process as the CBR and the Ministry of Finance have to work 
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together to liquidate and consolidate banks.71 If each uses different accounting standards, then 
the criteria for bank liquidation and consolidation will differ for each. In fact, the IMF¶V
assessment of the Basel Core PriQFLSOHVLQ5XVVLDLQIRXQGWKDWWKH&%5LVµPDWHULDOO\
non-FRPSOLDQW¶LQLWVUROHLQPHUJHUVDQGDFTXLVLWLRQVDQGWKDWWKHUHDUHEDUULHUVWRLWVDELOLW\
to consolidate the market.72 Thus, although these measures stabilised the banks, they made it 
diffLFXOW WR DVVHVV WKH EDQNLQJ VHFWRU¶V ULVN RI GHIDXOW 0RUH LPSRUWDQWO\ WKHVH PHDVXUHV
obfuscate the reasons for which the CBR and the Ministry of Finance liquidate and consolidate 
banks. As such, it is difficult to predict how regulations will be implemented, and encourages 
banks to rely more on their social networks than formal institutions.  
Bald and Nielsen demonstrate that financial institutions should be conducive to the 
development of efficient capital markets and encourage investment in profitable assets.73 As 
such, crisis resolution reforms should help the CBR and government facilitate this role, but the 
resolutions measures of the 2014 crisis do not appear to do so. If crisis resolution measures are 
to result in crisis modernisation, then the CBR should be strengthened as a financial institution. 
Yet, for every measure that appears to resolve institutional weaknesses, there is evidence that 
the resulting policies are more form than substance.74 To start, the government owned asset 
management and restructuring programmes were undertaken much more aggressively than 
RUDVWKH&%5FRQVROLGDWHGRUOLTXLGDWHGSHUFHQWRI5XVVLD¶VEDQNVEHWZHHQ
to 2015; but the banking sector still poses a large risk to economic stability.75 Even more 
promising was the 2016 privatisation plan Putin announced, which listed a number of lucrative 
state controlled firms to be sold. However, none of the stakes were enough to reduce state 
control.76 )LQDOO\7KH&%5¶VLQFUHDVHGUHJXOatory powers granted in 2013 have not improved 
the transparency or predictability of banking regulation. For example, the implementation of 
µ2Q WKH 6HFXULWLHV 0DUNHW¶ KDV HIIHFWLvely shut down the forex market and halted the 
relicensing of private pension funds. Each of these issues will be examined in turn to 
demonstrate that the means by which the government and CBR are implementing crisis 
resolution measures appear to undermine any chance of institutional development. 
The CBR closed 49, 41, and 53 non-viable banks in 2014, 2015, and 2016 respectively, 
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with most licenses being revoked for money laundering, fraudulent reporting, inability to pay 
creditors, and overvalued assets.77  However, the banking system remained on the brink of 
collapse as non-performing loans (NPLs) rose and banks struggled to meet capital adequacy 
requirements. Short-term debt became the tool of choice for banks and some regional 
governments to survive the crisis, with subnational loans accounting for 1/3 of short-term 
debt.78 Thus, despite the mounting roll-over and default risks, banks were still lending. The 
NPL risk rose from 6.5 in at the end of 2013, to 8.2 percent in June 2014, and then increased 
to 10 percent in 2017.79 )XUWKHUPRUH5XVVLD¶V ODUJHVWEDQNVZKLFKDUHFRQWUROOHGE\VWDWH
continued to support banks regardless of NPLs.80 More concerning is that the actual level of 
NPLs was obscured by the regulatory forbearance measures. Liquidity assistance and 
regulatory forbearance helped banks appear adequately capitalised even as their profit margins 
approached zero, falling from 7.9 to 2.3 percent between 2014 and 2015.81 As such, despite the 
&%5¶VLQFUHDVHGDELOLW\WRUHYRNHOLFHQVHVWKLVGLGOLWWOHWRUHGXFHWKHULVNWKHEDQNLQJVHFWRU
posed to the economy.  
Hoelscher and Quintyn demonstrate that poor policy coordination raises the costs of 
crises because it undermines efforts to resolve it.82 In order to resolve the crisis and ensure 
future economic growth, the state needed to increase economic production capacity through 
privatisation.83 Yet, the state undertook very little privatisation, thereby reinforcing the 
problem of growth capacity. The government announced a privatisation programme for 2016, 
including selling stakes in lucrative and strategic firms such as VTB, Aeroflot, Alarosa, 
Bashneft, and Rosneft, as a means increasing budgetary revenue.84 In the end, the privatisation 
of VTB was postponed until after sanctions have been lifted.85 However, none of the other 
VWDNHVVROGUHGXFHGWKHVWDWH¶VPDMRULW\VKDUHVRWKLVFDQQRWQRWTXDOLI\DV privatisation. For 
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example, in October 2016, Rosneft purchased the oil company Bashneft, which had been seized 
from Sistema CEO Vladimir Yevtushenkov in September 2014, for $5 billion.86 If the state 
controlled company purchased another oil company, then the state is increasing its assets, not 
privatising them. Additionally, the state did sell a 19.5 percent share of Rosneft in December 
2016 for $11 billion to a combination of the Swiss firm Glencore and the Qatar Investment 
Fund.87 However, the state still controls 50.001 percent of Rosneft, and other government 
agencies control the other 30 percent. As such, Rosneft was not privatised as it remains both 
directly and indirectly controlled by the state.  
The privatisation of Rosneft is also an example of how the CBR has not drastically 
improved its ability to regulate the banks. Anastasia Gnezditskaya illustrates how oligarchs 
and firms hide shareholder identities from banks: the CBR requires banks to disclose the 
identity of single investors who purchase stakes of 20 percent or more.88 To avoid this, 
companies will sell stakes of less than 20 percent to multiple individuals, which absolves them 
of any responsibility. Gnezditskaya further demonstrates that this erodes investor confidence 
because it increases firPV¶ PRUDO KD]DUG VLQFH WKH\ FDQQRW EH KHOG UHVSRQVLEOH IRU SRRU
decisions.89 Thus, among the various reforms the CBR has been able to implement, requiring 
the full disclosure of all investors is not one it has undertaken, nor does it have explicit plans 
to do so.90 This is particularly striking given the economic need for investment. For example, 
it is unknown who exactly funded the purchase of Rosneft as loans to secure the stake were 
initially issued by VTB, Italian Bank Intesa, and Qatar, and the amounts paid that can be traced 
leave a $2.6 billion shortfall.91 Additionally, although Putin forbade state banks from 
participating in the auction, VTB initially provided the entire $11 billion via a loan agreement, 
which ended on 22 December 2016. While the shares were transferred as collateral to a bank 
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in Singapore, and then Intesa in Italy, VTB never clarified that entire $11 billion had been 
paid.92 The failure to disclose where the all the funding for the stake came from, especially 
considering the value of the sale, and who all the owners are, undermines the CBRs credibility 
and investor confidence. 
North describes how limited access orders control competition and the number of 
economic actors to reduce disorder and chaos, but this only works if competition is 
suppressed.93 This results in high barriers to entry and the necessity of a blat to overcome them. 
7KH&%5¶VDSSURDFKWRQHZOLFHQVLQJVFKHPHVLQWKHXSGDWHWRWKHIRUH[WUDGLQJODZDQGWKH
new regulations for private pensions, reflects this. When the ruble crashed in December 2015, 
most of the foreign exchange dealers that had speculated on the ruble operated within banks, 
but the CBR had no power to regulate this.94 On 1st -DQXDU\WKHODZµ2QWKH6HFXULWLHV
0DUNHW¶FDPHLQWRIRUFH7KHODZUHTXLUHVIorex dealers to meet four requirements, including 
a minimum net capital of ༦100 million and a CBR issued license, which places the dealers 
under CBR supervision.95 The problem is that the CBR has used this law as a tool to prevent 
foreign exchange traders from operating at all. As of March 2017, only seven traders were 
granted licenses to operate, with others concerned about the lack of transparency over the 
licensing process as the CBR has not spelled out exactly what additional criteria the banks must 
meet to be licensed.96 Thus, in this instance, as the CBR increases its power, it incentivises 
players to use and reinforce informal institutions. 
Further evidence of this are the new regulations for private pension funds and the 
dissolution of Globex. In 2014, the government implemented a reform to ensure the security 
of the growing private pension fund market, which would require all private pension funds to 
change their status from non-profit organisation to joint stock company, and obtain the 
corresponding CBR license.97 In the interim, the government froze private pension accounts 
and diverted payments from these accounts to the public pension budget because the extra-
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budgetary fund use to pay pensioners was in deficit.98  In September 2015, the CBR revoked 
the license of the largest private pension fund Globex, and all of its subsidiaries. The reason 
given was that the funds paid into the accounts were used for other activities, such as Globex 
&(2 $QDWRO\ 0RW\O\RY¶V UHDO HVWDWH EXVLQHVVHV DQG WKDW WKH ༦109 billion assets were 
outweighed by the ༦210.5 billion of liabilities.99 ,WLVKLJKO\OLNHO\WKDWWKH&%5¶VDccusations 
are true. However, given the number of banks with NPLs that were allowed to remain 
operational, the singling out of Globex over others RQO\ LQFUHDVHV WKH UHJXODWRU¶V
unpredictability. This makes the CBR, like the government, appear predatory, which 
undermines the rule of law and the transition to the market.100 This uncertainty undermines 
confidence in formal institutions and encourages the use of informal ones.101 
 There are a few recent reforms that bear mentioning as they will be important to the 
future health and structure of the banking industry. First, there has been a growing number of 
small non-finance institutions specialising in micro-lending and loans for SMEs.102 Until 2013, 
these banks were regulated by the Federal Financial Market Service, but now come under CBR 
supervision. There have been two steps taken to ensuring these banks can provide funding to 
SMEs, as well as improving bank regulation more generally. First, as these banks provide 
micro-loans or smaller loans, capital charges on SME loans were lowered and the CBR has 
been working on enhancing the financial support mechanisms offered by non-bank financial 
institutions.103 Second, in January 2018, the CBR is implementing proportional bank regulation 
by adding a third tier to the banking sector. This will divide banks into three licensing 
categories with different licensing and reserve requirements: systemically important banks, 
universal banks, and basic banks.104 It is likely that non-bank financial institutions will need to 
be relicensed as universal banks, but this contradicts some of the exceptions just listed. As 
such, these measures seem promising on paper, but their implementation will determine how 
much they will actually improve banking sector regulation and financial intermediation. 
 Russia has only just begun to exit the 2014 economic crisis, and crisis modernisation 
and long-term recovery is questionable because the reforms that would diversify assets and 
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increase output have not been undertaken.105 The privatisation plan announced in 2016 did very 
little to privatise the economy, thus doing very little to increase asset diversification. 
)XUWKHUPRUHWKHEDQNLQJ LQGXVWU\VWLOOUHPDLQVDVXEVWDQWLDOULVNWRWKHFRXQWU\¶V ORQJ-term 
economic health because the lack of transparency makeVLWGLIILFXOWWRGHWHUPLQHEDQNV¶WUXH
ILQDQFLDOVWDWXV7KH&%5¶VQHZSRZHUDVDFRQVROLGDWHGUHJXODWRUGLGQRWKHOSWRFODULI\WKH
rules of the game in the banking industry either, as evidenced by the new laws on forex traders 
and private pensions. The regulators actions make it appear like a predatory institution. While 
this cannot be ruled out, it is possible that these actions are not purposeful. Rather, that the 
&%5¶VRZQZHDNQHVV, confronted with the strength of rigid informal institutions and sistema 
constrains its ability to evenly and universally enforce regulations. In which case, the logical 
conclusion does not change. If the CBR is unable to fairly and universally implement 
regulations, regardless of whether the weakness stems from its internal machinations or outside 
constraints, it fails to create a stable, predictable environment within which it can mediate 
conflicts and economic transactions. This restricts the impact it can play in fostering and 
sustaining a strong economy. Thus, the 2014 crisis forces Russia to reckon with the limitations 
of partial reform equilibrium as prospects for economic growth, outside of oil prices, are 
restricted. Without reform, or a sustained increase in oil prices the economy will stagnate and 
could eventually begin to contract.  
 
7.3 The crisis modernisation fallacy 
The case studies illustrate that Russia¶V EDQNLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQV DUH trapped in partial reform 
equilibrium, because banking policies fail to result in crisis modernisation. To refresh, partial 
UHIRUP HTXLOLEULXP LV GHILQHG DV µWKH VHOHFWHG LQWURGXFWLRQ RI PDUNHW PHFKDQLVPV LQWR DQ
economy in which substantial spheres of economic activity still operate according to alternative 
mechanisPVRIFRRUGLQDWLRQ¶106 As such, economic crises fail to result in crisis modernisation, 
because the mechanisms necessary to undertake crisis resolution measures are inherently 
market mechanisms, which have not yet been established. Each of the crises has a different 
cause and necessitates a different response, but all of the crises demonstrate the weakness of 
banking institutions through the reliance on crisis containment measures, and as a result, the 
difficulty in containing additional economic risks, such as inadequately capitalised banks. 
Furthermore, comparing the crisis resolution measures that should have been undertaken with 
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those that were (or in some cases were not), show how economic crises have only reinforced 
partial reform equilibrium by supporting the command practices of patrimonial state control 
and the use of the social economy. Thus, the &%5¶V approach to economic crises is an example 
RI IXUWKHU DWWHPSWV WR PRGHUQLVH 5XVVLD¶V HFRQRP\ UDWKHU WKDQ IRFXV RQ LQVWLWXWLRQDO
development. This will be demonstrated first by synthesising how crisis management policies 
support partial reform equilibrium, and why it endures. Next, the implications of this on the 
future of institutional development will be enumerated. Finally, we will conclude that partial 
reform equilibrium will be broken once the economy becomes primarily command or market, 
and that this will take time regardless of the outcome. 
As noted, historical institutionalists argue that institutions are fixed until major events 
force them to change, or what they call punctuated equilibrium.107 This is supported by 
numerous economic studies demonstrating how economic crises can result in institutional 
development, or what this study has FDOOHGµFULVLVPRGHUQLVDWLRQ¶108 However, the case studies 
and above analysis demonstrate that this has not happened in Russia. If crisis modernisation 
had taken place, then partial reform equilibrium would be broken as crisis resolution reforms 
would result in institutional development by creating the economic coordination mechanisms 
necessary to foster either a market or command economy. None of the measures undertaken in 
response to either the 1998, 2008, or 2014 crises appear to fulfil this criterion. This will be 
demonstrated by examining the impact of the crisis modernisation and crisis resolution 
measures on partial reform equilibrium. 
7REHJLQ WKHEXUGHQ RI SURRI WKDW WKH5XVVLD¶V HFRQRPLF LQVWLWXWLRQV DUHZHDN DQG
partially reformed is the overwhelming reliance on crisis containment measures to stabilise and 
resolve economic crises. As a result, the weaknesses that caused the crises are not addressed, 
thereby establishing an unstable foundation for future economic growth. All of the crisis 
containment measures maintain soft budget constraints (SBCs), because they do not require 
banks to take responsibility for their poor financial decisions, or risk they pose to the entire 
economy. While no blanket guarantee of liquidity assistance was issued in 1998, the Central 
Bank of Russia still recapitalised banks with little regard to mitigating future risk. Conditions 
were not attached to liquidity assistance, so there was no way to ensure banks used the funds 
appropriately. As a result, banks continued to exploit systemic weaknesses with little regard to 
the risk their actions posed to the banking sector and the wider economy. In fact, this directly 
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contributed to the cause and severity of the 2008 crisis in Russia. During this crisis, the state 
undertook bank recapitalisation with few conditions, aiming to stabilise the sector and keep it 
solvent. While these measures did stabilise the banking sector, they did not prevent the 
economy from contracting severely, nor did they result in a proportional economic recovery. 
In 2014, the use of liquidity assistance was again the dominant measure, but this time the CBR 
also heavily relied on regulatory forbearance to create a liquidity buffer for banks. That the 
containment measures stabilised the banking sector in 2008 and 2014 is irrelevant as they do 
not require strong institutions to be effective.  
These measures reinforce the patriarchal nature of the state and SBCs, which are the 
backbone of command economy institutions and at odds with market institutions. As a result, 
the necessity for banks to be as efficient and effective as possible is undermined, and the market 
drive for profit maximisation is missing. This approach to crisis containment measures 
demonstrates that the CBR and government are pursuing contradictory objectives regarding 
the banking sector. On the one hand, they want the banking sector to be as vibrant, productive, 
and profitable as those in the West. For example, the financial hub Moscow City is being built 
to rival Manhattan or London.109 However, the maintenance of SBCs allows inefficient banks 
that are a drain on economic resources to remain operational. This is a disincentive for banks 
to undertake medium and long-term investments, without which the sector cannot be as robust 
and profitable as the government and CBR would like. Hard budget constraints are necessary 
to make banks as efficient and profitable as possible, and the continued softening of these 
constraints prevents this from transpiring. Thus, the reliance on crisis containment measures 
not only demonstrates institutional weakness, but replicates it, reinforcing those practices that 
maintain partial reform equilibrium. 
Second, this is sustained by the failure of crisis resolution reforms to make economic 
transactions more predictable maintaining a weak rule of law and high barriers to entry. As 
discussed in the first chapter, there are three main principles of the rule of law: 1) there can be 
no crime without law; 2) law is universally applied ² no one is above or out of reach of the 
law; 3) the law will be analysed and enforced by a neutral third party.110 In order for crisis 
resolution measures to break partial reform equilibrium, they would adhere to these three 
criteria. None of the measures that were undertaken do so. As such, these reforms are merely 
parchment rules, which are laws that have been written to solve a problem, but the means of 
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HQIRUFHPHQWUHQGHUWKHODZV¶DSSOLFDWLRQXQSUHGLFWDEOH111 To demonstrate this, the analysis of 
major reforms from each crisis will be examined against these criteria. 
The first principle, there can be no crime without law, is where most scholars fail to 
appreciate the role that institutions play. Tax reform after 1998, CBR consolidation after 2008, 
and the new licensing requirements for forex traders and private pensions are the measures 
most likely to result in institutional development, because they seemingly target specific 
institutional weaknesses. Additionally, these measures have actually resulted in some tangible 
change: tax revenues have increased, the CBR has managed to bring the number of banks below 
700, and private pension funds and forex traders will be required to hedge their risks and put 
WKHLUFOLHQWV¶LQWHUHVWVILUVW<HWWKHVHODZVare often vague, enabling the state to use them as a 
political tool, and obscure what is and is not legal. For example, the implementation of the 
2001 tax reform was not as straightforward and effective as initially believed, because while 
the rate of flat tax payments from individual incomes increased, the same could not be said for 
businesses.112 Furthermore, the new measures enacted by the CBR to regulate licensing are too 
vague to be strictly enforced. There has been little transparency regarding decisions to revoke 
licenses from existing banks, and there has been little light shed on the criteria that forex traders 
and private pensions need to fulfil to be granted licenses.113 Thus, while laws have been written 
down they do not clarify what is and is not a crime. As a result, barriers to entry remain high 
and market institutions are diminished.  
The second principle, that the law applies to everyone, is where continued institutional 
weaknesses are evident despite crisis resolution measures. Because the laws are not clear, 
anyone can be prosecuted for criminal activity as many are breaking the law. For example, the 
cases of Khodorkovsky, Globex, and Master Bank illustrate the selective implementation of 
the law. In these cases, the problem was not state intervention; by all accounts the charges 
brought against each were true and easily substantiated. The problem is that many others have 
committed the same crimes as Khodorkovsky, and many banks have committed the same 
crimes as Globex and Master Bank. Furthermore, the increase in raiding cases demonstrates 
WKHXVHRIODZDVDWRROWRHQDFWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDJHQGD114 As a result, power and authority 
are vested not in the law or even institutions, but in the state, in individuals. The law does not 
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proscribe how the state and state agents should act, but individual agents determine how the 
law will be interpreted and used on a case by case basis, making it impossible to ever predict 
what the safest or even most profitable course of action will be. This necessitates the reliance 
on the social economy over institutions to navigate the economy, thereby reinforcing command 
economy practices. This is antithetical to market institutions, and prevents partial reform 
equilibrium from being broken.  
 The final principle is that the law is enforced by a neutral third party. The role of 
institutions is to mediate conflict and remain neutral when enforcing the law. North 
demonstrates that institutions are built to distil order from chaos.115 However, because laws 
and their implementation are chaotic, third parties cannot be neutral in their enforcement as 
there is no precedent for them to refer. Indeed, Solomon illustrates how the development of the 
judiciary system, and law as a practice, has taken place alongside the development of private 
property rights.116 It is inferred that if private property rights are weak, so too is the legal 
profession. This is because under the command economy, there was no private property, and 
economic crimes were committed against the state.117 Furthermore, this principle is 
compromised by the fact that the state has too much control over the economy, which results 
in a conflict of interest. Thus, because private property rights are weakened as the state 
increases its direct and indirect control over the economy, it is difficult for third party enforcers, 
such as judges and lawyers, to fairly uphold and implement the law. 
7KHSHUSHWXDOZHDNQHVVRI5XVVLD¶Vbanking institutions is the source of its weak rule 
of law. This maintains partial reform equilibrium as individuals resort to the social economy 
and sistema to navigate economic transactions and mediate conflict in the absence of strong 
institutions, thereby sustaining command economy practices at the expense of those that are 
PDUNHW$V9ODGLPLU*HO¶PDQH[SODLQVµ7KH³OHJDF\RIWKHSDVW´LVQRWMXVWDQREVWDFOHWRWKH
rule of law, buWLWLVDOVRDUHVRXUFHIRUULVNDYHUVLRQ¶118 It is difficult to overcome the legacy 
of the command economy as the practices that maintain partial reform equilibrium are how 
things have worked and how people have avoided trouble. As argued by Anders Åslund, the 
pillars of a command economy, such as planning committees and state-run distribution 
channels, have been abolished and prices are largely free.119 However, as the case studies have 
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demonstrated, the economy is not a market either. The state maintains very soft budget 
constraints, which permits inefficient and unproductive firms to remain open. This both 
undermines the drive to maximise profits and fails to allow demand to dictate production, 
which is antithetical to 3RODQ\L¶VGHILQLWLRQRIDPDUNHWDVDQHFRQRP\µGLUHFWHGE\QRWKLQJE\
PDUNHWSULFHV«DQGLVFDSDEOHRIRUJDQLVLQJWKHZKROHRIHFRQRPLFOLIHZLWKRXWRXWVLGHKHOS
RULQWHUIHUHQFH¶120 Therefore, as the economic crises of 1998, 2008, and 2014 have been unable 
to result in the institutional development necessary to strengthen rule of law and complete the 
WUDQVLWLRQWRDPDUNHWHFRQRP\5XVVLD¶Vbanking institutions remain neither command, nor 
market oriented, as they are trapped in partial reform equilibrium.  
*     *     * 
7KLVVWXG\KDVGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDW5XVVLD¶VHFRQRPLFWUDQVLWLRQKDVVWDOOHGDQGWKDWLWLVWUDSSHG
in partial reform equilibrium. As a result, Russia is not a market economy. This was established 
by tracing the origins of partial reform equilibrium from perestroika to the second Putin 
presidency to demonstrate its presence in Russian history and how significant historical events 
have been affected by partially reformed institutions. Specifically, the study analysed how the 
partial reform of the CBR has inhibited its development, and thus its ability to perform normal 
central bank roles, such as regulating inflation and the banking sector. The failure to upset 
partial reform equilibrium has been demonstrated by analysing the effects of economic crises 
on CBR development, and the evolution of the banking sector more broadly. These case studies 
concluded that economic crises not only fail to result in the institutional development of the 
banking sector, but that they also reinforce partial reform equilibrium by reaffirming the role 
of the state in the economy, the need for sistema, and the maintenance of command economy 
practices, such as soft budget constraints. 
7KHEDQNLQJVHFWRU¶VLQLWLDOGHYHORSPHQWFRQGLWLRQVSURYLGHDSRLQWHGH[DPSOHRIKRZ
the SDUWLDOO\UHIRUPHGQDWXUHRI5XVVLD¶VEDQNLQJLQVWLWXWLons created a self-replicating limited 
access order. Banks play a vital role in a market economy because they are they backbone all 
things financial: business transactions, investments, loans, savings, and so on. Yet, during the 
initial transition period, banks were cut out of the economy in a fundamental way as they were 
barred from participating in either the privatisation programme, or the retail savings and deposit 
PDUNHWEHFDXVHRI6EHUEDQN¶VPRQRpoly.121 As a result, banks became tools of the government 
and elites because they could not work with entrepreneurs, investors, or household clients. This 
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severely limited the role banks could play in economic development. As gas and oil prices 
increased, the government used the rents to compensate for the lack of a proper financial market 
WKDWFRXOGILQDQFHLQYHVWPHQWSURMHFWV7KXVDOWKRXJKWKHLQLWLDOEDUULHUVWREDQNV¶HFRQRPLF
involvement have been significantly reduced, they exist in an economy that has developed 
means of functioning without them. As such, the development of the banking sector, and its 
regulator, have not been a priority and predatory banking practices have continued. This 
undermines confidence in banks, which further reinforces the social economic institutions that 
have evolved to compensate for the lack of a proper banking sector. 
In the first chapter, it was presented that Russia deviated from the ability of GDP per 
capita to predict the level of rule of law by three standard deviations. The case studies have 
demonstrated that the banking institutions, specifically the CBR as a regulator, have remained 
underdeveloped. While this explained the low level of rule of law, it did not explain the 
increased GDP per capita. However, the inability of economic crises to result in institutional 
development has constrained opportunities for economic growth. Thus, as the economy has 
reached its limitations because of the failure to develop economic institutions, as illustrated by 
the 2014 crisis, it has begun and will continue to contract. There are two likely outcomes. Either 
the CBR and other economic agencies will be forced to develop and strengthen their role in the 
economy to facilitate investments, which will increase the level of rule of law until it is 
commensurate with the FRXQWU\¶V *'3 SHU FDSLWD. Or the failure to do so will restrain 
opportunities for further economic growth until the GDP per capita shrinks and is more 
reflective of the weak rule of law. Thus, while GDP per capita may be a good predictor of the 
strength of rule of law, a high GDP per capita itself may not be enough of an incentive to 
develop and strengthen the rule of law. In fact, consistently low growth may be more of an 
incentive to invest in institutional development in order to encourage economic expansion. It 
is likely that these are the conditions that will break partial reform equilibrium and incentivise 
Russia to complete its economic transition.




7KLVVWXG\KDVGHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW5XVVLD¶Vbanking institutions are trapped in partial reform 
equilibrium and do not play the role they would in a normal economy. By extension, given the 
role and importance of the banking industry to a market economy, its underdevelopment has 
complicated the general economic transition. This was illustrated with evidence from case 
studies that analysed the &HQWUDO%DQNRI5XVVLD¶VUHVSRQVHVWR 1998 and 2008 economic crises, 
and how these responses affected banking sector development. First, many scholars claim these 
crises were transformational recessions, which forced the Russian government to make hard 
decisions that ended command economy practices and resulted in a robust market economy. 
The implication is WKDW5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLRQLVFRPSOHWHEXWLWVPDUNHWHFRQRP\KDVHQGHPLF
corruption problems that poison the business and investment culture. However, the case studies 
provide sufficient evidence to counter this claim. They demonstrate that budget constraints are 
still very soft, and that the state has used this to increase its control over the economy. This is 
a vital contribution, as it changes how we see and understand Russia and its post-Soviet 
development.  
6HFRQG WKLV VWXG\ VLJQLILFDQWO\ HQKDQFHV WKH OLWHUDWXUH RQ 5XVVLD¶V WUDQVLWLRQ E\
reframing much of the pre-existing data and analyses to demonstrate that the barriers 
preventing Russia from completing its transition are constructed by institutions, rather than 
individuals. MRVWRIWKHVFKRODUVKLSRQ5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLRQ focuses on individual actions and 
choices, which fails to adequately capture the complexity of why the transition is incomplete. 
This does not explain why, despite genuine attempts at reform, the economy has not been able 
to modernise and become a fully-fledged market economy. This study has contributed to that 
answer by demonstrating how entrenched command economy practices in the banking industry 
prevent the establishment of market banking institutions. These practices stem from trying to 
create a market banking industry using command institutions.  
Finally, this study establishes that the attempt to implement market oriented banking 
reforms without dismantling command practices prevents market institutions from taking root. 
Modernising the banking industry UHTXLUHVVWURQJLQVWLWXWLRQV,I5XVVLD¶VLQVtitutions are weak, 
and institutional development has not taken place, then attempts to introduce modernising 
reforms will fail. Therefore, RuVVLD¶VIRFXVRQPRGHUQLVDWLRQRYHULQVWLWXWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW
has only strengthened the power of the individuals within those agencies that embody the 
institution, rather than the institutions themselves. Thus, 5XVVLD¶VFXUUHQWbanking institutions 
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do not provide a clear and predictable set of rules, which obscure rather than structure and 
clarify economic transactions. As such, the economy and society are not fully subordinated to 
this particular market institution. The result is that firms struggle to increase production, 
maximise profits, and drive economic growth. This contributes to 5XVVLD¶V economic 
stagnation, which could become contraction unless the transition is complete.  
This study does not deny that Russia has made significant progress in transitioning 
away from a command economy, as genuine attempts at strengthening rule of law and 
implementing market practices have been undertaken and measurable change has resulted. 
However, these attempts fail to address the remaining command practices that continue to 
undermine market institutions, such as the banking sector. For example, soft taxation practices 
cannot generate enough revenue for the government to balancing its spending. Furthermore, 
because of soft taxation, the concept of paying and collecting taxes is still unfamiliar. As such, 
it is to be expected that this would be a time consuming, trial and error process. However, 
despite the fact that tax reforms increased the amount of tax collected, the concept of soft 
taxation provided the government with an incentive and vehicle to renationalise or exert some 
control over strategic industries. That way it can ensure taxes are paid, and have additional 
sources of revenue for budgetary spending and saving. This presents two problems. First, 
maintaining soft taxation also maintains soft budget constraints. Consequently, firms have no 
impetus to meet the needs and demands of the economy, or to maximise profits and be self-
sufficient. More concerning is the second problem: WKDWJRYHUQPHQW¶Vrole in, and control over, 
the economy prevents competition from generating more efficient and profitable sources of 
income. This effect is UHDGLO\DSSDUHQWLQWKHEDQNLQJLQGXVWU\7KH&%5¶VHQKDQFHGUHJXODWRU\
powers have indeed reduced the number of banks in Russia, but this also favours the large, 
state owned banks. As a result, there is no competition among banks to provide the financial 
services necessary to a market economy, such as financing for long-term investments, which 
limits the economic actors to what state banks can offer.  
The case studies provide evidence for this by demonstrating that economic crises did 
not act as critical junctures for institutional development in Russia¶VEDQNLQJVHFWRU like they 
do in other countries. Economists such as Kornai, Laeven, Valencia, and Hallerberg 
demonstrate how crises can be transformational recessions.1 Specifically, they claim that crises 
instigated by exogenous rather than endogenous factors result in the most drastic institutional 
                                                 
1Kornai, 1994.; Hallerberg and Scartascini, 2011.; Laeven and Valencia, 2008.; Drazen and Grilli, 1993. 
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developments.2 This is because exogenous shocks uncover weaknesses that economic actors 
normally compensate for by using informal institutions. The 1998 and 2008 economic crises 
were examples of this. In 1998, the state postponed reforming tax collection mechanisms until 
the lack of revenue triggered a sovereign debt crisis. Soft taxation was still largely practiced, 
as enterprises knew that the more arrears mounted, the more difficult it would be for the 
government to collect them, and the more likely they would be forgiven.3 The result was that 
tax arrears reached ༦129 billion in 1998.4  Similarly, in 2008, the failure to properly develop 
the banking sector left few opportunities for domestic sources of funding, forcing banks to 
resort to external borrowing.5 Furthermore, the inability to regulate banks resulted in risky 
borrowing practices as external loans reached 40 percent of GDP with a 125 percent loan-to-
deposit ratio.6 In 1998, the government compensated for weak revenue streams by selling GKO 
bonds. In 2008, the banks were able to use gas and oil prices to obtain good credit, borrow 
abroad, and find sources of short-term investment to make loan payments. However, neither of 
these practices were sustainable, and each crisis exposed these weaknesses.  
 According to the crisis modernisation economists, the crises would have forced the state 
to address both tax collection and bank regulation in order to resolve and exit the crisis. The 
RXWFRPHZRXOGKDYHEHHQDFOHDUHUGHILQLWLRQRIWKH&%5¶VUROHLQWKHHFRQRP\DQGWKHUHE\ 
more consistent and predictable tax collection and bank regulation practices. This would have 
changed the expectations and behaviours of economic actors by encouraging them to use 
formal rather than informal institutions to mediate economic transactions and resolve conflicts. 
Yet, this is not what happens in post-1998 or post-2008 Russia. In theory, reforms to address 
these issues have been implemented: a simplified tax code was introduced in 2001, and the 
CBR merged with the Federal Financial Market Service (FFMS) in 2013 to reduce regulatory 
FRQIXVLRQDQGLQFUHDVHWKHIRUPHU¶VDXWKRULW\,QSUDFWLFHWKHUHVXOWVDUHOHVVVWUDLJKWIRUZDUG
Tax collection improved, but there are other explanatory variables, such as the overall increase 
in personal income anGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHQationalising several industries that could account 
for the increase in revenues. The &%5¶VQHZUHJXODWRU\SRZHUVKDYHUHGXFHGWKHQXPEHURI
banks, but they have not increased transparency or predictability, and thus there is no way to 
determine if its actions are fair or proportional.7 Furthermore, the state uses both tax arrears 
                                                 
2
 Calomoris, Klingebiel, and Laeven, 2003. 
3
 Perotti, E. (2001). 382.  
4
 EBRD Annex 1.1 p. 16 
5
 Connolly, 2011. 450. 
6
 Ibid. 446.; Bogetic, "Russian Economic Report No. 17," 2008. 35.; ibid.28 ± 32.  
7
 Seal et al., 2016. 20, 24, 32. 
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and compliance, and bank finances in raiding activities. This signals that the state is using the 
reforms as a tool to increase its own power.8 Thus, neither of the reforms implemented 
adequately strengthen institutional weaknesses, as they do not clarify or restrain the role of the 
government or CBR. The actions of both remain unpredictable, which is antithetical to the 
purpose that institutions serve ² to create order out of chaos.9  
However, the failure to fully address institutional weaknesses does explain the 
incentives of the state and other economic actors to use the social economy and exploit formal 
institutional weaknesses for profit. As defined in chapter one, North defines institutions as 
µ«WKH KXPDQO\ GHYLVHG FRQVWUDLQWV WKDW VKDSH KXPDQ LQWHUDFWLRQ ,Q FRQVHTXHQFH WKH\
VWUXFWXUHLQFHQWLYHVLQKXPDQH[FKDQJHZKHWKHUSROLWLFDOVRFLDORUHFRQRPLF¶10 Thus, weak 
institutions encourage economic actors to resort to informal networks, both to exploit them for 
financial gain and to expedite economic transactions and mediate conflicts. As such, if the 
institutional weaknesses that encourage this behaviour are not fully addressed in the reform 
process, then they will not disappear. Because crisis resolution and other reforms do not do 
this, they fail to address the specific weaknesses that incentivise these actions and provide no 
QHZLQFHQWLYHVRUEHKDYLRXUWHPSODWHIRUHFRQRPLFDFWRUV0RUHVLPSO\EHFDXVHWKHUHIRUPV¶
implementation fails to illuminate clear paths for economic transactions and conflict mediation, 
actors, including the state, continue to resort to informal networks. 
Furthermore, this study provides evidence that defies both the structuralist and agent 
centred models of institutional change. As discussed, the agent centric model of institutional 
change argues that the impetus for institutional change lies in the choices and intentions of 
individuals.11 Conversely, the structuralist school argues that institutions are difficult to change 
because of cultural and historical practices.12 Yet, neither school of thought explains the state 
RI5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLon. The case studies both demonstrate the intention to change, and actual 
change in the banking industry%HFDXVH5XVVLD¶VLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHVRZHDNLWLVWHPSWLQJWRVD\
that the structuralist school has more explanatory power as it explains why, despite genuine 
attempts to reform, little institutional development has taken place. However, while it is true 
that banking institutions are still weak and partially reformed, they have changed, even if that 
change has not resulted in stronger institutions. For example, taxes are collected more 
efficiently and the CBR can more efficiently close banks and consolidate the banking sector. 
                                                 
8
 Gans-Morse, 2012.; Rochlitz, 2014.. 
9
 North. Loc. 1394. 
10
 North, (1990). 1 
11
 Johnson, "Path Contingency in Postcommunist Transformations," 2001. 254. 
12
 Pipes, 2004.  Johnson, J. 2001. 254. 
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Conversely, the agent centric model would use this evidence to claim that the changes we do 
see are evidence of institutional development. Yet, because the implementation of these 
reforms has not created more predictable behaviour or changed expectations, the institutions 
have not actually developed. 
 ,QGHHGRQHRIWKHVKRUWFRPLQJVRIPRVWVFKRODUVKLSRQ5XVVLD¶VWUDQVLWLRQ LV that it 
focuses on the consequences of individuals¶ actions and decisions. This is a problem, because 
agents of change do not make decisions in an institutional void. For example, North and 
:HLQJDVW¶V HOXFLGDWLRQ RI D OLPLWHG DFFHVV RUGHU /$2 DWWHPSWV WR GHWermine how 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VDFWLRQVIUDPHDQGLQIOXHQFHLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW13 As such, 
LQ WKHµGRRUVWHSFRQGLWLRQV¶WKDW1RUWKDQG:HLQJDVWVWDWH as necessary to progress from an 
LAO to an OAO, they include first adopting rule of law among elites, and then extending it to 
impersonal contacts.14 This is similar to one of )XNX\DPD¶VVLJQDOs of institutional change and 
development: WKHLQFOXVLRQRIRXWVLGHUV¶SHUVSHFWLYHV15 However, this has happened in Russia. 
As demonstrated in chapter three, the nomenklatura eventually included the new oligarchs like 
Khodorkovsky and Abramovich in the 1990s. Then more elites IURP3XWLQ¶VLQQHUFLUcle, like 
Miller, Timchenko, and Sechin joined throughout the 2000s. Yet, the inclusions of new social 
groups and other outsiders has not resulted in stronger institutions. Thus, while Russia is an 
LAO, this is more of a symptom, rather than a cause of institutional weakness. Furthermore, 
the case studies demonstrate that as the group of elites has grown, so too has state control over 
the economy, which is antithetical to a market economy.  
 From chapter one, this study has used .DUO3RODQ\L¶VGHILQLWLRQRIPDUNHWHFRQRP\ to 
HYDOXDWH5XVVLD¶V WUansition. Polanyi defines a market economy DV RQH WKDW LV µGLUHFWHGE\
QRWKLQJEXWPDUNHWSULFHV«DQGLVFDSDEOHRIRUJDQLVLQJWKHZKROHRIHFRQRPLFOLIHZLWKRXW
RXWVLGHKHOSRULQWHUIHUHQFH¶16 Polanyi specifies that a market economy is an institution, or a 
set of institutions, that have been constructed slowly over time, rather than a set of natural 
instincts or reactions to price signals as argued by classical economists.17 Classical economics 
oversimplify many issues; most egregiously, its theoretical foundations presume the presence 
market institutions regardless of whether or not they actually exist. This study has demonstrated 
that market banking institutions do not exist in Russia, which undermines the assumption of a 
market economy. Thus, most classical economic theories do not apply. For example, the crisis 
                                                 
13
 North et al., 2007. 7 ± 8. For more information, please see chapter one. 
14
 Ibid. 21 ± 24. 
15
 Fukuyama, (2014). 463.  
16
 Polanyi, (1944). 45. 
17
 Ibid. 40. 
  217 
resolution measures analysed in the case studies are the same measures that are used in market 
economies, albeit with a much higher degree of success. Whereas, in Russia these measures 
can only be partly implemented, because the necessary institutional framework to fully do so 
does not exist. Specifically, in a market economy, the CBR would regulate the banking sector 
to both prevent the risk of a banking crisis, but also to ensure that the clear and fair enforcement 
the regulations maintains low barriers to entry. Doing so would foster competition and create 
a strong banking sector that generates financial opportunities for investors, as well as helps 
households manage their finances. This would create more economic growth in the long-run, 
as the most effective and efficient banks would respond to whatever banking services the 
economy needs. 
 However, this is not what happens in Russia, neither after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, nor after economic crises. In theory, crisis resolution reforms should have encouraged 
the CBR to develop WKLVUROH7KHFRQVROLGDWLRQRIWKH&%5¶VUHJXODWRU\SRZHUVVKRXOGKDYH
directed it to close only those banks that were detrimental to the overall health of the economy. 
Indeed, the CBR has liquidated a number of predatory banks and shell banks used for illegal 
purposes. However, as discussed, its decisions and actions have not been transparent. This 
makes it difficult to understand why some banks, such as MasterBank, the Globex banks, Trust 
Bank, and others, have been foreclosed, where Bank Rossiya, Otkrite Bank, and Sberbank, and 
others who have committed the same violations remain operational. Additionally, inspections 
E\WKH,0)UHYHDOWKDWGHVSLWHWKH&%5¶VFRQVROLdation of the banking sector, the risk of non-
performing loans remains high.18 This suggests that the CBR has not actually mitigated the 
ULVN\SUDFWLFHVRIWKHEDQNLQJVHFWRU)XUWKHUPRUHWKH&%5¶VDFWLRQV LQUHVFLQGLQJEDQNLQJ
licenses appear to favour the state and its control over the banking sector rather than fostering 
competition. The IMF has even said that while it cannot find evidence of preferential treatment, 
that this would be difficult to isolate.19 Overall, while the crisis resolution reforms did result in 
change, they did not result in institutional development. This is an important distinction 
because while the reforms increased the power of individuals at the CBR, they did not 
strengthen the banking institution. Strong institutions promote and strengthen the rule of law. 
Yet, if powerful individuals use the law as a tool, then the institution is compromised and can 
no longer be used as a means of objective mediation.   
 This distinction is vital to understanding how RussiD¶V LQVWLWXWLRQV KDYH GHYHORSHG 
                                                 
18
 Seal et al., 2016. 22. 
19
 Ibid. 41. 
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Actual institutional development would have curbed individual power, not enhanced it. 
Institutions, as described by North, Kahn, and Carey, and others, moderate, curb, and constrain 
individual power.20 ,I5XVVLD¶VLQVWLWXWLRQVKDGGHYHORSHGDQGVWUHQJWKHQHGVLQFHWKHFROODSVH
of the Soviet Union, then there would be a clearer moderation of individual power by the 
institution. However, as demonstrated by the case studies, and the analysis of partial reform 
equilibrium in chapters three and four, we see the opposite. Chapters three and four illustrate 
how individual power in the vertikal has increased overtime. For example, after Putin became 
president, he increased both direct and indirect control over the economy by placing members 
of his social networks and government ministers in strategic economic positions. This was 
illustrated by the micro-study that showed how the government has increased both direct and 
indirect control over the gas and oil industry from 2010 to 2017. Furthermore, the formal case 
studies demonstrate that each economic crisis sees the further amplification of individual power 
over market banking LQVWLWXWLRQV 7KLV H[SODLQV ZK\ WKH &%5¶V HQKDQFHG UHJXODWRU\
responsibility has resulted in the non-transparent closure of banks ² it is not protecting the 
banking sector or its institutions, it is looking out for its own interest (and that of the 
government).    
The result is that institutions do not provide a predictable set of outcomes for economic 
actors, as outcomes are decided by individual discretion. To navigate this, actors resort to 
informal institutions, such as sistema or the social economy. Neil Robinson describes the social 
economy as patrimonial capitalism, or a system in which formal and informal rules contradict 
each other, transaction costs are high, reforms serve elite interests, and leaders are not subject 
to democratic constraint.21 Robinson argues that there is a high degree of path dependency that 
fixes this system in place, and that the 2008 economic crisis was the critical juncture for this.22 
This study VXSSRUWV5RELQVRQ¶VDUJXPHQWE\SURYLGLQJevidence of how the partially reformed 
institutions cannot provide clear, low-risk means of undertaking economic transactions. 
However, Robinson argues that because of patrimonial capitalism, modernisation is unlikely 
to occur.23 While this is true, this study has illustrated that this has always been the case, and 
is not a pattern that emerged after the 2008 economic crisis. Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the partially reformed nature of RussiD¶V LQVWLWXWLRQV KDV XQGHUPLQHG attempts at 
modernisation. In fact, this is reinforced by HunWLQJWRQ¶V DUWLFXODWLRQ RI WKH FRQWUDGLFWLRQ
                                                 
20
 North, (1990).; Kahn, 2006.; John Carey, "Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions.," Comparative 
Political Studies 33, 67. (2000): 735 - 31.; Polanyi, (1944). 
21
 Robinson, "Russian Patrimonial Capitalism and the International Financial Crisis," 2011. 438. 
22
 Ibid. 436 ± 439. 
23
 Ibid. 438. 
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between development and modernisation.24 %HFDXVH5XVVLD¶VLQVWLWXWLRQVZHUHXQGHUGHYHORSHG
at the outset of transition, they were too weak to implement the modernisation reforms 
necessary to become a market economy. This study has illustrated why and how this economic 
state has endured. At no point have the institutions been developed enough to modernise the 
economy.   
 Therefore, Russian banking institutions are trapped in partial reform equilibrium, which 
undermines the general economic transition. The perestroika reforms unintentionally 
introduced market mechanisms into a command economy to make it more productive. These 
mechanisms conflicted with command practices, which weakened both institutions. This study 
has illustrated how command economy practices have been upheld in the banking sector, 
including: soft taxation, soft budget constraints, and the increasing control of the government 
over the economy. This is established by describing how the government managed to support 
the banking sector through every crisis. During the economic crises of 1998, 2008, and 2013, 
the government and the CBR intervened to prevent banks and firms from becoming insolvent. 
Superficially, these methods of crisis containment appear normal and rational. Yet, while the 
government is not indebting itself to do this like the Soviet Union did, this patriarchal role 
echoes the command economy and undermines the market economy by softening budget 
constraints. As a result, inefficient firms the crisis would have otherwise seen liquidated or 
restructured, remain operational. These practices directly contradict a market economy and 
weaken market institutions, as they undermine the principles of supply and demand, and the 
drive for competition.  
 Attempts to rectify these weaknesses have only increased the power of individuals 
rather than the institutions themselves. This only ensures that institutional weaknesses will 
continue to be replicated, as Robinson outlines in his model on patrimonial capitalism, by 
reforms serving elite interests. The question that remains to be asked is, how can partial reform 
be upset? As North describes, the first step is for the individuals within institutions to begin to 
moderate themselves and their own power.25 How that will come about is pure conjecture and 
beyond the scope of this study. However, it will likely happen on an institution by institution 
basis. The conceptual hurdle is substantiating that partial reform equilibrium is not a 
phenomenon that either exists or not, but a long-term state of being. It will not be broken 
suddenly or quickly. It will be unravelled and unpicked slowly, like untying a large, 
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 Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," 1965. 
25
 North et al., 2007. 21. 
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complicated knot. To attempt otherwise will only replicate the present system, as it would fail 
to pay the required attention to properly develop the necessary institutions. If partial reform 
equilibrium is to be broken anywhere first, it would likely be in the banking sector because the 
role the state wants it to play is similar to that in a market. Furthermore, the CBR has been 
focusing how to improve its internal regulation as a means of improving the consistency with 
which it regulates the banking sector.26 This is again a promising step, but whether it actually 
results in institutional development remains to be determined.  
This study has GHPRQVWUDWHGWKDW5XVVLD¶VHFRQRPLFLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHWUDSSHGLQSDUWLDO
UHIRUP HTXLOLEULXP ,WV PDLQ FRQWULEXWLRQ LV D UHIUDPLQJ RI KRZ ZH XQGHUVWDQG 5XVVLD¶V
transition, by demonstrating that the success of its economic transition lies in the strength and 
development its economic institutions, rather than on the laws and rules that are drafted. 
Without strong institutions, the best laws cannot be properly implemented or enforced. This 
was illustrated by tracing the genesis of partial reform from the perestroika era, to post-2008 
crisis recovery. Specifically, the intractability of partial reform was evidenced by using 
K\SRWKHVHV WR WHVWZKHWKHU FULVLVPRGHUQLVDWLRQ KDG UHVXOWHG IURPHLWKHU RI5XVVLD¶VPDMRU
economic crises in 1998 or 2008. This is important as many scholars had claimed that the 1998 
economic crises forced Russia to complete its economic transition. While the hypotheses found 
evidence of change, it found no support for institutional development in the banking sector. 
Furthermore, preliminary DQDO\VLVRI5XVVLD¶VFULVLVDJDLQFRQILUPVWKHVHILQGLQJV7KH
result is that Russia¶VEDQNLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVUHPDLQQHLWKHUFRPPDQGQRU market, but trapped 
between the two in partial reform equilibrium.  
8QWLO QRZ 5XVVLD¶V HFRQRP\ KDV FRQWLQXHG WR IXQFWLRQ GHVSLWH SDUWLDO UHIRUP
HTXLOLEULXPEHFDXVHRIJDVDQGRLOUHQWV7KHVWDWHXVHVWKHVHSURILWVWRIXQGWKHHFRQRP\¶VOHVV
efficient and less profitable enterprises. For example, the government could afford the large 
liquidity assistance packages provided in the 2008 and 2014 crises because of the Stabilisation 
and National Wealth Funds, which were created with gas and oil windfalls. As such, the 
economy has never fully confronted its paralyzing contradictions, as the government could 
afford to buy its way out of problems or use its power to neutralize threats. While this initially 
happened in 1998, oil prices increased so shortly after that the imperative for reform quickly 
diminished. So long as gas and oil rents continue to pour in, the government can be an economic 
powerhouse without needing to develop strong institutions. Because of institutional weakness, 
state power is unmediated: The economy does not function according to a set of clearly defined 
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rules that are enforced by various institutions, the economy functions according to the rule of 
the state and the elites that comprise it. However, as gas and oil prices have begun falling and 
have remained depressed, the economy is feeling the limitations of partial reform. It remains 
to be seen if these limitations will provide a sufficient incentive to begin to dismantle partial 
reform equilibrium by seriously undertaking institutional development.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
OLS Multiple Linear Regression GDP per capita and Rule of Law 
 




GDP per capita (GDP) 
Population (pop) 
Gini index (income) 
Geographical location. Dummy variables: Africa (AfDum), Asia (AsDum), North (NADum) 
and South America (SADum). Constant: Europe.) 





5R/ Įȕ1 *'3ȕ2 ,QFRPHȕ3 SRSȕ4 (NADum) ȕ5 6$'XPȕ6 (AfDum) + 




Model R R2 Adjusted R2 Standard Error 









1 Regression 107.81 9 11.98 55.32 .000b 
 Residual 29.02 134 .217   










 B Std. Beta t Sig. Tol. VIF 
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Error 
1 Constant .009 .196  .047 .963   
 GDP  2.76 .000 .559 10.67 .000 .576 1.74 
 Income .004 .005 .043 .810 .419 .550 1.82 
 Population 5.58 .000 .009 .211 .833 .907 1.10 
 Asia -.162 .136 -.072 -1.19 .238 .431 2.32 
 Africa -.158 .134 -.073 -1.17 .242 .411 2.43 









-.706 .109 -.349 -6.50 .000 
.549 1.82 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Gas and Oil Company Executives 2009 ± 2010 / 2016 ± 2017 
 
This appendix contains the names of the current members in the case study FRPSDQ\¶V%RDUGV¶
RI'LUHFWRUV¶DQG0DQDJHPHQW&RPPLWWHHV¶DVZHOODVHDFKFRPSDQ\¶VFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH
VWUXFWXUH$OOPDWHULDOLVWDNHQGLUHFWO\IURPWKHFRPSDQLHV¶UHVSHFWLYHZHEVLWHVWKHDXWKRU¶V
notes are included in italics. The transliteration of names has changed from 2010 to 2017, and 




Board of Directors ± 11 Members 
 
The Board of Directors administers general management in the Company, save for those 
matters that are, under the Federal Companies Act, the prerogative of the General Shareholders 
Meeting. The Board of Directors assures the advancement of the goals and vision of the 















Burkhard Bergmann  
Mikhail Sereda 
 
2017 ± 11 Members  
Viktor Zubkov 
Alexey Miller 







Dimitry Patrushev  
Mikail Sereda 
Management Committee  
 
The Management Committee is a collective executive body that runs the Company on a day-
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to-day basis. The Management CommittHH FRQWULEXWHV WR WKH GUDIWLQJ RI WKH &RPSDQ\¶V
strategies and policies and sees to it that the same are properly implemented; it also oversees 
compliance with resolutions of the General Shareholders Meeting and the Board of Directors. 
The main duties of the Management Committee are to ensure reliable operation of the Unified 
*DV6XSSO\6\VWHP8*66DQGVWHDG\JDVVXSSO\WRFRQVXPHUVWRPDQDJHWKH&RPSDQ\¶V
assets so as to maximize returns, to improve internal controls and risk management, and to 
advocate WKHODZIXOULJKWVDQGLQWHUHVWVRIWKH&RPSDQ\¶VVKDUHKROGHUV 
 











Alexander Medvedev  





Kirill Seleznev  
 





















Board of Directors  
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Corporate governance information is unavailable on website. 
  






Yuri Pianykh  




Board of Directors  
 
7KH%RDUGRI'LUHFWRUVVKDOOEHWKH&RPSDQ\¶VFROOHJLDOPDQDJHPHQWERG\SHUIRUPLQJJHQHUDO
PDQDJHPHQW RI WKH &RPSDQ\¶V RSHUDWLRQV ZKLFK IXQFWLRQV VKDOO EH VSHFLILHG LQ WKH
Regulations on the Board of Directors. The functions of the Board of Directors shall include:  
Formulation of the Company development strategy and control over its implementation; 
HQVXULQJHIILFLHQWPDQDJHPHQWRIWKH&RPSDQ\FRQWURORYHUWKHDFWLYLWLHVRIWKH&RPSDQ\¶V
executive bodies and those of the management; ensuring efficiency of WKH&RPSDQ\¶VLQWHUQDO
control and risk management system; and facilitating exercise and protection of the 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶ULJKWV 
 






















Management Committee  
 
No information on Management Committee corporate governance available. 
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Board of Directors  
 
An H[HFXWLYHPHPEHURIWKH%RDUGRI'LUHFWRUVH[HFXWLYHGLUHFWRU´ is a member of the Board 
of Directors, who is an official of the Company, and who, at the same time, is a sole executive 
body and member of a collective executive body of the Company. The Board of Directors shall 
H[HUFLVHJHQHUDOPDQDJHPHQWRIWKH&RPSDQ\¶VDFWLYLWLHVZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRILWVWHUPVRI
UHIHUHQFHVWLSXODWHGE\ODZDQGWKH&RPSDQ\¶V&KDUWHU 
Thus, all non-executive members are simply members of collective bodies of the company with 
no executive power; not a member of an executive body. 
 
An independent member of the Board of Directors is a member of the Board of Directors: -  
x who within the last 3 years has not been an official (managing director) or an 
employee of the CoPSDQ\ RU DQ RIILFLDO RU DQ HPSOR\HH RI WKH &RPSDQ\¶V
managing entity;  
x ZKRLVQRWDQRIILFLDORIDQRWKHUFRPSDQ\ZKHUHDQ\RIWKH&RPSDQ\¶VRIILFLDOVLV
DPHPEHURIWKH%RDUGRI'LUHFWRUV¶&RPPLWWHHRQ6WDIIDQG5HPXQHUDWLRQV  
x who is not an affiliated person of an official (managing director) of the Company 
(an official of WKH&RPSDQ\¶VPDQDJLQJHQWLW\ 
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x who is not an affiliated person of the Company, with exception of such ground of 
affiliation as membership in the Board of Directors, and who is not an affiliated 
person of such affiliated persons either; 
x ZKRLVQRWDSDUW\WRWKH&RPSDQ\¶VOLDELOLWLHVZLWKLQFRPSOLDQFHZLWKFRQGLWLRQV
of which he may purchase property (collect cash assets) which costs 10 and more 
percent of its total annual revenue, except for collecting remuneration for 
participation in the activities of the Board of Directors;  
x who is not a major contracting party of the Company (such contracting party the 
total volume of transactions of the Company with whom for a year is equal to 10 
DQGPRUHSHUFHQWRIWKH&RPSDQ\DVVHWV¶ERRNYDOXH  
x who is not a representative of the state. 
 
2010 ± 9 Members 
Igor Sechin 
Sergei Bogdanchikov 
Vladimir Bogdanov  
Andrei Reus (Non-executive Director) 
Yuri Petrov (Non-executive Director) 
Alexander Nekipelov (Independent Member of the Board of Directors) 
Andrey Kostin (Independent Member of the Board of Directors) 
Hans-Joerg Rudolf (Independent Member of the Board of Directors) 
Nikolay Tokarev  
 












Management Committee  
 
No information of the corporate governance of the Management Committee available.  
 










2017 ± 11 Members 





Dider Casimiro  
Peter Lazarev  
Yury Narushevich 








Board of Directors  
 
Board of Directors: Board of Directors shall perform the overall management of the operations 
of the Company, except for issues assigned by the effective legislation of the Russian 
Federation and the Company Charter to the authority of the General Shareholders Meeting. 
The Board of Directors is elected annually at the general shareholders meeting. 
 













2017 ± 11 Members 
Valery Grayfer 
Ravil Maganov 











Management Committee  
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7KH0DQDJHPHQW&RPPLWWHHLVWKH&RPSDQ\¶VFROOHFWLYHH[HFXWLYHERG\ 
The Board of Directors elects the Management Committee. 
 




































Board of Directors  
 
Board of Directors: TNK-BP is governed by an eleven-member Board of Directors with four 
representatives from each of the two shareholder groups and three independent directors. 
No information on independent directors, but it is assumed that they fit the same criteria put 
forth by Rosneft. 
 
2010 ± 12 Members 
Mikhail Fridman 
Viktor Vekselberg 






Lord Robertson of Port Ellen 
Dimitri Kosolov 
Gerard Schroeder (Independent Director) 
Aleksandr Shokin (Independent Director) 
James Leng (Independent Director) 
 
Management Committee  
 
TNK-%3¶VVHQLRUPDQDJHPHQWWHDPUXQVWKHGD\-to-day operations of the company.  
Senior management team = Management Committee 
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